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A PARADOX OF AMERICAN TRAGEDY: LONG DAY’S JOURNEY 
 INTO NIGHTAND THE PROBLEM OF NEGATIVE  
EMOTION IN THEATRICAL PERFORMANCE 
 
  Jeremy Killian 
 
August 8, 2013 
 
In this dissertation I examine a philosophical problem referred to as the “paradox 
of tragedy” as it presents itself in the context of the positive reception of Eugene 
O’Neill’s Long Day’s Journey into Night.  This play depicts a harrowing day in the life of 
the Tyrone family, where each of the family members cope with failure, addiction, and 
disease.  The emotional tone is bleak and pessimistic, yet people often describe their 
responses to this tragedy in terms of pleasure, and one can easily imagine someone 
claiming to “enjoy” the play.  How is this possible?  Moreover, what motivates one to 
pursue Long Day’s Journey into Night when they would endeavor to avoid negative 
emotional stimuli in real life? 
In chapter 1 of the project, I survey a family of theories as proposed resolution of 
this problem.  I examine a theory derived from Stoic philosophy, David Hume’s 
“conversion” theory, and John Morreall’s “control” theory.  Utilizing evidence drawn 
from analytic philosophy as well as cognitive psychology, I rule each of these theories 
out.  This allows me to establish acceptable criteria for any resolution to the problem.  In 
chapters two and three, I turn my attention to the claim that Journey on the whole elicits 
vi 
 
more good than bad emotional states.  Using a method of emotional analysis proposed by 
Nöel Carroll, in chapter three, I construct a close reading of the emotional address of the 
play, concluding that the claim that the play elicits more positive emotion than negative is 
likely false. 
In chapters four and five, I construct a thematic reading of the play by first 
establishing the connection between the writing of Eugene O’Neill’s writing and the 
work of Friedrich Nietzsche.  I perform a second close reading of the play to validate a 
Nietzschian reading, and then utilize this data as a feature of my own resolution to the 
problem.  In chapter six, I conclude by presenting two theories that account for all the 
conditions I have established as a candidate solution and defend a “meta-response” style 
solution to the paradox of Journey. 
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In 1956, Long Day’s Journey into Night appeared on the American stage for the first 
time, and most heralded this play as the greatest of Eugene O’Neill’s career. John 
Chapman of the New York Daily News described the opening of the play as exploding 
“like a dazzling skyrocket over the humdrum of Broadway theatricals.”
1
  With few 
exceptions, the critical response to the play was overwhelmingly positive, with critics 
asserting that with Long Day’s Journey, “the American theatre acquires size and 
stature.”
2
  When Journey premiered in Paris, despite the fact that the theatre was without 
air-conditioning in July and the play ran from 8 PM until 1 AM, the Herald Tribune 
reported that “there was a five minute ovation, marking the most enthusiastic reception 
ever accorded an American play in France.”
3
 
 When one considers the nature of the play, a philosophical problem emerges.  The 
overwhelming response to O’Neill’s masterpiece was—and continues to be in 
contemporary performance—expressed in terms of pleasure.  There is nothing apparently 
contradictory in an audience member stating, “I really enjoyed Long Day’s Journey,” but 
how can this be the case?  The play depicts the terribly dysfunctional relationships of the 
members of the Tyrone family, each of whom struggles with some form of addiction and 
                                                     
1
 Qtd. in Jordan Miller, Playwright’s Progress: O’Neill and his Critics, (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, and 
Company, 1965), 133. 
2
 Qtd. in Brenda Murphy, Plays in Production: Long Day’s Journey into Night, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 47. 
3
 Ibid., 48. 
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malady, each of whom is at once oppressed and the oppressor of the other four members .  
When one interrogates her emotional response to the play, she is likely to recognize that 
she experiences so-called “negative” emotions as a result of the events depicted.  If she 
feels empathy toward these characters.
1
  By negative emotion, I refer to the fact that the 
viewer finds herself experiencing anger, despair, and pity, emotions whose qualia are 
typically those we wish to avoid in our daily lives.  Through the course of the play, the 
audience member receives little relief from these emotions.  The philosophical problem, 
then, is how to understand what goes on when one characterizes the experience of 
Journey as one of enjoyment. Moreover, why would an audience member willingly 
subject herself to the negative emotions aroused by Long Day’s Journey into Night when 
she would not likely subject herself to such negative emotion in real life?  
 Students of David Hume’s aesthetics will recognize this problem as a localized 
version of what has come to be called “The Paradox of tragedy,” Hume describes the 
phenomenon of tragic enjoyment in his essay “Of Tragedy:”   
It seems an unaccountable pleasure which the spectators of a well-written tragedy 
receive from sorrow, terror, anxiety, and other passions that are in themselves 
disagreeable and uneasy. The more they are touched and affected, the more are 
they delighted with the spectacle…the whole art of the poet is employed in 
rousing and supporting the compassion and indignation, the anxiety and 
resentment, of his audience.  They are pleased in proportion as they are affected, 
and never so happy as when they employ tears, sobs, and cries to give vent to 
                                                     
1
 It is important to note that not all viewers experience such empathy toward the characters in the play.  
Thomas R. Dash, a reviewer of the play for Women’s Wear Daily, writes that “For the cognoscenti and for 
devotees of O’Neill, these flagellations and psychological penetrations into the pitiful ruins of a family may 
prove stimulating.  But for the neutral and dispassionate observer and for the rank and file of theatregoers, 
‘A Long Day’s Journey into Night’ may prove a long night’s journey without too much daylight.” (Qtd. in 
Jordan Miller, Playwright’s Progress: O’Neill and the Critics, 136).  Here it is not necessary for me to 
defend that all people experience negative emotions with respect to the representation of the Tyrone family; 
instead, I am attempting to resolve the problem of how anyone may experience a positive response 
despite—and perhaps because of—the negative emotions she experiences toward the Tyrones and the 
world of Journey. 
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In other words, when one observes tragedy in art or literature, often one is most thrilled 
by the horror it depicts.  Why do decent, generally moral people seem to enjoy the 
representation of human suffering at its most egregious level when it is placed before 
them in an artistic context?  This question transcends mere theatrical tragedy and seems 
to have far-reaching implications.  Much art represents, at least in part, elements of the 
world that are morally repugnant.  If one finds these elements of the world displeasing 
and seeks to avoid them, why does she seem to enjoy their representation in an aesthetic 
context?   
The paradox Hume believes he has uncovered might be formulated this way: 
1.People avoid situations that arouse pain, and pursue situations that arouse 
pleasure. 
 2.People experience pain in response to tragedy. 
 3.People pursue tragedy. 
 
According to most critics, the Humean formation of this paradox (as stated above) relies 
on a dubious assumption regarding human motivation and action. Alex Neill and Flint 
Schier point out that for Hume, the “chief spring and actuating principle of the human 
mind is pleasure and pain.”
3
 On Hume’s view, every action that humans take is motivated 
by a desire to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. It is unremarkable then, that Hume believes 
he has uncovered a significant problem in the human experience of tragedy. “From such a 
                                                     
2
 David Hume, “Of Tragedy,” in Hume: Selected Essays, S. Copley and A. Edgar (Eds.), (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 126.  
3
 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Shelby-Bigge, 2
nd
 edn. rev. P.H. Nidduch (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1978), 574. 
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perspective, the fact that we keep returning to tragedy, that we value it as highly as we 
do, can only be explained in terms of its being a source of pleasure for us.”
4
   
Neill argues that Hume’s hedonic assumption is an outdated mode of describing 
human motivation; there are more sophisticated explanations that describe why humans 
pursue reward than simple hedonism.  If this strong hedonic assumption is removed, the 
paradox is significantly weakened; however, the problem does not altogether dissolve.  
Generally, psychologists assume the hedonic principle is a good representation of human 
motivation, if one broadens her definition of “pain” to include “negative emotions,” (fear, 
anger, and sadness) and expands her definition of “pleasure” to include “positive 
emotions.”
5
  All things being equal, people generally pursue experiences which provide 
positive emotional responses over experiences that elicit negative responses, unless there 
is some overwhelming reason they should do otherwise.
 6
   As this this is the case, the 
paradox might be better formulated (although weakened) this way: 
1.People generally avoid situations that arouse negative emotions, and pursue 
situations that arouse positive emotions. 
 2.People have negative emotional responses to tragedy. 
 3.People pursue tragedy. 
 
Construed for the project at hand, the paradox reads: 
 
1.People generally avoid situations that arose negative emotions, and pursue 
situations that arouse positive emotions. 
2.People have negative emotional responses to performances of Long Day’s 
Journey into Night. 
 3.People pursue performances of Long Day’s Journey into Night. 
 
                                                     
4
 Alex Neill, “Hume’s Singular Phenomenon,” British Journal of Aesthetics 30 (April 1999), 121. 
5
 To be clear, the value judgments “positive” and “negative” refer to the qualia of the experience of these 
emotional states.  Positive emotions are those emotions we claim to “enjoy” in our daily lives, while 
negative emotions are those we attempt to avoid in daily life, and the latter may even be construed as 
“painful.”  From an evolutionary standpoint however, it is likely that all emotions are “positive” in that they 
have evolved as principles of attraction and repulsion in the context of survival.   
6
 Eduardo Andrade and Joel B. Cohen, “On the Consumption of Negative Feelings,” Journal of Consumer 
Research 34: 3 (March 2007), 284. 
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Both (1) and (3) appear to be uncontroversial.  In order to resolve this problem, most 
philosophers have taken up the task of modifying (2) by offering some caveat to its claim.  
Ultimately, the question is what motivates audiences to pursue Long Day’s Journey into 
Night?    
In order to tease out an acceptable modification to second statement of the 
paradox, I will examine and eliminate a number of prominent solutions to the paradox.  
In the first three chapters, I will examine four theories that share a common feature.  One 
strategy that has been employed to undercut (2) is to argue that audiences do not in fact 
experience significant negative emotions as a result of viewing Long Day’s Journey into 
Night. It does seem, on initial inspection, that the sort of sorrow one might feel when she 
views Journey is appreciably different than the sort of sorrow she would feel if she 
encountered similar emotional stimuli in her actual life.  There is a family of theories who 
take this intuition seriously and attempt to deny that tragedy really makes viewers feel all 
that bad.  In Chapter One, I will consider three modifications of (2) along such lines, and 
I will demonstrate that because of the inadequacies of each approach to account for the 
experience of “tragic emotions,” none of them can get off the ground as a description of 
an audience’s experience of Long Day’s Journey. After showing the deficiencies in 
approaches that deny the existence of significant negative emotions in response to 
putatively painful art, in chapters Two and Three, I will then explicitly demonstrate, 
through a detailed analysis of Long Day’s Journey into Night, that on the whole, this play 
is designed to elicit powerful negative emotional states. In so doing, I will refute the 
theory that on the whole, Journey does not elicit negative emotional states.  The method 
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that I utilize in these chapters will establish criteria whereby any potential solution to this 
paradox might be measured. 
Chapters four and five mark a disciplinary shift in this project.  Any solution to 
the problem of negative emotions proposed by a specific artifact ought to include a close 
examination of the artifact itself.  Such an analysis is particularly significant in this 
project because, as I will show, the theme of the play will become a component of the 
solution to the problem.   This theme emerges when one contextualizes Journey as a 
product of O’Neill’s philosophical interests.  Eugene O’Neill’s affinity for the philosophy 
of Friedrich Nietzsche has been well-documented, with a number of biographers pointing 
out that though many O’Neill scholars have noted the influence of Thus Spake 
Zarathustra in many of O’Neill’s plays, I will argue that the paradigm Nietzsche 
describes in Birth of Tragedy serves as an invaluable interpretive aid for reading the play.   
One key theme Nietzsche develops is the power of tragedy to enable those who 
participate in it to find themselves in community with others, and I contend that this is 
precisely what O’Neill intends to embody onstage.  I will show that not only does BoT 
provide an important reading of Journey, O’Neill also intends to deliver an early 
Nietzschian message to the audience: a life of positive affirmation of one’s suffering can 
only be achieved in interdependent community with others.  The development of this sub-
thesis will allow me to establish a powerful reading of the play in chapter five that 
illuminates what I believe to be the central theme O’Neill displays to the audience. 
In chapter six, I will apply the criteria established in the first five chapters to two 
potential solutions to the problem of Journey.  I will demonstrate that both “rich 
experience” and “meta-response” theories of tragic pleasure provide the sturdiest 
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accounts of the emotions elicited by Journey, and I will argue that there is good reason to 
prefer a “meta-response” style theory over and above the “rich experience” theory.  My 
ultimate claim is that viewers pursue Long Day’s Journey into Night because it provides 
an occasion whereby viewers experience negative emotional states while being 
compensated by a positive emotional response directed toward the community created in 
the event.  
There are significant challenges to be faced in constructing a solution to the 
problem of Long Day’s Journey into Night. Though perhaps the most popular solution to 
the paradox of tragedy in contemporary aesthetics is Alex Neill’s “rich experience” 
theory, no clear consensus has emerged in the discussion as to the best solution to the 
problem.  The paradox of tragedy seems to be an open question.  This may be the case for 
at least two reasons: (a)Most theorists working on the paradox of tragedy assume that 
there is a single all-encompassing solution to the paradox that explains why people 
pursue negative emotion in all art.  In this case, the “paradox of tragedy” really ought to 
be referred to as “the paradox of negative emotion in art.” A philosopher like Susan 
Feagin, for example, assumes her solution to the paradox should hold whether the viewer 
is watching a theatrical tragedy, attending a horror movie, or looking at a particularly 
violent Caravaggio painting. .  She writes, “my remarks do not apply merely to the 
narrow, Aristotelian sense of tragedy, in which sense there is a question about whether 
such works as, e.g., Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman or Eugene O’Neil’s A Long 
Day’s Journey into Night are tragedies. I am concerned with, to put it bluntly, the class of 





  However, as Alex Neill points out, people are motivated to participate 
in different genres of art for a variety of reasons.  People see plays, for example, for 
different reasons than they look at sculptures. Therefore it seems easy to provide counter-
examples to any grand theory of negative emotion in art by simply analyzing audience 
response to one or several genres that do not seem compatible with the theory presented.  
Good responses to the paradox of tragedy ought to be more focused on individual genre; 
for example, a response to the paradox of tragedy with respect to religious art must 
consider problems of religious phenomenology and the constraints of religious tradition, 
while a response to the paradox of tragedy with respect to sculpture must consider 
problems native to that discipline. It also may be important to examine genres of art and 
particular work by taking into consideration the cultural and historical moment from 
which they emerge, instead of opting for more universalized motivational accounts. 
Largely, these approaches have not been explored.
8
 This dissertation focuses itself one 
artifact, in the hopes that a localized solution might pave the way for more generalized 
solutions to the problem. 
The second reason there seems to be little consensus on the problem of negative 
emotion in art is that (b)most philosophers of art  are no longer strongly committed  to a 
strong cognitivism of emotion  in the current dialogue.  Cognitivist understandings of 
emotions assert that emotions “can be dealt with by a psychology whose main theoretical 
entities are the beliefs and desires that feature in everyday explanations of people’s 
                                                     
7
 Susan Feagin, “The Pleasures of Tragedy,” (American Philosophical Quarterly, 20, 1: November 1983), 
96. 
8
 There does seem to be some progress in this field, however.  More focused approaches such as James 
Harold’s “Mixed Feelings: Conflicts in Emotional Responses to Film,” (Midwest Studies in Philosophy 
34:1, September 2010, 280-294), reflect a much more narrow approach to the problem—in the case of his 





  Emotions, on this view, should be understood as a kind of thought able to be 
communicated in strong propositional statements (i.e. “I am jealous of x because he has 
y.”). On cognitive theories, emotions are strongly intentional—that is, directed toward 
some object (often referred to as an “intentional object”) and occur because of a person’s 
beliefs, judgments, or construals of that object. Additionally, in many cognitivist theories, 
a high value is placed upon the truth or falsehood of such propositional statements, with 
many cognitivists asserting that in order to have emotions toward something, a high 
criterion of belief must be met with respect to the intentional objects of such feelings. In a 
cognitivist mode, the paradox of tragedy is most sharp, because the problem seems to 
assert that one can have both a positive and negative feeling (perhaps even 
simultaneously!) toward a single intentional object—namely, the work of art eliciting 
such feelings.  This is further complicated by the fact that these emotions are aroused by 
fictional entities and events that are clearly not “real” in the traditional sense.   
A cognitivist ought to be very motivated to provide a solution to the paradox, 
because its implications seem to undermine key features of her theory of emotion.  For 
example, the cognitivist has to make sense of the how seemingly opposite propositional 
statements might be made about our interaction with tragedy: “I feel fear and pity toward 
Long Day’s Journey into Night,” and “I feel pleasure toward Long Day’s Journey into 
Night.”  If these statements both accurately characterize our experience of tragedy, it 
appears we have reached a limit with respect to how language can describe emotional 
content. If emotions are a kind of thought based upon belief, one ought to be able to 
semantically describe the response to tragedy without having to make two contradictory 
statements.  A cognitivist also has to account for the kind of judgments, beliefs, or 
                                                     
9
 Paul E. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997), 2. 
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construals about tragedy one must have in order to derive both pleasure and pain from its 
consumption.  
In recent years, however, strong cognitive theories of emotions such as those 
proposed by Robert Solomon or Martha Nussbaum have fallen out of fashion in favor of 
“perceptual” or “feeling” theories of emotions.  For example, Jesse Prinz, heavily 
utilizing contemporary methods of experimental philosophy, defends a modified version 
of the James-Lange theory of emotion that asserts that emotions are “perceptions of 
bodily change.”
10
 In other words, emotions ought best be understood as “embodied 
appraisals,” perceptions by the mind that the body has encountered, to borrow James’ 
terminology, something exciting.
11
 Prinz’s theory, as well as other feeling theories, 
denudes the paradox of tragedy by asserting that the problem is largely a conceptual one, 
brought on by thinking of emotions as first and foremost containing propositional 
content, instead of initially as perceptions of bodily stimulation that are later evaluated by 
cognitive processes of the mind.  In this description of emotions, the formal object of the 
emotion (the quality an intentional object must possess in order to elicit such an emotion; 
for example, an intentional object of fear must possess the formal object “danger”), does 
not require the cognitivist high standard of belief on the part of the person who is 
emotionally responding to the intentional object of the emotion.
12
 Given that most 
solutions of the paradox of tragedy assume at least a moderate cognitivist theory of 
emotion, it is unsurprising that in recent years, few new theories have been offered.  
Someone like Prinz, for example, might assert that we feel negative emotions toward 
                                                     
10
 For a concise understanding of James’ theory, one might refer to his essay “What is an Emotion?” where 
he famously states “we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and 
not that we cry, strike, or tremble because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be.” 
11
 Jesse Prinz, “Embodied Emotions,” in Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotion, 
Ed. Robert Solomon, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 55. 
12
 Dimasio claims this, but Prinz attempts to retain a high standard for the formal object in his model. 
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tragedy only incidentally, because we have built an “elicitation file” throughout our lives 
in response to certain negative stimuli, so that when we encounter a new negative 
situation in the form of tragedy, we respond to such a situation out of a kind of emotional 
habituation.  Here, two different processes are occurring, a somatic reaction (the initial 
negative response) and a reaction that can be described semantically (the pleasure we 
take in the event), therefore the seeming conflict seems to weaken significantly.  If 
“feeling” theories best describe emotions, such solutions, though a bit mundane, are 
certainly plausible.   
Though the challenges described above have led to an interpretative stalemate, the 
paradox of tragedy is a compelling, and I believe, solvable dilemma.  In my survey of the 
literature on the paradox, I have encountered few lengthy discussions on the subject that 
take seriously either (a) or (b), and in my dissertation project I intend to utilize a 
particular artifact, the play Long Day’s Journey into Night, as a means to test my own, 
albeit very limited, solution to the paradox. 
Readers unfamiliar with the literature surrounding the paradox of tragedy but 
loosely familiar with Aristotle’s Poetics might notice and complain that I do not discuss 
Aristotelian catharsis as a potential solution to the problem posed of emotion posed here.  
After all, does Aristotle not offer a coherent account of tragedy, asserting that its telos is 
the “purging of the emotions through the arousal of fear and pity?”  There are several 
problems with an assertion of catharsis as a potential solution to the Paradox of tragedy, 
chief among them is the fact that, as Stephen Halliwell points out, despite what Aristotle 
provides, it is unclear what catharsis actually is, and there is little interpretive agreement 
12 
 
in Aristotilean literature about this concept as well.
13
 In contemporary culture, however, 
the common conception of catharsis is that the term refers to the phenomenon of people 
reporting feeling better after having a good cry.  Unfortunately, there is no empirical 
evidence to support the claim that such an effect actually exists.
14
 Because the concept of 
catharsis is so fuzzy, and the empirical evidence from cognitive and behavioral 
psychology does not seem to support its existence, it seems an insurmountable task to 
utilize catharsis as a component of a theory of tragic pleasure.  Therefore, although 
Aristotle’s understanding of tragic emotion is likely insightful in certain ways, I do not 
utilize his approach in this essay. 
 Readers more familiar with the paradox of tragedy will likely notice two more 
omissions in the discussion that follows, and these omissions might raise questions about 
my methodology in crafting a solution to the Paradox of Journey.  First, one might fairly 
point out that my discussion does not rely on a specific conception of what constitutes an 
emotional state.  In current philosophical discourse on emotion, there is some controversy 
about whether emotions should be classified as primarily mental events or physiological 
responses to stimuli. In chapter two, I will discuss in detail the divide between theories of 
emotion referred to as cognitivist and those known as “feeling” theories and how these 
theoretical distinctions might impact an analysis of Long Day’s Journey into Night, but 
here it is unnecessary to stake a claim in this debate, for at least three reasons.  Harold 
points out that those thinking about the problem of negative emotion in art need not make 
                                                     
13
 The Poetics of Aristotle, trans. Stephen Halliwell (University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 90. 
14
 For more on this, the reader might consult either (or both) Paul Bloom, How Pleasure Works: The New 
Science of Why we Like What we Like, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company 2010), 192; or Clark 
McCauley, “When Screen Violence is not Attractive” in Why We Watch: the Attractions of Violent 
Entertainment, Edited by Jeffrey Goldstein, (New York, Oxford University Press), 1998. 147-149. 
13 
 
a choice between cognitivist and “feeling” (also known as “Jamesian”) descriptions of 
emotions when crafting a solution, 
First, for all the differences between the two approaches, there are many 
similarities. The cognitivists grant that physiological response is an 
important part of emotional experience, and the Jamesians agree that 
emotions can and often do lead us to cognize the world differently. They 
agree that in a wide range of cases, bodily feeling and belief are both very 
important to emotion. Second, the kinds of emotional conflicts that are of 
interest here can arise under either theory: for the cognitivists, it arises as 
a conflict between judgments, and for the Jamesians, it arises as a conflict 




In other words, the paradox seems to stand, regardless of one’s view on the nature of 
emotional life. 
 The final reason one need not commit herself to a particular view of emotion 
when working on this problem lies in the way in which the paradox has been formulated 
here.  If one were to formulate the paradox of negative emotion and Long Day’s Journey 
into Night as follows, she would likely need to defend a robust depiction of the emotions 
to craft a solution: 
1.People of normal mental constitution do not enjoy experiencing 
sadness, fear, and disgust. 
2.People of normal mental constitution experience sadness, fear, and 
disgust when they watch Long Day’s Journey into Night. 
3.People of normal mental constitution enjoy watching performances of 
Long Day’s Journey into Night. 
 
This “hedonic” formulation of the paradox compels a solution that is robust with specific 
depictions of what emotions really are, but such a formulation is outside the scope of my 
project.  I have formulated this problem in terms of motivation instead of hedonism, and 
though a solution to the above paradox that relies on precision in emotional vocabulary 
might help solve the hedonic version of this paradox, I hope to craft a solution that does 
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 James Harold, “Mixed Feelings: Conflicts in Emotional Responses to Film,” Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy 34, (September 2010), 281. 
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not rely on what I believe to be still a burgeoning field where consensus has not yet been 
reached.   I believe that the motivational solution I will ultimately propose will stand 
regardless of shifts in approaches within emotion theory. 
 The third major complaint one might have about my approach to solving the 
paradox of tragedy is that I will not develop a robust explanation for how fictional 
narratives elicit emotional states sans the requisite beliefs the viewer has about the reality 
of such events.  There is a great deal of literature regarding the so-called “Paradox of 
Fiction” that could be explicated and utilized on this point, and one might suggest that my 
solution should refer to these approaches.  I deem such discussion, though tangentially 
relevant to my thesis, as an unnecessary avenue for providing a coherent reformulation of 
(2) for two reasons: First, the scope of this project focuses, as I have pointed out above, 
on the motivational component of this problem, and not the hedonic component of the 
problem.  The Paradox of Fiction is primarily concerned with the affective states a work 
of fiction elicits, and I am primarily concerned with the reasons one would subject herself 
to such conditions.  Secondly—and relatedly—though there may be little agreement 
about how this engagement of emotion occurs with respect to fictional narrative, there is 
little doubt that fiction does elicit emotion.  How best to characterize such experiences is 
a separate (though related) question that is also beyond the bounds of the discussion at 
hand. 
As I have mentioned above, the Paradox of tragedy has fallen out of the 
mainstream discussion in philosophical aesthetics, and I believe that a dissertation-length 
inspection of the issue in terms of Long Day’s Journey into Night will provide not only a 
plausible solution to the problem but also a method whereby the problem might be 
15 
 
examined in other artistic contexts and genres.  Not only will this paper be relevant to 
those with an interest in philosophical aesthetics, it will also interest Theatre Studies 
scholars and practitioners as well.  For those interested in interpreting or presenting the 
play, I believe the close connection that I make between Journey and Birth of Tragedy 
provides an important thematic through-line that to my knowledge has not been made 
explicit in the scholarship surrounding the play.  More generally, I believe my solution to 
the problem of emotion and Long Day’s Journey provides a powerful reason audiences 
should participate in difficult theatre such as Journey:  there is a unique positive 
emotional response one can derive from being a part of a performance of Long Day’s 









In the introduction to this essay, I have formulated the paradox presented by the 
positive reception of Long Day’s Journey into Night as follows: 
1.People generally avoid situations that arose negative emotions, and pursue 
situations that arouse positive emotions. 
2.People have negative emotional responses to performances of Long Day’s 
Journey into Night. 
 3.People pursue performances of Long Day’s Journey into Night. 
 
One way one might resolve the problem is by denying that people have negative 
emotional responses to tragedy.  Indeed, a question worth asking is whether tragedy 
really make us feel all that bad?  We might cry or feel pity for the fate of a tragic hero or 
heroine, but can we really feel as badly about the fate of Ophelia or Antigone as we might 
about a victim of horrible violence in the real world?  A family of proposed solutions to 
the paradox of tragedy suggest that such negative aesthetic experiences are not 
significantly similar to real-world pain.  In the following chapter, I will examine and 
critique three proposed solutions to the problem of negative emotion and Long Day’s 
Journey into Night drawn from the conventional philosophical discussion of the Paradox 
of tragedy, and I will conclude that while each approach does have some explanatory 
scope and power, there is at least one feature of the phenomenon each of these solutions 
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fails to sufficiently describe.  The common thread that runs through each of the theories 
that follows is that each of these theories denies that viewers experience significant 
negative emotional states in response to tragedy generally and can be ruled out as options 
that apply to viewer’s experience of Journey specifically.  As each of these explanations 
fail, their critiques will clarify the criteria a robust solution to the problem of negative 
emotion and Journey for which it ought to account. 
 
1.2 “Better You than Me” 
There is a potentially ugly resolution to the problem of negative emotion in art, a 
resolution is perhaps inspired by ancient Stoic philosophy
1
 and is seemingly verified in 
the contemporary world on a daily basis.  Smuts points to an all-too-familiar phenomenon 
from daily life, “one of the obvious drawbacks of living in a commuter city is the 
inevitable traffic jams that result from rubbernecking—drivers slowing down to get a 
good look at an accident, hoping to catch a glimpse of a gruesome scene.”
2
  It is a grim 
reality that people have strange curiosity about and often seemingly derive pleasure from 
witnessing the misfortune and suffering of others. Lucretius asserts that people do this 
“not because it is joy or delight that anyone should be storm-tossed, but because it is a 
pleasure to observe what troubles you yourself are free.”
3
  Perhaps however, beneath the 
veneer of culture and compassion, one possible explanation for our enjoyment of others 
misfortune is that most people are secret sadists who take pleasure in suffering that is not 
their own. Though this is a sobering thought, such an account provides an explanation for 
                                                     
1
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2
 Aaron Smuts, “Art and Negative Affect,” Journal of Aesthetic Education 41:3 (Fall 2007),  
3
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audience’s attraction to tragedy: people watch tragedy because they enjoy watching 
others experience pain. 
 Such a theory denies that audiences experience any negative emotion as a result 
of tragedy.  When one watches Long Day’s Journey into Night, for example, she 
ultimately does not feel pity or despair for the Tyrone family, but instead experiences 
pleasure as she watches them suffer, perhaps because she believes that they have each 
done something to deserve it.  This approach to the nature of tragic emotions would 
require the following re-formulation of (2): 
Revised Statement of PoT: Because people enjoy watching the suffering 
of others, they experience positive emotional states when viewing 
performances of Long Day’s Journey into Night. 
 
If this assessment represents the reality of tragic experience, a consequence of this is that 
the morality of watching Long Day’s Journey into Night would be called into question.  
Most mainstream ethical theories would correctly criticize a practice that caters to human 
tendencies to place others in any sort of pain for the gratification of an audience.  If this 
Stoic position best characterizes what happens when an audience pursues tragedy, 
perhaps performances of Long Day’s Journey into Night ought be viewed with the same 
derision with which most Westerners view cock-fighting.  One defending the Stoic 
position on ethical grounds might assert that viewing Long Day’s Journey is a harmless 
substitute for actually watching others suffer in the real world, however this position 
seems a difficult one to sustain while holding to most conventional moral frameworks.  
Most ethical theories would not find simulated cockfighting an acceptable substitute for 
watching the real thing, so how can one morally justify simulated suffering in the theatre? 
19 
 
 Though this theory has ethical costs, those costs do not rule this theory out as a 
possible resolution to the paradox of tragedy. However, the “Better You than Me” 
approach fails because it does not adequately account for the fact that people actually 
report feeling a great deal of pity and sympathy for those who suffer in an aesthetic 
tragedy.  It would be strange for a viewer to report pleasure when watching Oedipus 
because Oedipus “got what was coming to him.”  Instead, the viewer suffers with the 
tragic hero because he recognizes the disgust and shame Oedipus faces..  A significant 
feature of tragic power is the capacity of tragedy to elicit pity for and outrage at the fate 
of those who suffer, whether that suffering is just or unjust.   Further, even if the Stoics 
are correct in assessing the pleasure we take in the suffering of others who are not close 
to us in the real world (i.e. traffic accidents), it does not follow that we take the same sort 
of pleasure in aesthetic tragedy. 
 A study performed at the University of Alberta lends support to the claim that the 
aesthetic representation of suffering actually heightens a viewer’s ability to experience 
empathy.  Participants classified as typically “low empathizers” (young male adults) were 
presented with several narratives that portrayed melodramatic situations designed to elicit 
an empathetic response.  When these participants were informed the narratives they were 
reading were reporting actual events, these low empathizers reported very little emotional 
response to the characters within the stories.  When, however, the participants were 
informed that the events and characters depicted within the narratives were the product of 
an author’s creativity, this group of young men reported significantly higher emotional 
responses—responses such as sadness and pity—because they felt freer to do so (likely 
because of gender stereotypes such as “big boys don’t cry”) than they would have if they 
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were responding to a real-world scenario.
4
 Because of the perceived artificiality of the 
narrative, men felt stronger feelings of empathy toward the characters portrayed than they 
would have if they perceived the account as factual. While one study does not provide 
exhaustive empirical evidence that fictional accounts elicit more empathetic responses 
than real world situations, this study does suggest that the Stoic intuition about people 
deriving pleasure from other’s pain does not apply to the emotions one experiences when 
she views tragedy, much less Long Day’s Journey into Night, because even if the Stoic 
assumption is correct about people’s experiences in the real world, the aesthetic nature of 
the emotional encounter one has with the play produces more empathy and pity than real 
life stimulus.   
 In order to sustain the Stoic approach as a resolution to the Paradox of tragedy, 
one would have to deny the reality of pity, empathy, and similar emotions elicited by 
aesthetic narratives. When a viewer says, “I really felt sorry for Edmund Tyrone,” the 
Stoic reply would be to deny that the viewer is accurately reporting her feelings.  This 
denial flies in the face of the plainest experience of tragedy, and renders such statements 
about empathetic emotions elicited by tragedy absurd.  Since viewers do experience real 
attachments to the characters who suffer in tragedy (hence the viewer’s continued 
engagement with the narrative), the Stoic position cannot be a viable solution to the 
problem of negative emotions and Long Day’s Journey into Night. 
  
1.3 Tragic Conversion 
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Another solution that denies audiences experience negative emotion when viewing 
tragedy is Hume’s own, as presented in “Of Tragedy.”  Hume wonders about the 
phenomenon of tragic enjoyment.   Why is it that in an aesthetic situation, viewers 
experience pleasure by viewing a tragedy, though they are moved to tears of fear and pity 
by the portrayal of those horrible events that unfold before them?   How can one “enjoy” 
negative emotions stimulated through theatrical tragedy? 
 Hume begins by examining a solution to the problem credited to French 
philosopher Jean-Baptiste Dubos.  Dubos, according to Hume, asserts that “nothing is in 
general so disagreeable to the mind as a languid, listless state of indolence into which it 
falls upon the removal of all passion and occupation.”
5
  If this is the case, then any 
emotional state is more pleasant than dull boredom.  If one is moved to tears by the 
viewing of a dark tragedy, she has found a cure to the malaise of day-to-day life, and the 
resulting emotion will be welcome to the viewer. 
 Though Hume thinks that Dubos’ theory possesses some explanatory force, 
ultimately this solution does not provide a robust enough account for his taste.  He points 
out that there is a significant difference between the stimulation one receives from 
fictional portrayals of negative events and similar negative events experienced in the 
actual world. No matter how bored one may be, it is unlikely that a normal human being 
would wish to witness egregious suffering in the real world, no matter how bored she 
was.  No decent person would wish to observe a violent murder, for example, as a cure 
for boredom.   However, such an event portrayed fictionally can bring intense pleasure to 
the viewer.  Dubos’ solution does not explain the different responses one might 
experience given the fictionality or reality of the situation. 
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 Laying aside Dubos’ proposed solution, Hume next considers the solution offered 
by Monsieur Fontenelle.  Fontenelle’s solution resembles contemporary “control” 
theories.  Fontenelle asserts that pleasure and pain do not differ so much in their causes.  
Pleasure and pain are very closely related, so that “sorrow soft and agreeable” might be 
called a mild form of pleasure. In the case of theatrical tragedy, though we are moved 
toward the fate of the tragic hero, we are constantly aware that we are watching a play, 
and in this context we can experience the enjoyment of watching the play, further 
heightened by our sorrow for the fate of the tragic hero.  This theory might be referred to 




 Hume critiques this solution because it fails to account for the enjoyment one 
might take from the description of actual horrific events.  As an example of this, Hume 
discusses Cicero’s narrative of the Sicilian captains by the Verres.  Apparently, though 
this account is quite graphic and describes actual events that occurred in the real world, 
the listener is able to immensely enjoy the retelling of this story.  Were Fontenelle 
correct, the listener could not get pleasure from this retelling, because the listener would 
realize these grave events actually occurred in real life.   
 From this objection, Hume is able to draw his own solution to the paradox of 
tragedy.  He writes: 
this extraordinary effect proceeds from that very eloquence with which 
the melancholy scene is represented.  The genius required to paint objects 
in a lively manner, the art employed in collecting all the pathetic 
circumstances, the judgment displayed in disposing them: the exercise, I 
say, of these noble talents, together with the force of expression and 
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beauty of oratorial numbers …diffuse the highest satisfaction on the 




Here, Hume claims that the viewer obtains pleasure not from the negative events that are 
portrayed on the tragic stage, but that her pleasure comes from the aesthetic quality of the 
portrayal of such events.  It is the eloquence with which the author expresses the painful 
circumstances of tragic events that pleases the viewer. 
 Elisa Galgut explains that Hume’s theory of tragic conversion relies on his 
understanding of the emotions as communicated in his analysis of the passions.  She 
writes that “for Hume, an emotion is comprised of three distinct entities: an ideational 
content (which consists of a propositional attitude directed toward an intentional object), 
an affect, and a quantity of energy.”
8
  To illustrate, Galgut provides a Biblical example.  
On a Humean account, “Adam feels pleasure of a certain degree in relation to the object 
of his affection, that is, Eve.”
9
  Adam’s propositional attitude toward Eve is love, the 
affect of this emotion (the phenomenological experience of the emotion) is pleasure, and 
the quantity of the emotion is the degree of intensity with which he feels this emotion 
toward her.     
 The eloquence of a well-written tragedy transforms the subordinate emotion 
(sorrow or pity) into a predominant experience of joy.  The propositional attitude and 
intentional object of the audience’s attention shifts away from the horror of the play to 
the beauty with which it is written, and the degree of intensity with which one felt the 
original horror and pity is now redirected powerfully toward this beauty.
10
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   Hume provides no description of how this occurs, however, and the narrative 
here reads more like a supposition than a formula (more will be said on this below).  He 
does offer some evidence that seems to support his claim, however.  This support is 
presented indirectly, in that he provides examples in which passions aroused by lesser 
emotions rouse the predominant emotions.  For example, Hume points out that “novelty” 
is generally considered an “agreeable” experience, but if one experiences an emotional 
state brought on by some new negative experience, the pain of that experience is 
heightened by the newness of it.  In this way, the lesser passion is “converted” to the 
greater passion.  Similarly, Hume points out that if a storyteller wishes to increase the 
dramatic impact of an event, she often can utilize suspense or “delay” to heighten the 
audience’s response to that event.  In Othello Act 3. Sceme 3, Othello’s jealousy is 
accentuated by the emotion of impatience.   The greater passion (jealousy) is heightened 
by the lesser one (impatience).  
 Hume continues to provide examples of the greater passion being somehow 
supported and transformed by the subordinate.  He writes that parents are often most 
affectionately tied to the child who gives them the most grief.  He also notes that there is 
no single factor that endears one to her friend than that friend’s death.  Hume then points 
out that jealousy is an emotion that provides a great deal of support for the dominant 
emotion love.   
                                                                                                                                                              
interpretation.  He claims that “Hume’s view is rather that our experience of tragedy is made pleasurable 
overall through the infusion of pleasure from the aesthetic qualities of the work, even though some portions 
of the overall experience are painful.  The sorrow is not made pleasant, though our overall experience of 
tragedy may be.”  While Yanal does offer a reasonable argument for this claim, his view is certainly a 
minority interpretation of Hume and defies the fact that Hume explicitly claims that sorrow is transformed 
into pleasure.  At this point in the essay, I wish to acknowledge this variant interpretation, but I will only 




 Hume’s final piece of evidence to support the claim that subordinate emotions 
might be converted into dominant ones is drawn from Pliny the Elder’s Natural History, 
in which Pliny notes that the greatest works of art are often unfinished.  If one discovers 
that a sculptor has died before completing a sculpture, somehow that sculpture is more 
aesthetically compelling than other works. Pliny writes, “our very grief for that curious 
hand, which had been stopped by death, is an addition increase (sic) to our pleasure.”
11
 
Pliny here seems to validate Hume’s assertion; the sorrow one might experience in 
relation to the loss of the artist somehow brings further delight to her appreciation of the 
unfinished work.   
 Hume believes that these examples confirm the essential element of his argument, 
particularly that subordinate emotions provide additional intensity for the dominant 
emotional state.  He writes,  
the force of imagination, the energy of expression, the power of numbers, 
the charms of imitation; all these are naturally, of themselves, delightful 
to the mind: and when the object presented lays hold of some affection, 
the pleasure still rises upon us, by the conversion of the subordinate 
movement into that which is predominant.   The passion, though perhaps, 
naturally, and when excited by the simple appearance of the real object, it 
may be painful; yet is so smoothed, softened, and mollified, when raised 




In the case of the paradox of tragedy, though the scenario presented to the viewer outside 
an aesthetic context might be painful to the viewer, within the realm of theatrical 
performance, for example, the viewer’s dominating pleasure in imitation is reinforced by 
the intensity of the painful emotions elicited by tragic events unfolding onstage.  To 
support this claim, Hume offers an additional counter-example.  He writes of a parent 
who has lost his child.  In this scenario, the parent’s dominant emotion is one of pain, and 
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were one to “exaggerate, with all the force of elocution, the irreparable loss,”
13
 that 
parent’s despair would be significantly heightened by the use of the imagination.  In this 
scenario, the intensity of the subordinate emotion, pleasure in imitation, has added to the 
intensity of the dominant emotional state, grief.  
Certainly something about Hume’s argument rings familiar, but does he provide a 
coherent narrative that explains a viewer’s engagement with Long Day’s Journey into 
Night?  In order to put his view to the test, one might formulate Hume’s revision of (2) as 
follows: 
Revised Statement of PoT: Because of the aesthetic beauty of Long 
Day’s Journey into Night, the energy of  people’s negative emotional 
responses to the performances of the play are converted to a powerful 
positive emotional response to the play. 
 
 Though Hume’s examples seem to appeal to intuitions about the nature of 
emotions, ultimately, his version of (2) fails in at least three ways. First of all, Hume fails 
to provide a satisfying description of the mechanism which makes such a conversion 
possible.  What components are necessary to transform the intensity of a powerful 
emotion from one valence to another?  His claim that “the force of imagination, the 
energy of expression, the power of numbers, the charms of imitation,” somehow cause 
this transformation is merely an assertion that is inadequately defended.  Susan Feagin 
complains of Hume’s theory: 
…it is not clear how the ‘dominance’ of imagination and expression is to 
be achieved…More puzzling, however, is the process of ‘conversion’ 
which imagination performs on the unpleasant feelings (and which those 
feelings, when dominant perform on the natural pleasantness of the 
imagination).  Pains are not merely mitigated by the pleasure, but 
converted or transformed into something different.  The mechanics of this 
conversion are never explained.
14
 








In order for Hume’s theory to rise above an appeal to intuition, he would need to clarify 
and defend  his view of emotion and offer a picture of how the intensity of an emotional 
state can feed and be transformed into an opposing emotional state. 
 Hume’s idea of tragic conversion might be additionally critiqued by pointing out 
that rests on a shaky assumption, namely that it is impossible to experience “mixed 
feelings.”  Hume’s theory seems to assume that one can only meaningfully experience 
one sort of emotional state at a time, and this is likely not the case.  Flint Schier remarks 
that “Hume was right to suggest that tragedy involves a duplex experience, as of 
attending to the tragic hero and to how the actor plays him; he was wrong, I think in 
supposing that these two experiences become fused…in the theatre we simultaneously 
feel emotions of distinct hedonic change and intensity and there is no need to suppose 
that these emotions lose their identities in the alchemy of association.”
15
  Schier’s 
intuition that one can experience emotional states of opposing valence seems to be 
confirmed by the findings of experimental psychology.  There is a strong empirical case 
that people have the capacity to feel tangible and conflicting feelings in response to 
aesthetic stimuli simultaneously.
16
  The idea of mixed feelings is still a somewhat 
controversial notion in cognitive psychology, but there are several good reasons to accept 
that people can experience identifiable emotions of opposing valences simultaneously.  
As cognitive researchers learn more about the brain and its relationship to emotional 
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states, it appears that different areas of the brain are associated with negative and positive 
emotional states, and there is some evidence that the brain can fire in these areas 
simultaneously. Joseph LeDoux has concluded that the amygdala is the main cortical 
center for negative emotional states,
17
 and evidence indicates that happiness typically 
requires participation of the pre-frontal cortex.
18
 These brain areas can operate in 
isolation from one another as well as simultaneously, and coupled with evidence drawn 
from psychological studies, the best explanation is that people can experience such 
simultaneous states. Using a model for efficiently testing awareness of affective response, 
Jeff Larsen et al. demonstrated that students placed in emotionally ambiguous 
experiences were able to report both happy and sad feelings.
19
  Andrade and Cohen 
confirmed similar findings in their study of emotional responses to horror films.
20
  With 
the weight of the conceptual and scientific evidence, one ought to conclude that mixed 
emotional states are not merely a figure of speech, but a reality.    
Hume’s attempt to consolidate both emotional states into a single, unified, intense 
feeling of pain-pleasure, fails because it relies on a faulty assumption, that people cannot 
experience positive and negative emotional states at the same time.  However, people 
frequently are able to experience multiple emotional states which they can readily 
describe in terms of both affective and propositional difference.  As this is the case, 
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Hume’s account becomes superfluous as it adds an unnecessary complexity to a 
description of tragic emotional experience. 
Even if the above objections are ultimately unsuccessful in invalidating Humean 
conversion theory, one might point out that Hume himself offers a significant caveat that 
undermines his approach as a whole. He offers an account that describes how 
disagreeableness of the scenario presented onstage might be so graphic that the pleasure 
one receives from the tragedy might be overcome by the horror and disgust the viewer 
experiences in relation to the onstage action.  Hume cites Nicholas Rowe’s The Ambitious 
Stepmother as an instance of such a graphic depiction.  In the play, a “venerable old man, 
raised to the height of fury and despair, rushes against a pillar, and striking his head upon 
it, besmears it all over with mingled brains and gore.”
21
  In this case, it would seem that 
the aesthetic artistry employed by Rowe has taken a back-seat to the crudeness of the 
event depicted.  As a result, the viewer cannot take pleasure in the play, but only be 
disgusted and horrified by it. 
 This passage provides an unresolved problem for Hume’s theory, given the fact 
that Rowe’s play was enjoyed by many theatregoers of Hume’s day.
22
  If Hume intends to 
provide an account for how one might enjoy negative events in an aesthetic setting, his 
inclusion of this example is counter-productive.  Here, it seems as if his theory is slipping 
from an explanation of how one enjoys tragedy to how one ought to enjoy tragedy.  
Hume seems to be saying that there are things that ought to horrify moral people, even 
presented in an aesthetic context.  He does not, however, provide any sort of account for 
the fact that audiences (though perhaps uneducated in matters of taste) took tremendous 
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delight from the besmearing of the venerable old man’s head upon the pillar.  As the 
essay concludes it becomes apparent that Hume is not presenting a robust account of 
tragic pleasure, but instead a limited and perhaps snobbish normative account that saves 
the “good” tragedies and ignores the bad ones. He seems to intend to use this example as 
a starting point for a sort of “poetic method” of incorporating negative emotions into 
artistic works.  He concludes the essay by advocating a kind of poetic self-control with 
the portrayal of objects that might elicit negative response. The responsible tragedian 
tempers these negative objects with selective detail and artful delivery, so that the 
primary emotion of pleasure can be heightened by the conversion of the intensity of the 
painful emotion.   
This final point is a serious problem for the theory as Hume presents it, and a 
contemporary defender of his view would likely have to jettison this value-laden 
component in order to offer conversion theory as a viable depiction of people’s negative 
emotional response to art.  Were she to do this, she still would have to offer a coherent 
account of how this conversion occurs as well as show that the within the context of 
tragedy, one experiences only one emotional state as opposed to a “mixed” emotional 
state, that of a heightened pleasure brought about by way of aesthetic beauty in the 
context of painful events.  For these reasons, Hume’s conversion theory fails as a 
plausible account for what goes on when one views and seems to enjoy Long Day’s 
Journey into Night. 
 
1.4 The Joy Of Control 
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 Why is it thrilling to go bungee jumping or ride a particularly terrifying roller-
coaster?  One feature of such experiences is that while the participant certainly 
experiences a “rush,” she never finds herself in any real danger.  If, for example, the 
bungee cord were to snap and the jumper found herself hurtling uncontrolled toward the 
earth, the fun of bungee jumping would quickly slip away into terror for the jumper.  
Likewise, if one rode a roller coaster that flew from the tracks, it is doubtful that she 
would (provided she survived the event) later describe the ride as “enjoyable” or 
“exciting.”  It is more likely that a normal, well-adjusted human being would 
acknowledge that she was terrified by such an event.  The difference in bungee jumping 
and roller coaster riding and experiences that genuinely cause one to fear for her life 
seems to be the degree of control she has over the events that she is facing. 
 This observation about the nature of control and pleasure has inspired a third way 
of denying the experience of significant pain in response to putatively painful art.  Such 
denial might take the form of a “control” theory in the tradition of those articulated by 
John Morreall and Marcia Eaton.  These theories argue that people pursue tragedy 
because in an aesthetic context people have more control over these emotions than they 
do in real life.  These responses claim that we do not experience significant negative 
emotional states in response to tragedy because we have the ability to walk away from 
the experience at any time.  As a result, we only experience as much emotional 
discomfort as we allow ourselves.  This theory differs from the previous too in that it 
does admit that we might experience some incidental “pain” in our response to tragedy, 
but this pain is not nearly as palliative as pain felt in non-aesthetic contexts. 
 Aaron Smuts acknowledges that there is some empirical data that confirms this: 
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Recent experiments on pain thresholds seem to support this conjecture.  
When subjects are able to say when the pressure on their finger should 
stop, they can take far more pressure and pain than if the experimenter 
does not give them the option.  Subjects also report feeling greater 




Furthermore, experiments conducted at the University of California at Berkeley seem to 
confirm a similar hypothesis—a hypothesis more directly related to aesthetic stimulations 
of negative emotional states than those Smuts references.  Students averse to horror films 
were asked to watch clips from Salem’s Lot and The Exorcist and using computer 
software based upon the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule,
24
 asked to evaluate their 
positive and negative emotional responses to the clips.  Students who did not enjoy horror 
films initially reported that they experienced little enjoyment of the clips.  These students 
were then shown clips from a horror film in a window on a computer screen that was 
framed by information about the film (images and short bios of the actors playing the 
roles in the given clips as well as other items of trivia regarding the film), and they were 
asked to report their responses again.  In the second experiment, students typically averse 
to horror films report a marked improvement in their enjoyment and a decline in their 
displeasure toward the horror films they viewed. It appears that one of the key 
components of these students positive response to the film was a degree of controlled 
distance the viewer is able to maintain from the suspenseful and horrific images 
displayed.  The “reference frame” surrounding the clip became a buffer that not only 
helped the horror-averse student cope with fright and suspense but also improved her 
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enjoyment of the clip.
25
  A control theorist would likely point to such experiments as 
validation for her claim that people enjoy putatively painful art only when the negative 
emotional impact can be properly managed and seems appropriately distant as a result. 
 Morreall offers a compelling control-based resolution of the paradox of painful art 
in his essay “Enjoying Negative Emotions in Fiction.”  In his essay, he attempts to show 
that many real-life emotional experiences can best be understood as manageable based 
upon a person’s level of control of those affective states.  With this foundation laid, he 
claims that the negative emotions generated by tragedy are of little significance compared 
to the pleasure the viewer takes in her ability to manage her emotional response based 
upon a set of control criteria. 
 Morreall begins by asserting that what might be exciting about certain negative 
emotional states is that they awaken people psychically and offer escape from the 
doldrums of life.  In his analysis of fear, he acknowledges the incredible physiological 
changes that occur when one finds herself in such a state.  He writes that in fear we 
experience dramatic changes in the nervous and endocrine systems that prepare one to 
fight or flee for the sake of self preservation, and it may be that, “for someone who leads 
a relatively dull life, the stimulation provided by fear can be pleasurable by contrast with 
the ordinary lack of stimulation.”
26
  This statement is reminiscent of Dubos description of 
the pleasures of tragedy in Hume’s “Of Tragedy.”  Fear may be physically enjoyable for 
the stimulation it provides, however Morreall agrees with Hume that fear is only exciting 
within limits.  If a skydiver’s parachute fails to open, for instance, she no longer finds 
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herself enjoying the rush of the fall and instead finds herself in a state of terror.  Using 
examples of other “disagreeable” emotional states such as anger and sadness, Morreall 
argues that “we can enjoy negative emotions only when we retain control of our overall 
situation.”
27
    
 One might respond by questioning what counts as control in this context.  In 
response to this question, Morreall establishes three criteria for a person’s feeling “in-
control.”  First of all, he claims that “control is usually easiest to maintain when we are 
merely attending to something which has no practical consequences for us, as when we 
watch from a distance some event unrelated to us.”
28
  For example, one might enjoy 
watching a YouTube video of a car crash at a race, as she does not know the driver, or 
even if the event she views actually occurred.  In this case, she may be merely enjoying 
the spectacle of an incredible auto accident.  Next, Morreall’s analysis reveals that the 
advantage that this distance offers the viewer is that she has the ability to “stop, start, and 
direct the experience.”  If I choose to watch a sad movie on television, for example, I 
maintain control because I have the capacity to turn the channel, and this ability 
empowers me to maintain control and enjoy the physical sensations delivered by mild 
negative emotional states while enjoying myself.  Lastly, Morreall argues that in order for 
control to be maintained, the emotion elicited by the stimulus must not be too strong.  In 
an aesthetic context, he writes, “part of an artist’s job is to present that situation in such a 
way that we can stay in control while feeling negative emotions, so that we can get 
satisfaction from the experience, rather than being overwhelmed or utterly distressed by 
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  Here, he agrees with Hume that even in an aesthetic context, it may be possible to 
elicit emotions that are so strong that the viewer is no longer able to enjoy the experience 
but is instead overcome by the powerful emotions elicited by a work.   
 For Morreall, then, these three criteria (distance, the ability to start, stop, and 
direct, and the emotional stimulation is not too strong) are met in good tragedy, and as a 
result, the viewer is able to characterize her experience as one of enjoyment and the 
negative emotions she experiences are ultimately not significantly powerful.  If 
examining this phenomenon as it relates to Long Day’s Journey into Night, the control 
theorist would formulate (2) as follows: 
Revised Statement of PoT: Because people are in control of their 
relationship and emotional response to performances of Long Day’s 
Journey into Night, on the whole, they do not experience significant 
negative emotional states as a result of viewing the play. 
 
Unfortunately for this approach, it fails upon close scrutiny.   First of all, 
Morreall’s conception of “control” based upon his established criteria is highly dubious.
30
   
Robert Yanal points out that there are significant reasons to doubt Morreall’s account of 
control.  On Morreall’s analysis, in order for the emotion of pleasure to emerge as a result 
of painful art, that work must hold no “practical consequence” for us, or we must be able 
to “stop, start, and direct” our attention to it, or if the emotion it inspires is not “too 
strong,” then we will be able to control it.  Yanal attacks the first condition by pointing 
out that there a number of possible real-world instances in which we might observe a 
situation of no practical consequence to us but still feel powerful negative emotions about 
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or toward those involved.
31
  In no real sense can I intervene at this moment in conditions 
of starvation in Somalia, nevertheless, I find myself moved by the plight of the children 
of a country ravaged by famine.  One might suggest that in some way, I can help in a way 
that I cannot with the fate of King Lear, and this is why I am feel real, significant pity for 
Somalia as opposed to Lear, however it is difficult to see what actions I could take that 
would directly impact the lives of those involved in Somalia.  In other words, there is no 
appreciable difference in my feelings of pity and sadness toward tragedy and those I 
experience toward actual conditions in the real world which arouse such emotions.  It 
would seem then, that control is only achieved when one cannot anticipate the possibility 
of taking action, and that anticipation is grounds for painful experience.    
Next, Yanal criticizes Morreall’s claim that the ability to stop and start the 
experience is what allows us to feel in control of the fictional situation, as Morreal is 
quick to point out that at times we put down a book precisely because it elicits too strong 
an emotion. How can this be, however, if in this situation, we have been in control the 
entire time?  Morreall’s theory cannot account for how this is possible.  Additionally, 
Morreall claims that a third criterion of “weakly felt emotion” is a condition of control, 
but in order for this to be true it seems to follow that all emotions elicited by tragic art 
must be weakly felt, and this is plainly false, as powerful emotions can be aroused by 
fictional tragedy. 
Though Morreall’s conception of control is fraught with intractable difficulty, it is 
possible that he and other theorists who defend a control-based framework are generally 
describing what happens in people’s response to negative art.   Perhaps all that is needed 
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is a modification of the existing criteria that supposedly constitute control. After all, as 
pointed out above, there is some empirical data that supports such the hypothesis that in 
certain contexts, controlled negative emotional states might be characterized as pleasant.  
Unfortunately however, regardless of one’s conception of control, this family of 
approaches to the paradox of tragedy ultimately fails in several key respects.  
One critique Yanal offers of all control theories is that there often is intense 
pleasure to be had from losing control of one’s emotions.  Control is often associated 
with a kind of miserable restraint.  For example, I may have a tremendous problem with 
my boss, but instead of airing my grievances, I—for the sake of my job—grit my teeth 
and clench my fists every time he enters the room.  It is often very satisfying to lose 
control and rage unabated or cry without restraint, and perhaps this is what occurs when a 
person views tragedy.
32
  Control based theories do not have much explanatory power 
with respect to this phenomenon, as this is the opposite of what they predict. 
Aaron Smuts offers a similar critique of control-based theories.  He points out that 
“our emotional responses to fiction are not completely, or even to a high degree, 
controllable.”
33
  If one is deeply saddened by her viewing of a play or film, that sadness 
does not always end at the close of the curtain or as the credits appear on the screen.  
Often, the most poignant works of art are marked by the emotional power they exercise 
over people after they are finished, and it is certainly familiar to describe oneself as being 
“moved for days” by some powerful tragedy.  Many empirical studies confirm this claim.  
Clark McCauley, utilizing the available empirical research on negative emotional states 
and film, shows that strong negative emotional states elicited by narrative art typically 
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amplify pre-existing negative emotional states instead of mollifying it.  Aggressive young 
men, for example, who watch a violent film tend to report feeling more aggressive after 
the film ends.
34
  Though the empirical data cited earlier (Andrade and Cohen) supports 
the idea that people who are predisposed away from certain negative emotional states 
gain more enjoyment from negative aesthetic stimuli when that stimuli is presented to 
them in a controlled frame, it does not falsify the fact that people still feel significant 
negative emotional states as a result of such stimuli.  In light of the abundant evidence 
McCauley cites, it is wise to conclude that control theories have misrepresented the 
significance of the negative emotions one experiences in response to “painful” art.   Since 
control theories have little to say about this phenomenon, at best they are incomplete. 
A final objection one ought to raise against control-based resolutions of the 
paradox of tragedy is that they do not answer what Smuts refers to as the “motivational 
question,” namely, what motivates audiences to pursue works of art that elicit negative 
emotions while they endeavor to avoid such emotions in their daily lives? Even if control 
theories accurately describe most people’s relationship to “painful” art, they still do not 
provide a reason that people pursue such art.  Even if people experience positive 
emotional states as a result of being able to control their negative affections toward art, 
why not pursue art designed only to evoke cheerful emotional states?  Any satisfactory 
restatement of (2) ought to at least suggest what motivates audiences to pursue 
performances of works of art such as Long Day’s Journey, but control theories (even if 
successful) do not provide even a glimpse at why this is the case.  On this question, 
control theories are silent, and for this and the reasons states above, this family of 
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theories fails as a candidate for an explanation of what goes with respect to a viewer’s 
relationship to Long Day’s Journey into Night.  
 
1.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have surveyed and critiqued three proposed resolutions the problem of 
negative emotion and Long Day’s Journey into Night.  These resolutions attempt to deny 
that viewers of the play (and tragedy in general) experience significant and powerful 
negative emotional reactions to the narrative they watch.  I have shown that as an over-
arching theories of negative emotion in relation to art, each theory fails to adequately 
account for (1)the actual emotional attachments and responses elicited by the tragedy in 
general and Long Day’s Journey particularly, and (2)the “motivational question,”
35
 an 
answer to the question of what motivates audiences to participate in such “painful” 
experiences.  As a result, one cannot resort to these explanations to account for the 
negative emotional address of Long Day’s Journey into Night.  Given that these theories 
fail, one will have to turn elsewhere for a robust account of this phenomenon.  In the 
chapter that follows, I will examine a related resolution the problem, using a close, 
hermeneutical method that will falsify that resolution as well as further validate the claim 
that audiences experience powerful negative emotions in their relationship to Long Day’s 
Journey into Night. 
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PARSING THE NEGATIVE ADDRESS OF LONG DAY’S  





In the previous chapter, I argued that the family of resolutions to paradox of tragedy that 
deny the existence of powerful negative emotions elicited by tragedy fail to provide an 
adequate description of what goes one when one views a play such as Long Day’s 
Journey into Night. In light of this discussion, perhaps the reader has become aware of 
another related, and intuitively possible, resolution to the paradox.   In the chapter that 
follows, I will examine this possibility, one articulated by Robert Yanal’s minority 
interpretation of Hume’s “conversion” theory.  According to Yanal, Hume accepts the 
reality of powerful negative emotional states elicited by tragedy, but he asserts that Hume 
is merely suggesting that on the whole, people experience more positive emotional states 
than negative ones in their response to tragedy.
1
  For example, in the case of Hamlet, 
though audience members are truly and perhaps significantly troubled during the play by 
the death of Hamlet, in the end, they are more pleased by the fact that justice is carried 
out and Hamlet’s father is avenged than pained by the suffering of the prince.  On the 
whole, then, they can characterize their experience of the play in terms of enjoyment.   
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 Were one to adopt such a position, she likely would reformulate step (2) of the 
Paradox of Negative Emotion and Long Day’s Journey into Night as follows: 
2.Though audiences do experience powerful negative emotional states as a result 
of Long Day’s Journey into Night, on the whole the play elicits more powerful 
positive emotional states than negative ones. 
 
This solution has a good deal of potential, as it allows for the possible existence of mixed 
feelings—emotions of opposing valences that are experienced simultaneously,
1
 which 
most theories do not admit or account for.  Additionally, it provides a good answer to the 
motivational question, as audiences derive more pleasure than pain from the artifact they 
view; thus it is reasonable that they pursue Long Day’s Journey. 
 In order to verify or refute this formulation of (2), I will examine the text of Long 
Day’s Journey utilizing an interpretive method proposed by Nöel Carroll.  Carroll asserts 
that it is possible to mine a narrative for its “emotional address”—the sort of emotions the 
author intends to elicit with the narrative.  Using this method, I will demonstrate that the 
formulation of (2) is not an accurate representation of an audience’s experience of Long 
Day’s Journey into Night, because on the whole, audiences do not experience more 
positive emotional states than negative ones when they watch this particular play.  Such 
an approach will not only falsify (2), it will also provide additional evidence that the 
category of theories I critiqued in chapter 2 fail as sufficient explanations of the Paradox 
of Long Day’s Journey into Night, as they cannot account for how this play traffics in 
powerful, negative emotional states. 
 
2.2 The Emotional Address of Narrative Art 
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Nöel Carroll points out that in the study of narrative art such as works of literature, film, 
and theatre, a great deal of attention has been paid to how one is to read the work.  Those 
who study such works have focused their attention on hermeneutics, analyzing these texts 
for what “is loosely called the meaning of the work.”
2
  Though such studies are valuable 
and important, these approaches have a significant deficiency, in that “what is not studied 
in any fine-grained way is how works engage the emotion of the audience.”
3
  In the 
essay, “Art, Narrative, and Emotion,” Carroll proposes a research program whereby those 
who examine works of narrative art might conduct such a research program.  Because of 
advances in philosophy of psychology and emotion contemporary to Carroll’s essay, he 
writes that people interested in emotional responses to narratives have a grounded and 
practical method whereby they might describe the emotional responses such works elicit. 
 Carroll anticipates that some might object to his characterization of the state of 
hermeneutic study.  One might point out that critics working in the psychoanalytic 
tradition seem very concerned with emotional responses to narratives.  To such 
objections, Carroll replies that psychoanalysis is not terribly concerned the workings of 
“garden variety” emotions such as fear, pity, joy, and the like.  Instead, those working 
under Freudian and Lacanian frameworks are more concerned with emotional disorder 
like Oedipal anxiety or male castration disorder.  Furthermore, if psychoanalysts do 
utilize terms designated more “typical” emotional states, they are often ambiguous and 
refer to mental states that philosophers of emotions might refer to in terms of Mood as 
opposed to emotion. 
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 The mode of analysis Carroll proposes begins with the basic assumption that , “in 
large measure, what commands and shapes the audience’s attention to the artwork, what 
enables the audience to follow and comprehend the artwork, and what energizes our 
commitment to seeing the narrative artwork through to its conclusion is the emotional 
address of the narrative artwork.”
4
  He adds that emotions serve as an adhesive that keeps 
audiences focused on the events, characters, and objects which make up the narrative.  
With this assumption in mind, Carroll believes that it might be possible to identify such 
emotional addresses within the text, asserting that the emotions elicited will likely be 
“garden-variety emotions,” emotions whose qualia are familiar and readily accessible to 
most people who consume narrative art. 
 The claim that narrative works of art elicit and even traffic in the arousal of 
emotions is likely not a controversial one.  Carroll points out that this claim is made as 
early as Plato’s Republic, though for Plato this feature of narrative art makes such art 
unacceptable in the ideal polis.  Plato holds that emotions are irrational enemies of a 
person’s capacity for reason.  If he is correct in his description of the topography of the 
mind, then it follows that people dedicated to living rational lives would wish to avoid art 
which arouses emotions, as emotions serve to blind people from the true nature of reality.   
Plato’s view of the emotions as somehow at odds with reason seems to have a 
robust position in contemporary Western thinking.  We pejoratively describe others as 
“blinded by emotion,” or as “living based upon gut feelings instead of reason.”  Mr. 
Spock, whose alien race has rejected emotion altogether, is regarded as cognitively 
superior to his Star Trek counterparts precisely because he is able to dispassionately 
evaluate the world and navigate it based upon pure reason.  Eugene O’Neill himself 
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seemed to accept this traditionally strong division between the rational faculties of the 
mind and its capacity for emotion, though he rejected Plato’s veneration of rationality.  In 
an interview with the American Spectator in 1922, he stated that, “Our emotions are a 
better guide than our thoughts.  Our emotions are instinctive.   They are the result not 
only of our individual experiences, but of the experiences of the whole human race 
through the ages.  They are the deep undercurrent, whereas our thoughts are only the 
small individual surface reactions.  Truth usually goes deep, so it reaches you through 
your emotions.”
5
  Though in addition to articulating a view on the nature of emotion 
O’Neill likely is alluding to the Jungian collective unconsciousness here, it is evident that 
he sees emotion and reason as two psychological forces at odds with one another, and in 
this way, he is roughly endorsing the Platonic conception of the mind. 
 Plato’s topography of the mind ought to be called into question, however.
6
  
Instead of holding a view that strongly distinguishes between the emotive and cognitive 
capacities of the mind, Carroll writes that contemporary psychologists and analytic 
philosophers are inclined to “maintain that reason and emotions are not opposed, 
inasmuch as reason is an ineliminable constituent of the emotions.”
7
  Because emotions 
can be accounted for in rational terms, in the 1980s and 1990s philosophers began to 
articulate a “cognitivist” model of emotions.  Carroll asserts that there are good reasons 
to think emotions do not merely consist of feelings of bodily change.  Instead, emotions 
begin with a “cognitive component,” a belief, appraisal, judgment or construal initiated 
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by some perception of the world or oneself, which give rise to a “feeling component,” a 
phenomenological experience and/or bodily change. 
 Cognitivist philosophers of emotion developed their view in response to the 
dominant mode of describing the emotions by psychologists and scientists during the 
mid-20
th
 Century, an approach loosely referred to as the Darwinist or evolutionary 
account of emotion.
8
  This approach was largely held and utilized by psychologists and 
cognitive researchers, and still has a robust following in the both disciplines.   During his 
lifetime, Charles Darwin became interested in developing an evolutionary account of the 
emotions after reading Charles Bell’s Anatomy and Physiology of Expression, a work of 
Christian apologetics that argued for the uniqueness of man’s emotional experience 
among the rest of creation.  Darwin, sensing that Bell’s work would challenge his theory 
of evolution, developed a theory of the evolutionary necessity of emotion and articulated 
his view in The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. Darwin examined 
seemingly purposeless facial expressions and developed an evolutionary account based 
upon natural selection as to why humans utilized such expressions.  This mode of 
analysis inspires Darwinist researchers of emotion who operate under the theory that an 
emotion is reducible to “a neurophysiological event whose manifestations typically 
include the facial and overt bodily movements that are the emotion’s true expressions.”
9
 
In order to meaningfully talk about and analyze emotions, the Darwinist view holds that 
one need only examine the bodily—and as far as humans are concerned, facial—
responses to stimuli.  The bodily response is the emotional response, regardless of and 
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apart from the cognitive directedness the bodily response precedes or accompanies.  To 
determine the emotional state a person is experiencing, Darwinists carefully study the 
facial responses of that person, and they believe this can yield a definitive description of 
the emotion that person manifests.
10
 
 Cognitivist philosophers of emotion find such approaches to the nature of 
emotions lacking in explanatory scope and power.  Some cognitivists grant that 
evolutionary approaches are adequate explanations for “basic emotions” (rage, disgust, 
joy, surprise, distress, anger and fear), as these emotions are quick in onset, short in 
duration, universal to human beings, and innate;
11
 However, John Deigh offers an 
example that seems to undermine the power of the evolutionary account to explain even 
these emotions.  He points to the phenomenon referred to as Beatlemania.  In the 1965 
concert at Shea stadium, when the Beatles took the stage, they were greeted (as in many 
other venues) by the shrieks and cries of thousands of teenage girls.  There is clear 
footage showing that many of these girls break down into tears, “their faces lose all 
composure and become blubbery and slack.”
12
 If a Darwinist, unfamiliar with the context 
in which these images were recorded, were to examine this footage, they would 
undoubtedly describe the emotions these girls were experiencing as anguish, pain, or 
grief.  Yet it is clear that none of the women who responded to the Beatles in this way 
would characterize their emotional experience of the event in these terms.  The missing 
piece of the Darwinist theory is the cognitive component.  The object of the girls’ 
emotional response is the Beatles, and because this approach “excludes considerations of 
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intelligibility from the definitions of the basic categories of emotions, it cannot correctly 
identify the girls’ emotion in this case.”
13
 
 The picture of the emotions laid out by evolutionary approaches is clearly 
incomplete, and, if Deigh’s example has any force, it cannot even fully account for the 
simplest emotional responses, much less more complex emotional states like grief, guilt, 
or pride.  In this arena, the cognitivist of emotion attempts to provide a meaningful 
picture of emotional life that both accounts for the mental events that incite emotions as 
well as the bodily manifestations of the emotion in question.  According to Carroll, one 
of the key contribution cognitive theories offer to a full picture of affective life is the 
description of the intentionality of emotions.  Cognitivists point out that it is easy to 
imagine chemically inducing the bodily response in a person that accompany anger, for 
example; however this seems appreciably different from actually making that person 
angry.  In the chemical induction, “you cannot be said to be in an emotional state of anger 
unless there is someone who or something that you think has done you or yours some 
wrong.”
14
 When one is angry, she experiences a state that one can describe in vivid and 
precise language, developed in this discipline.  In a state of anger, that anger is directed at 
what has come to be called the “intentional object” of that emotion.   
Cognitive theories of emotion provide a great deal of information about the nature 
of intentional emotional states.  For instance, if I react in fear to a snake, that snake can 
be said to be the intentional object of my emotion of fear.  It should be pointed out that I 
only fear the snake because of what I perceive or believe about the snake, that it looks 
dangerous, or that I know that it is poisonous and able to bite me.  I would not have the 
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same experience of fear if I were at the zoo looking at the snake from behind glass.   The 
state and intensity of my fear is determined by a set of conditions that the snake meets 
(looking dangerous, being poisonous, and not enclosed), and these conditions are often 
referred to as the “formal object” of my fear.  If these conditions were different, I would 
undoubtedly find myself in a different emotional state.  It is important to note that the 
cause of the emotion might be different than the intentional object.  For example, I might 
experience the fear of a poisonous snake as described above, but the cause of my fear 
might not be a snake at all, but someone’s telling me that there is a snake at my feet.  In 
the scenario above, cognitive theories of emotion offer clear working categories which 
allow me to articulate clearly my experience of fear:  I am afraid of the (intentional 
object) poisonous snake, because it possesses the (formal object) quality of being 
dangerous, though my fear is caused by the practical joke of a friend.  If any of these 
components were altered, it is reasonable to believe that my emotional experience of the 
poisonous snake would differ from the fear of the snake that I did in fact experience.                  
 Carroll’s essay assumes that the cognitivist model of emotions provides a robust 
picture of emotional life.  With this in mind, he argues that not only are emotions 
governed by reasons (i.e. formal and propositional content), they also contribute to the 
ways in which a person’s mental focus develops in a particular situation.  He writes: 
Perception and emotion are interrelated in a number of ways.  First, it is 
our attention to certain aspects of a situation—say, the harmful ones—
that moves into certain emotional states in the first instance. But the 
emotions provide feedback to our processes of attention.  Once alerted to 
the harmful aspects of a situation, our fear will impel us to search the 
situation—to scan the scene—for further evidence of harmfulness.  The 
emotions focus our attention.  They make certain features of situations 
salient, and they cast those features in a special, phenomenological 
49 
 
light…and then they hold our attention on the relevant features of our 




With this in mind, Carroll suggests that a mode of narrative analysis presents itself.  If 
emotions are organizers of “patterns of salience,” this might cast a new light upon how 
narratives engage the viewer’s emotions, for in narratives, the author has organized 
certain details of the narrative, placing characters, objects, and events in deliberate 
arrangement to direct the reader’s focus in particular ways.  The author has 
“foregrounded what features of the event are salient.”
16
 Carroll asserts that it is possible, 
then, to examine this arrangement of saliences, and working backward, one might 
ascertain the kind of emotion the author intends to elicit with the narrative she crafts.  
Carroll asserts that narrative fictions come to the viewer “criterially prefocused,” 
meaning that narratives typically are arranged in ways that meet the criteria for emotional 
categorization described above. 
 Carroll acknowledges that even if texts are criterially prefocused to elicit certain 
emotions, there is no guarantee that the audience of the narrative will actually experience 
those emotional states.  Distraction or confusion might render such design ineffective.  
He responds to such a critique, “Nevertheless, I think that it is equally uncontroversial to 
suppose that narratives do induce readers, listeners, and viewers to preferences about how 
the story should evolve.”
17
  Generally, it is fair to assume that if a reader responds to a 
narrative emotionally, they will respond in roughly similar modes as those the author 
intends.  Though one might acknowledge that reader response to texts is subjective, using 
Carroll’s method, one can at least determine what the author intends, and in many (if not 
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most cases) can pith the emotions elicited by the text.  Carroll writes, “Authors are able, 
fairly reliably, to induce the emotions they set out to evoke—especially basic emotions 
(like anger, fear, hatred, and so on)—because of the fact that they share a common 
background (cultural, but biological as well) with their audiences.”
18
  Audiences share 
not only the physiological capacity for emotion but also the general criteria necessary to 
cognitively motivate such emotional states.  Given that Carroll has appropriately 
characterized the nature of emotions and how they are aroused in narratives, his method 
necessarily follows. 
 
2.2 Challenges to Carroll’s Cognitivism 
 It must be acknowledged that cognitivist (at least strong cognitivist) theories of 
emotion have given way to newer developments in philosophy of emotion.  The sea 
change has been largely initiated by a re-examination of “feeling” theories of emotion as 
initially described by William James in his famous 1884 essay “What is an Emotion?”  
James’ picture of the emotions differs significantly from the cognitivist’s conception.  
James writes famously that,  
Our natural way of thinking about these standard emotions is that the 
mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the 
emotion, and that this later state of mind gives rise to bodily expression.  
My thesis on the contrary is that the bodily changes follow directly from 
the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same 
changes as they occur IS the emotion…the more rational statement is that 
we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we 
tremble, and not that we cry strike or tremble, because we are sorry, 
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James conceives of an emotion as a perception of bodily excitement.  The important 
distinction Jamesian approaches to emotion draw from cognitivist conceptions is that the 
Jamesian believes that the emotion begins in the body as a physiological event, whereas 
cognitivists assert that the emotion begins in the mind as a belief, construal, judgment, or 
appraisal.  Certainly, one can appreciate how Jamesian conceptions of the emotions have 
been informed by the Darwinist approach; when cognitivist objections to evolutionary 
approaches to emotion emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, many philosophers of 
mind seemed to disregard the James-Lange Theory of emotion, as many cognitivist 
objections apply to Jamesian theories as powerfully as they do to Darwinist theories.
20
 
 With the publication of works such as Antonio Damasio’s Descartes’ Error and 
Jesse Prinz’s Gut Reactions, philosophical and psychological approaches to the emotions 
in the James-Lange tradition have received new attention and acceptance.  Prinz’s work 
on the emotions, an interdisciplinary research program which tests philosophical 
hypothesis against empirical psychological data, has breathed new life into the James-
Lange approach, and many (if not most) philosophers of mind are appropriating such a 
framework into their research on emotions.  There are a variety of philosophical theories 
of emotion that would best be classified as “feeling” theories, however Prinz’s 
“perceptual” theory of emotions is perhaps the most influential and codified; as a result, 
for the purposes of this discussion, I will focus on some of the key distinctions it draws 
from cognitivist and psycho-evolutionary models. 
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 Prinz sees his iteration of the feeling theory of emotion as a hybrid between 
Darwinian approaches (approaches which describe emotions as wholly somatic), and 
cognitive theories (those theories which describe emotions as semantic mental events 
which evoke somatic response).  He defends an approach that defines emotions as 
“perceptions (conscious or unconscious) of patterned changes in the body (construed 
inclusively).”
21
  Prinz agrees with James that the emotions begin in the body and occur as 
the mind perceives a bodily change, however he improves the James-Lange theory by 
attempting to show that there is a rationality to emotional elicitation, an idea he borrows, 
in part, from cognitivist understandings of emotional experience.  The evolutionary 
model asserts that emotions are merely bodily events, and Prinz improves it by 
attempting to show that they are the mind’s perception of those bodily changes. 
 In light of how much explanatory scope and power the cognitivist model of 
emotions seems to have, why would Prinz choose to reject it in favor of what seems to be 
a very counter-intuitive model?  Prinz utilizes the empirical data cited by Darwinists 
regarding the strong link between emotional states and bodily “perturbations.”  He points 
out that James himself often cited lengthy passages of Darwin’s research on the emotions 
to establish his claim.  A century later, Levenson, Ekman, and Freisen carefully 
categorized the physiological changes associated with what they call “basic emotions,” 
and “found that each corresponds to unique body pattern.”
22
  Additionally, Prinz points 
out that areas of the brain associated with emotional states are all uniquely associated 
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 and he also cites the preponderance of evidence that supports the 
claim that bodily changes can induce emotional states. If emotions can be incited without 
appraisal judgments and are instead sometimes merely the byproducts of some physical 
change, Prinz asserts that the cognitive mode of describing emotions needs to be re-
examined because it does not provide an appropriate account of the somatic component 
of emotional experience. Similarly, he critiques the evolutionary model for failing to 
account for the fact that the mind is involved (at least in terms of perceptions) in 
emotional experience.  
 Another problem with the cognitivist view, according to Prinz, is that it too 
heavily relies on conceptual analysis and cognitivists take little stock in the empirical 
data when defining emotional states. Using the example of guilt, Prinz characterizes the 
method a cognitivist philosopher typically uses as follows: 
A philosopher will insist that guilt just cannot occur without thinking 
about the self and anger cannot occur without judging that someone has 
delivered an insult.  These assertions are based on intuitions.  The 
philosopher will first try to imagine cases of an emotion occurring 
without a particular concept or propositional attitude.  If no one case 
comes to mind, she will stipulate that the link between the emotion and 
that concept or propositional attitude is analytic.  It is a conceptual truth 




Following the critique of Griffiths,
25
 Prinz complains that this method relies too heavily 
on a subjective mode of analysis, pointing out that even a philosopher’s intuitions are 
inevitably guided by her theoretical commitments. Perhaps more problematic is the fact 
that intuitions “derive from reflecting on our concepts, and concepts may contain 
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information that is false or misleading.”
26
  For instance, it may well be that though I 
cannot imagine becoming angry without believing myself insulted, such a state is still 
possible without such a belief.  These worries may pose a significant challenge to those 
philosophers of emotion who rely on simply thinking hard about what one means when 
she uses an emotional term.  Prinz sees himself as getting to the bottom of the question of 
the ontology emotions, while most cognitivists simply seem to settle for answers to 
questions of the epistemology of emotions. 
  Though Prinz is wary of such modes of argumentation, he does employ some 
conceptual arguments to reinforce his position as well.  For example, to support the idea 
that bodily changes are necessary to elicit emotional states, he cites the appeals to 
intuition that James and Lange utilize to support their claims. James and Lange ask their 
reader to imagine an emotional state stripped of its bodily responses.  James writes “What 
kind of an emotion of fear would be left, if the feelings neither of a quickened heart beat 
nor of shallow breathing, nor of trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of goose-
flesh, nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite impossible to think.”
27
  If all the 
physical responses of fear in this example are stripped away from the emotion, it does not 
seem apparent that one would describe herself in a state of fear.  Yet this is what the 
cognitivist would have the reader believe, as she believes some mode of thought 
(appraisal, belief, judgment, construal) is sufficient to account for an emotional state.. 
 While Prinz is rightly suspicious of cognitivist understandings of emotion, he is 
not ready to fully accept the Darwinist view of emotions either, because such a view 
offers an inadequate picture for why emotions matter and how they influence our lives 
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and decision making, as emotions on this view are merely bodily responses to stimuli.  
Prinz argues that there is what might be understood as a cognitive component to 
emotions.  Emotions, as a mode of perception, register bodily changes but represent to 
the mind certain “core relational themes.”  This category, first introduced by Richard 
Lazarus, refers to “a relation that pertains to well-being.”
28
 Prinz argues that when the 
mind perceives a bodily response, that response is represented to the mind in terms of 
thematic content. For example, when one encounters an apparently dangerous object, the 
body responds with goose bumps and quickened heart rate and the emotion of fear 
represents the theme of overwhelming physical danger to the mind.
29
  Because of this 
cognitive content, emotions do play roles in decision making and value judgments, but 
they should not be understood as judgments or appraisals in and of themselves.   With the 
above conceptual and empirical evidence, Prinz and other feeling theorists build a 
cumulative, interdisciplinary case that suggests that emotional states begin in the body 
and are perceived by the mind, as opposed to cognitivist views which assert that emotions 
begin in the mind and produce bodily responses. 
 If Prinz and others of his position are correctly characterizing the nature of 
emotional life, can one still conduct the sort of analysis of the emotional structure of 
narrative works Carroll proposes? Carroll’s methodology assumes a cognitivist model of 
emotions, so if the cognitivist model is false, must one give up the ability to pith the 
emotional address of a narrative as the methodology prescribes? One should consider this 
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problem and see if the relevant features of Carroll’s method are affected by one’s view of 
the emotions.  
 One of the most significant problems posed to Carroll’s hermeneutic of emotion 
by the Prinz feeling theory is the problem of intentionality.  On this view, it is something 
of a mistake to assert that emotions have intentional objects (at least as the cognitivist 
asserts), because emotions are perceptions of the way the body responds to the world.  
Emotions often accompany the perception of an object by the body, but according to 
Prinz, it is a bit misguided to assert that an emotion’s object is a constituent component of 
that emotion, even if that “object” is the cause of the emotion.
30
  Cognitivists assert that 
emotions are a breed of thought, and that thought must contain certain sorts of content 
(intentional and formal objects), but feeling theorists do not share this commitment.  
Through careful consideration, one might determine the cause of an emotional response, 
but this does not mean that somehow that cause is a component of the emotion itself.  
One might imagine feeling an emotion for which she can identify no object.   This is an 
easy concept to grasp; it is not difficult to imagine being angry, sad, or joyful, for 
example, without knowing at whom or exactly why one feels this way.
31
  Cognitivists 
have to do some terminological gerrymandering to deny that such an event is an 
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emotional state because it has no object, but Prinz is under no such burden, because he 
can simply point to the cause of such an emotional state (some event that elicits a 
particular somatic response perceived by the mind) as sufficient for that emotion’s 
occurrence.   
 The reader will recall that one of the central features of Carroll’s hermeneutic 
method is the identification of the objects the author intends to draw into the center of the 
reader’s field of focus.  Once the object is identified, the reader can identify how the 
object is set apart from the rest of the narrative and ascertain the emotional response the 
author intends.  If the feeling theory as articulated by Prinz is correct, and the 
representation of the object is not part of the emotion but merely attached to it, can the 
reader really perform emotional “analysis” of a narrative?  Perhaps the best one can do is 
determine the conclusions the author wishes the reader to draw about intended objects of 
the reader’s attention, but how does such an analysis differ from many other hermeneutic 
methods the reader might consider when she responds to narrative art?  If emotions are 
“perceptions of bodily change,” it does not seem that one can be nearly as certain about 
the emotional address of a narrative as she might if emotions are cognitive judgment, 
beliefs, or appraisals because an evaluation of the intentional object and the formal 
conditions established around that object in a narrative are not necessarily components of 
the emotions elicited by the narrative.  
 
2.4 Redeeming Carroll’s Hermeneutic of Emotion 
 There are at least three strategies a philosopher of emotion sympathetic to feeling 
theories might utilize to avoid this problem.  The first and perhaps the simplest way for 
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Carroll’s methodology to avoid such a threat would be to point out that regardless of the 
physical and psychological mechanisms involved in the elicitation of emotional states, 
the claim that narrative art elicits such states is entirely uncontroversial.  Whether 
emotions begin in the mind or in the body, both theories agree that there is cognitive 
engagement involved in emotional responses, and neither theory is threatened by 
emotional engagement of an aesthetic nature.
32
  Both theories can even employ 
intentional and formal objects as part of their terminology, provided that such 
terminology is properly understood in its respective context.  In cognitive theories, these 
objects are constituents of the emotional state, while in feeling theories, these objects are 
likely indicators of the causes, conditions, and representations of the elicited emotions in 
question.  In either case, the analytical approach Carroll proposes can yield meaningful 
emotional analyses of emotion states the author likely intends to elicit.  In order to use the 
methodology, a feeling theorist would have to be prepared to make certain terminological 
concessions in the interest of preserving the framework, however these concessions 
would not ultimately undermine feeling theory or the project of pithing the emotional 
structure of a narrative. 
 The second strategy one might employ to preserve a hermeneutic of emotion 
would be to assert that Prinz is correct in his diagnosis of emotions as bodily responses in 
only the case of “basic emotions”—those emotions specifically identified by Ekman and 
appropriated for Prinz’s argument as having a distinct physiological referent (joy, 
distress, anger, fear, disgust, and  surprise).  More complex emotions such as love, guilt, 
and shame seem to require contextual and cognitive content than do emotions such as 
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joy, distress, or anger.  Higher cognitive emotions seems to possess a different qualitative 
character than basic emotions, and one might rightly assert that it is difficult to ascertain 
the difference (at least on the purest model of feeling theory) between the qualia of 
jealousy versus that of envy or embarrassment versus shame.  One might point to such 
fine-grained distinctions as inadequately explained on Prinz’s view, and she might 
instead construct a hybrid model that utilizes feeling theory to explain the basic emotions, 
and a cognitive theory to describe higher cognitive emotions.  Since emotions elicited by 
a narrative typically require complex cognitive evaluations based upon the readers 
interaction with a text, one who adopts a hybrid view as described above would be well 
within her rational rights to utilize Carroll’s methodology while still holding to a feeling 
theory of basic emotion. 
 The final strategy one might employ to justify Carroll’s framework while 
accounting for feeling theory of emotion is by utilizing a feature of the theory unique to 
Prinz’s description of emotions.  On Prinz’s model of emotions, a feeling theorist is not 
required to make as large a concession in this area as a traditional Jamesian, as Prinz does 
allow that some emotions can be elicited by thoughts.  Prinz classifies some emotions as 
“attitudinal emotions,” and these emotions are those that consist of some form of thought.  
Considering the example of anger because of some personal offense, he writes, “when 
one is angry about an insult, one’s thought about that insult is not merely the cause of 
one’s anger, it is part of one’s anger.”
33
  Such emotions differ from what Prinz defines as 
“state emotions,” which fire upon environmental stimulation.
34
 Attitudinal emotions 
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require complex situational and relational cues without which they would not exist. One 
who is interested in preserving Carroll’s interpretive approach while maintaining a 
feeling theory of emotion might insist that emotions elicited by a narrative are 
“attitudinal” in that they are not initiated accidentally; instead they involve a person’s 
consideration of a deliberately construed aesthetic work.  Such a work is designed—at 
least in part—to elicit such emotional states.  If attitudinal emotions exist, then describing 
them in terms of their relation to objects is a consistent and coherent practice, and a 
hermeneutic of emotion remains viable.  This strategy allows one to utilize Carroll’s 




 By utilizing one of the routes described above, a feeling theorist of emotion might 
consistently utilize Carroll’s methodology without significantly compromising her 
position on the question of the nature of affective states.  For the purposes of this 
argument, it is unnecessary to defend one of these positions over and above the other two; 
instead, I have presented these options to demonstrate that the hermeneutic of emotion 
proposed here stands whether one is a cognitivist or a feeling theorist.  Both approaches 
agree that emotion and perception are linked, and both allow that emotions are 
intentional, at least to a degree; therefore the research program Carroll proposes seems a 
                                                                                                                                                              
like those that bind together components of a complex precept…In the case of attitudinal emotions, the 
proposal would be that the neural representation of an emotional body state fires at the same time as the 
neural representation of its particular object…When the attitudinal emotion arises, this embodied appraisal 
must be caused by the representation of the particular object and, once caused, must be linked with that 
representation, so that the two persist simultaneously.” (Ibid.). 
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fruitful analytic endeavor.  It is to such a process that I will now subject Long Day’s 









According to Harold Bloom, there is a vexing puzzle posed by Long Day’s Journey into 
Night.  O’Neill, on Bloom’s view, is America’s greatest playwright, and Journey is 
obviously O’Neill’s masterpiece.  It stands to reason, then, that Long Day’s Journey into 
Night should be read in the company of The Scarlett Letter, Huckleberry Finn, and As I 
Lay Dying, but when one reads the text of O’Neill’s play, she finds that “perhaps no 
major dramatist has been so lacking in rhetorical exuberance.”  O’Neill, according to 
Bloom, is incredibly limited in his ability to construct powerful dramatic language, and 
he adds that, 
it is embarrassing when O’Neill exegetes attempt to expound his ideas 
whether about his country, his own work, or the human condition.  When 
one of them speaks of ‘two kinds of nonverbal, tangential poetry in Long 
Day’s Journey into Night,’ as the characters’ longing for ‘a mystical 
union of sorts,’ and the influence of the setting, I am compelled to reflect 
that insofar as O’Neill’s art is nonverbal, it must also be nonexistent.
1
    
 
If Long Day’s Journey into Night is mediocre, why is it highly esteemed as the greatest 
tragedy the United States has ever produced?
2
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 Bloom concludes that the power of Long Day’s Journey is not contained in the 
force of the language O’Neill employs in dialogue, but instead this power comes from a 
“drive-toward-staging he learned from Strindberg.”
1
  When Bloom reflects upon 
performances of the play that have significantly moved him, he does not recall Mary’s 
“petulant outbursts” or the languid speeches of Edmund about the sea; instead, what 
Bloom finds moving are the powerful stage pictures O’Neill creates through meticulous 
stage directions.  Of the closing of act one when Edmund pleads with his mother not to 
return to morphine, Bloom writes, “That grim ballet of looks, followed by the terrible, 
compulsive drumming of her long fingers, has a lyric force that only the verse quotations 
from Baudelaire, Swinburne, and others in O’Neill’s text are able to match.”
2
  According 
to Bloom, then, it is clear that the emotional force of the play is largely derived from the 
staging of the action, more so than the eloquence of dialogue he has written. 
 Because of the care with which O’Neill describes the scenes and character 
interactions within Journey, such an analysis can be especially revelatory.  In the 
following analysis, I intend to focus almost exclusively upon the images O’Neill crafts in 
his stage directions, as I believe these images function primarily to provide the criteria 
necessary to focus the audience’s emotional attention along certain lines.  Using the 
hermeneutic of emotion Carroll describes, I will examine these stage pictures to 
determine in a “fine-grained” way what emotions O’Neill intends to elicit.  On the whole, 
the reader will discover that O’Neill does in fact intend to elicit forceful negative 
emotional states. This analysis will heighten the problem posed by the paradox of tragedy 
and allow me to suggest a solution in the conclusion of this essay. 
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 To conduct this analysis, I will pay special attention to each stage picture 
explicitly called for in the text in concert with the dialogue of the play to determine, 
based upon O’Neill’s stage directions, where he intends the audience to focus their 
attention.  I will refer to this object of the audience’s attention as the intentional object of 
the emotion in question.  Next, I will examine under what conditions that object is 
displayed, which will allow me to establish the formal object of the emotion in question, 
or the conditions under which the object of the emotion are presented to the reader, and 
this will reveal the dominant emotion O’Neill intends to elicit with that particular stage 
picture.  Based upon the conditions met by the formal object of the emotion, I will be 
able to classify the relevant intended emotional state roughly based upon the following 




Emotion Core Relational Theme 
Anger A demeaning offense against me and mine 
Anxiety Facing uncertain, existential threat 
Fright Facing an immediate, concrete, and overwhelming physical danger 
Guilt  Having transgressed a moral imperative  
Shame  Having failed to live up to an ego-ideal 
Sadness Having experienced and irrevocable loss 
Envy Wanting what someone else has 
Jealousy Resenting a third party for loss or threat to another’s affection 
Disgust Taking in or being too close to an indigestible object or idea 
(metaphorically speaking) 
Happiness Making reasonable progress toward the realization of a goal 
Pride Enhancement of one’s ego-identity by taking credit for a valued object or 
achievement, either one’s own or that of some group with whom we 
identify. 
Relief A distressing goal-incongruent condition that has changed for the better or 
gone away. 
Hope Fearing the worst but yearning for better  
Love  Desiring or participating in affection, usually but not necessarily 
reciprocated 
Compassion Being moved by another’s suffering and wanting to help. 
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It is important to note, that for Lazarus, these themes represent how the mind interprets 
emotional states, so he is not, in constructing this list, exhaustively establishing necessary 
and sufficient conditions required for a formal object of each emotion in question.  
Nevertheless, I find that the criteria he establishes as relational themes sufficiently 
describe the conditions generally necessary to count for instances of each emotional state 
possibly elicited by a text.  As a result, these themes will be used to help characterize the 
emotional state the text addresses. 
After the object of the audience’s attention is identified and the conditions under 
which that object is presented is analyzed, the reader should be in good position to 
identify the emotional state O’Neill intends to elicit in each of the stage pictures he 
creates throughout the play.  Once this analysis is conducted, the reader will conclude 
that on the whole, Long Day’s Journey into Night elicits negative emotional states that 
are not mitigated or controlled by positive emotional states.  Given the likelihood of these 
intended states actually being elicited by the faithful reproduction of the stage pictures 
O’Neill prescribes in conjunction with the spoken dialogue of the play, the reader will 
conclude that more often than not, if Long Day’s Journey into Night is presented in a 
manner faithful to the text, the audience’s emotional experience on the whole should be 
negatively characterized. 
   
3.2 The Emotional Structure Of Long Day’s Journey into Night    
As the play opens, O’Neill describes in exhaustive detail the precise appearance of the 
set.  In the later thematic analysis of the play, a great deal of space will be devoted to the 
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appearance of the stage as the curtain rises.  The scene depicted is the Tyrone drawing 
room and perhaps the most notable feature for this analysis is the presence of the morning 
sunshine coming in through the stage right windows.  It is fair to assume that O’Neill is 
likely attempting to elicit a feeling of repose, a calm that will be broken by the rising 
conflict of the Tyrones.  This repose is not directed at a clearly discernible object, 
therefore cognitivists might describe this moment in terms of setting a mood. 
 In Act I, there are basically three distinct scenes marked by a steady decline in the 
positive emotional states O’Neill intends the viewer experience.  The first of these scenes 
begins as the play opens in the morning just after breakfast.  Mary and James enter from 
the dining room, his arm around her waist. As they enter he gives her a hug and praises 
her for her recent weight gain.  As Mary and James are the only characters in the room, 
illuminated by the morning sun, and jovially joking with one another, it is probable that 
the emotional response O’Neill intends to evoke is at least a mild form of happiness.  It is 
clear based upon his careful descriptions of both Mary and James in the stage directions 
that he intends the viewers find Mary and James initially attractive, even if they have 
aged beyond their best years.  Of Mary, O’Neill writes that, she “must have once been 
extremely pretty, and is still striking,”
4
 while James, though sixty-five, “looks ten years 
younger…His face has begun to break down but he is still remarkably good looking—a 
big, finely shaped head, a handsome profile, deep set, light-brown eyes.”
5
  Mary and 
James close connection and love for one another is demonstrated to the audience both by 
their proximity to one another as well as their playful—though noticeably contrary—
dialogue with one another.  Mary teases James about his overeating as well as his real 
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estate speculating, and though James clearly takes offense, he does not respond with the 
venom that will later mark his interactions with his family.   
There are brief but mild shifts away from this overall tone of happiness crafted by 
O’Neill, but these are momentary.  For example, Edmund and Jamie can be heard joking 
in the dining room, and this is interrupted by the sound of Edmund’s consumptive 
coughing.   At this point, there is a marked shift in the tone of James’ and Mary’s 
dialogue.  Mary marks this shift by nervously drumming her fingers on the drawing room 
table.  Here O’Neill is attempting to elicit mild anxiety from the audience.  Though James 
attempts to reassure his wife that her concerns are unwarranted, it is clear to the audience 
that there is an undercurrent of truth to the worries Mary is experiencing, and when Mary 
and James change the subject to the sound of the foghorn keeping them awake, once 
again adopting a teasing tone with one another, this momentary anxiety undoubtedly 
pulls against the feeling of happiness and repose O’Neill has set out to establish in the 
play’s opening.          
 The Tyrone sons enter joking and laughing with one another, which likely further 
relieves the anxiety of the previous moment.  Mary continues to tease James about his 
snoring and invites her eldest son to join her, but he responds by staring at her strangely 
with an “uneasy, probing look,”
6
 which prompts her to begin fussing with her hair to 
avoid his glance.  This moment compels the audience to focus on Mary again as the 
object of their attention, and her attempt to avoid her son’s suspicious gaze at least 
evokes curiosity, and worst evokes a kind of dread about what is to come between them.  
It is clear that Jamie is not interested in pursuing the conflict his stare might provoke, and 
to avoid this conflict he praises his mother for how well she has looked lately.  
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Throughout the play this is a method the Tyrone men use to alleviate Mary’s anxiety, as 
will become apparent throughout Act 1. 
 The mood of the scene is further lightened by Edmund’s retelling of the 
Shaughnessy-Harker incident, and it is clear O’Neill intends to evoke happiness directed 
toward this story, and though James reacts grouchily to what he perceives as Marxist 
overtones in Edmund’s stories, generally the emotion of the narrative is not interrupted 
by another emotional elicitation until Tyrone becomes enraged at Jamie’s needling.  
Edmund heads upstairs to avoid further conflict, and the audience is focused, in a likely 
disgusted manner, at the inappropriate rage James has displayed toward his sons.  
 As Edmund leaves the room, the emotional address of the narrative is directed 
toward Edmund’s illness, evoked by the sounds of his coughing from upstairs.  Mary 
expresses her worry, and Jamie and James attempt to persuade her that Edmund’s illness 
is nothing she should be concerned about.  Based upon Mary’s return to her anxious 
adjustment of her hair, it is clear to the audience that she is not comforted, as O’Neill is 
attempting once again evoke anxiety from the viewer.     
 This anxious tension is momentarily broken as James kisses his wife and tells her 
that her eyes are beautiful.  Mary forgets her anxiety for a moment and “her face lights up 
with a charming, sly embarrassment.  Suddenly and startlingly one sees in her face the 
girl she had once been, not the ghost of the dead, but still a living part of her.”
7
  This 
moment of tenderness between this pair that has been married for so many years 
undoubtedly elicits a moment’s compassion for both Mary and James, and though the 
audience does not yet realize the depth of Mary’s psychic trouble and addiction, the 
audience is once again drawn to she and her husband in compassionate terms. 
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 This moment of compassion is broken as Mary leaves the room, when she turns in 
the doorway and asks her husband not to require Edmund to work with his brother 
trimming the hedges.  The audience is focused on Mary, as she is likely the only 
character standing, and her dramatic turn and shift from girlish tone to that of motherly 
concern initiates the anxiety that the audience will experience throughout the 
conversation between Jamie and his father after Mary leaves the room. 
 With Mary and Edmund offstage, the second major scene marked by a particular 
emotional address begins—this scene much darker than the first.  Because the 
emotionally weak Mary has left the room, the elder Tyrone and his son begin a strident 
argument that marks a turn toward emotionally addressing anxiety, disgust, and perhaps 
anger from the audience.  As Mary leaves, James turns to his son “condemningly”
8
 and 
berates him for suggesting to his mother that Edmund’s condition might be more serious 
than a summer cold.  Throughout the ensuing dialogue of attack and retreat between 
James and Jamie, an intensifying anxiety is evoked by the dialogue.  
 Initially, Edmund’s condition is the subject of this anxiety.  James reveals to his 
son that Doc Hardy believes that Edmund has tuberculosis, and immediately, Jamie 
attacks his father because of his cheapness.  Because Tyrone does not deny the charge, 
the audience recognizes that Jamie is speaking the truth about his father, which likely 
arouses the emotion of disgust directed toward the father.  This emotion of disgust is 
likely also conferred upon Jamie as the dialogue unfolds, as his father reveals that Jamie 
is a “lazy lunk and sponge”
9
 who spends all his money on whiskey and whores and who 
only remains employed because of his father’s influence and good graces.  Again, Jamie 
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does not object to his father’s characterization of him, which reinforces and validates the 
feeling of disgust the audience is intended to experience in response to him. 
 The overwhelming sense of anxiety marked in this section of Act 1 is interrupted 
by a few moments designed to mitigate some of the disgust the audience likely feels 
toward these two privileged white men whose pain is largely brought on by their own 
actions.  For example, when James scolds Jamie for introducing Edmund to the “worldly 
wisdom” of barrooms and whore houses, accusing his son of wishing to destroy his 
brother, Jamie replies, “that’s a rotten accusation, Papa.  You know how much the kid 
means to me—and how close we’ve always been—not like the usual brothers! I’d do 
anything for him.”
10
  James is moved and retreats by saying, “I know you thought it was 
for the best, Jamie.  I didn’t say you did it deliberately to harm him.”
11
  Moments such as 
these are peppered throughout this scene, interrupting the worsening conflict, and they 
are constructed to elicit compassion for these Tyrone men, though their personalities and 
dialogue are strident and full of ego. 
 The conflict between James and his son turns from the subject of Edmund’s 
tuberculosis to that of Mary’s addiction.  This moment is meant to reveal important 
exposition to the audience, but it also increases the anxiety of the scene.  When Jamie 
reveals his suspicion that Mary has returned to morphine and authentically expresses his 
concern for her recovery, James attacks him “with a burst of resentful anger” by saying 
“by God, how you can live with a mind that sees nothing but the worst motives behind 
everything is beyond me!”
12
  Though Tyrone is attempting to change the subject, for the 
audience member, it appears that he is abusing his son who has momentarily opened up 
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to him with genuine concern for Mary. Undoubtedly, such behavior toward James would 
arouse feelings of disgust toward the father and sympathy toward James. 
 As the argument between Tyrone and his son reaches its zenith, Mary enters the 
room and interrupts, which marks a third downward emotional shift in the texture of Act 
I.  Mary again returns to the room, this time with a strange manner of movement and tone 
of voice that provokes both Tyrone men to stare at her “with a growing dread.”
13
  She 
holds up her hands and complains of how ugly they have become, to which Tyrone 
responds by gently pushing them and reassuring her that her hands “are the sweetest 
hands in the world.”
14
  Again, this stage picture likely evokes compassion for the elderly 
couple, and Mary responds to James’ kindness by kissing her husband.   
As James exist, Jamie momentarily encourages his mother not to worry 
about Edmund, and he walks out onto the front porch.  Mary’s inner 
conflict becomes evident to the audience as she is momentarily alone 
onstage. 
She waits rigidly until he (Jamie) disappears down the steps. Then she 
sinks down in the chair he had occupied, her face betraying a frightened, 
furtive desperation, her hands roving over the table top, aimlessly moving 
objects around.  She hears Edmund descending the stairs in the front hall.  
As he nears the bottom he has a fit of coughing.  She springs to her feet, 
as if she wanted to run from the sound, and goes quickly to the windows 
at right.  She is looking out, apparently calm, as he enters from the front 





This moment, of course, is likely meant to elicit several emotions, but chief among them 
is likely the feeling of anxiety.  The audience is, for the first time in the play, witnessed 
the frantic inner-turmoil that Mary is facing, and though she manages to regain control of 
herself by the time Edmund enters, it is clear that she will not be able to maintain this 
control throughout the play.  The audience likely wonders when she will lose control of 
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herself and what will be the cause of this loss of control, and this will provoke an 
unsettled, anxious feeling directed toward Mary, a feeling which is heightened by her 
other-worldly tone of voice and mannerisms. 
 Throughout this final sequence of Act I, Mary’s demeanor has clearly been 
altered by the presence of the narcotic, and her clearly detached manner inevitably 
heightens the anxiety level O’Neill intends to craft in this scene.  In addition to this 
anxiety toward Mary, O’Neill is clearly establishing a pattern of salience in order to elicit 
compassion for Edmund.  Mary remarks that he has grown too thin, and he weakly sits 
down in rocking chair.  She kisses him, and he looks at her earnestly and urges her 
“Never mind me. Take care of yourself. That’s all that counts.”
16
  Again, it is fair to 
characterize this moment as displaying something of Edmund’s nobility in spite of his 
consumption, and this heightens the audience’s sympathetic compassion toward him, 
especially as this is contrasted by Mary’s punctuated detachment toward him. 
 Mary, clearly under the influence of the narcotic, complains about her husband’s 
pride, his cheapness, her lack of friends, and the moral depravity of her sons, all while 
Edmund rests, wearily, in the rocking chair.  Her behavior in the face of her stricken 
youngest son likely further strengthens the audience’s sympathy toward him as well as 
their disgust for her.  Edmund gently encourages his mother to stay strong in her 
resistance to the addictive power of morphine, to which Mary replies by accusing him of 
being overly suspicious and somehow in league with his father.  These accusations 
intensify when Edmund reveals that he had heard his mother in the spare room the night 
before.  “Her hands flutter up to pat her hair in their aimless, distracted way.  Suddenly a 
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strange undercurrent of revengefulness comes into her voice.”
17
  Of Edmund’s suspicions 
that Mary is returning to morphine, she blurts out “It would serve you right if it were 
true!”
18
  Edmund is clearly hurt by this attack, and it is clear the audience would be 
disgusted by her attack on a weak, ailing, and loving son. 
 Mary realizes that she has gone too far, and she puts her arms around her son, 
hugging him “with a frightened and protected tenderness.”
19
  She attempts to soothe her 
son for a moment but quickly slips back into her detached and strange tone of voice.  She 
eerily informs him that she is going upstairs to take a nap, and he responds with a look of 
suspicion, then “ashamed of himself, looks away.”
20
  Edmund goes to the screen door and 
attempts to make a joke at which Mary forces a laugh.  He exits and she is left alone on 
the stage, the sole object of the audience’s focus: 
Her first reaction is one of relief.  She appears to relax.  She sinks down 
in one of the wicker armchairs at rear of the table and leans her head 
back, closing her eyes.  But suddenly she grows terribly tense again.  Her 
eyes open and she strains forward, seized by a fit of nervous panic.  She 
begins a desperate battle with herself. Her long fingers, warped and 
knotted by rheumatism, drum on the arms of her chair, driven by an 




This last moment of the act reinforces the general anxiety O’Neill has crafted in the final 
scene of the act.  As the curtain falls, undoubtedly the audience member is left with 
uncertainty about Mary’s conflict within herself, and the strange physical manifestation 
of this inner conflict leaves is constructed to leave the audience member ill-at-ease with 
respect to how the upcoming acts will unfold.   
                                                     
17




 Ibid., 48. 
20





 When one evaluates the emotional address of the first act, she finds that while the 
play begins by eliciting positive emotional responses (happiness in the scene just after 
breakfast), and momentary positive emotions are elicited throughout (compassion toward 
Mary, James, and Edmund), by the conclusion of the first act negative emotions (largely 
disgust and anxiety) dominate.  On the whole, then, it is unlikely that an audience 
member would characterize her emotional experience of the first act positively.  The 
anxious discomfort she is intended to feel is likely to increase as the following acts 
develop the plot and deepen the onstage conflicts within the Tyrone family. 
 As the curtain rises on the second act, the audience discovers Edmund sitting in 
the armchair, reading a book.  The stage directions point out that sunlight no longer 
comes into the room now, and “outside the day is still fine but increasingly sultry, with a 
faint haziness in the air which softens the glare of the sun.”
22
 Edmund appears nervous 
and unsettled, undoubtedly worried about his mother.  Additionally, he looks “more 
sickly than in the previous act.”  These features of the scene likely recall the anxiety of 
the first act, although since Edmund finds himself alone onstage, this anxiety is 
significantly weakened. 
 Cathleen appears with the tray of whiskey, and her appearance continues the 
move away from the anxious tone set by the appearance of Edmund.  Because she is 
obviously flirting with Edmund during her dialogue with him, and the brash, uncouth 
manner with which she shouts for the other Tyrone men to come to lunch, she provides a 
comic relief that may well evoke laughter from the audience, and one might describe the 
tone of this first scene as eliciting a mild happiness.  Before Jamie enters, Edmund sneaks 
a drink and returns to his chair quickly, but as he enters, Jamie looks knowingly at the 
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bottle and teasingly chides his brother’s sneakiness.  This moment further lightens the 
tone of the scene, increasing the comic happiness O’Neill intends, likely as a break from 
the intense emotional anxiety that ended the preceding act.  Jamie takes a drink for 
himself and then fills the bottle up to the level he has taken with water, and this act 
continues the comic tone of the scene, further easing the previously felt anxiety and 
strengthening a feeling of happiness. 
 The happiness elicited by the comedic moments at the beginning of the first act is 
abruptly interrupted when Jamie inquires as to the whereabouts of Mary, and Edmund 
informs him that she has been upstairs throughout the morning.  Immediately Jamie’s 
demeanor changes, and he attacks his brother for allowing her to go upstairs by himself.  
Edmund attempts to weakly defend himself, and then the brothers both acknowledge their 
awareness that Mary had been in the spare room the night before.  The stage directions 
prescribe a pause, during which “the brothers avoid looking at each other.”
23
  This pause 
once again elicits anxiety directed toward Mary’s condition.   
Edmund attempts to deny that his mother has returned to her drugs, but Jamie 
attacks him for it.  Jamie “bursts out” saying “you’re a damned fool!  Why did you leave 
her alone here so long?  Why didn’t you stick around?”
24
  The focus of the audience’s 
attention moves here from Mary’s suspected relapse to the conflict between the brothers, 
and during this dialogue, O’Neill intends to create sympathy for the sickly Edmund.  
Edmund defensively replies, “Because she accused me—and you and Papa—of spying on 
her all the time and not trusting her.  She made me feel ashamed.  I know how rotten it 
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must be for her.”
25
  Jamie himself seems to be moved with compassion for his brother’s 
predicament.  He empathizes with Edmund and explains that Edmund does not appreciate 
the signs of Mary’s relapse.  This moment, though likely colored by the anxiety elicited 
by the impending revelation of Mary’s addiction, establishes a connection between the 
brothers that compels compassion from the audience.  This moment is very brief 
however, as Mary re-enters the room.    
 As Mary enters, Edmund coughs nervously and this initiates a “real fit of 
coughing.”
26
  This coughing directs the audience’s attention back to the ominousness of 
Edmund’s condition, and it is accompanied by Mary’s otherworldly presence in the 
parlor.  She is clearly under the influence of the drugs now, and this is made clear to the 
audience, as they become aware “that her eyes are brighter, and there is a peculiar 
detachment in her voice and manner, as if she were a little withdrawn from her words and 
actions.”
27
  She gently and eerily scolds Edmund for his heavy coughing, kissing him, 
and Edmund does not initially suspect that anything is wrong with her.  Jamie, on the 
other hand, “knows after one probing look at her that his suspicions are justified.  His 
eyes fall to stare at the floor, his sets in an expression of embittered, defensive 
cynicism.”
28
  Mary sits behind Edmund, so that he cannot see in her eyes, and this 
arrangement of the characters, coupled with Mary’s inebriated tone of speaking, is 
constructed to once again evoke and strengthen the feeling of anxiety evoked so 
powerfully at the end of the first act. 
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 Mary asks why Jamie is so “down in the dumps,” concluding that his demeanor is 
the result of his having had to work outside on the hedges.  Jamie glumly replies, “If you 
want to think so Mama.”
29
  She asks where James is, which provokes one of Jamie’s 
criticisms of his father as an old blow-hard.  This criticism draws a fierce attack from 
Mary, and she hits him where it hurts, “Everyone else admires him, and you should be 
the last one to sneer—you, who thanks to him, have never had to work hard in your 
life!”
30
  The stage directions describe Jamie as “stung” by this attack, and he appears for 
a moment in a sympathetic light, compelling a feeling of compassion from the audience. 
 Despite her brief attack on Jamie, Mary returns to her strange tone of speaking, 
and “Edmund is made apprehensive by her strangeness. He tries to look up at her eyes 
but she keeps them averted. Jamie turns to her—then looks quickly out of the window 
again.”  This tableau, Edmund’s searching look, and Jamie’s deliberate avoidance of eye 
contact with Mary, and Mary’s unwillingness to look at her sons, again evokes a 
pronounced anxiety.  Jamie’s deliberate refusal to look at his mother portends a later 
conflict that the audience realizes will erupt in the near future.  He attempts to change the 
subject, stating that he is hungry and he wishes his father would return to the house for 
lunch.  His comment ultimately his ineffective, as Mary continues to deliver a long 
speech in the same eerie, detached tone as before.   
 Cathleen enters and informs the trio that James is too busy talking with the 
neighbor to come in for lunch, and Edmund takes this opportunity to leave the 
awkwardness of the parlor, asserting that he will hurry his father along. Jamie and Mary 
are left alone onstage, and this moment will mark an intensification of the tension and 
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anxiety already elicited earlier.  When left alone with her eldest son, Mary “has risen 
from the arm of the chair.  Her hands play restlessly over the table top.  She does not look 
at Jamie but she feels the cynically appraising glance he gives her face and hands.”
31
  She 
asks why he is staring at her, and Jamie says “you know,” and turns back toward the 
window.
32
  Instead of taking the opportunity to avoid the conflict, Mary protests that she 
does not know what he is talking about, and Jamie angrily tells her to examine her eyes in 
the mirror.  It is clear, based upon her eyes, that she is under the influence of the narcotic.  
Edmund re-enters from the porch, looks around, and senses the tension between his 
mother and Jamie.  Mary appeals to Edmund for help from Jamie’s attack, and Edmund 
takes “a threatening step toward him.  Jamie turns his back with a shrug and looks out the 
window.”
33
  The anxiety created by the eerie tone of Mary’s speech and the 
unwillingness of Jamie to engage her has been amplified by his direct accusation of her 
and Edmund’s confrontation of him, but again, instead of following the conflict where it 
will lead, Jamie avoids the situation, further prompting anxiety by keeping the threat of 
the impending argument alive.  The audience knows that this fight is coming, and they 
will remain anxious until this conflict is resolved. 
 James enters from outside, oblivious to what has transpired while he has been 
gone, and his entrance provides a moment of emotional relief as he calls attention to the 
earlier moment of comedy in which Jamie filled the whiskey with water up to the level of 
liquor he had taken.  James “comes to the table with a quick measuring look at the bottle 
of whiskey.”
34
  He cheerfully offers his sons a drink, though he cautions Edmund about 
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taking liquor given the younger Tyrone’s illness. Edmund gets up and pours himself a big 
drink immediately after his father advises him to observe moderation given his condition.  
He then looks at Jamie and remarks, “I suppose it’d be a waste of breath mentioning 
moderation to you.”
35
  Though there is darkness to this humor, it is fair to characterize 
this moment as eliciting mild happiness through levity, especially compared to the 
moment of intensity that has just occurred among Jamie, Mary, and Edmund. 
 Tyrone’s momentary levity is undercut as Mary returns to the scene. Mary returns 
to the room, and it is clear to James, based upon her excited behavior and uninhibited 
speech that she is once again under the influence of narcotics.  She flies into a tirade 
about James’ pretense that this is a home, and implicitly accuses him of causing her 
addiction, and “they stare at her.  Tyrone knows no.  He suddenly looks a tired, bitterly 
sad old man.  Edmund glances at his father and sees that he knows, but he still cannot 
help trying to warn his mother.”
36
  Though Edmund attempts to get his mother to stop 
talking, James already understands what has happened, and his appearance as a “bitterly 
sad old man,” compels sympathy from the audience in the face of their disgust for Mary’s 
behavior.  This moment is further heightened when she notices that Edmund has taken a 
drink despite his illness.  She violently attacks her husband for allowing this behavior, 
and then eerily and checks herself, asserting in an eerily distant tone of voice, “But, of 
course, there’s no comparison at all.”
37
  Again, Mary has suggested a point of conflict 
that she will only later address, promoting a feeling of unresolved anxiety. As the family 
leaves the room for dinner, Mary begs James’ forgiveness, and she cries “James!  I tried 
so hard! I tried so hard! Please believe.”  For a moment, it is clear that O’Neill intends the 
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audience have compassion for Mary, as her husband momentarily does, but when Mary 
once again denies that she knows what James is talking about, the feeling of anxiety 
returns, and as the lights dim to close the first scene of the second act, the audience is 
undoubtedly left with anxiety directed toward the conflict that has yet to be fully 
explored. 
 The second scene of Act Two begins as the Tyrone’s re-enter the parlor after 
lunch.  The stage directions describe their entrance: 
Mary is the first to enter from the back parlor.  Her husband follows.  He 
is not with her as he was in the similar entrance after breakfast at the 
opening of Act One.  He avoids touching he or looking at her.  There is 
condemnation on his fact, mingled now with the beginning of an old 
weary, helpless resignation.  Jamie and Edmund follow their father.  
Jamie’s face is hard with defensive cynicism.  Edmund tries to copy this 
defense but without success.  He plainly shows that he is heartsick as well 
as physically ill. 
Mary is terribly nervous again, as if the strain of sitting through lunch 
with them had been too much for her.  Yet at the same time, in contrast to 
this, her expression shows more of that strange aloofness which seems to 




Based upon the way the family enters the room after their meal, especially contrasted 
with the way they entered after breakfast, the audience immediately recalls the anxiety 
they had experienced as the last scene closed.  
 This anxiety is likely interrupted as Mary informs the family that she will return 
upstairs.  As she leaves the room, presumably to administer more morphine, Jamie 
cynically remarks, “Another shot in the arm!”
39
  This bitterly blunt remark is intended to 
evoke a mild disgust that will be evoked much more strongly in Act IV when Jamie 
remarks that his mother is like Ophelia in Hamlet.  Immediately, James and Edmund 
attack Jamie for his frank and disrespectful lack of pity, and Jamie’s response compels 
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sympathy for the young loafer.  As a spasm of pain crosses is face, he asks, “No pity?  I 
have all the pity in the world for her.  I understand what a hard game to beat she’s up 
against—which is more than you ever have!  My lingo didn’t mean I have no feeling. I 
was merely putting bluntly what we all know, and have to live with now, again.”
40
 At 
least momentarily, the audience comes to understand that Jamie sees himself in the same 
situation as his mother, and that his criticism of her is an indictment of his own weakness.  
Because of this understanding, it is likely the viewer is sympathetic to Jamie’s plight and 
the attack on him by the other Tyrone men has elicited this compassion. 
 The pattern of disgust mitigated by sympathy occurs throughout the conclusion of 
Act Two.   For instance, James rebukes his sons for their pessimistic nihilism in lifestyle 
and philosophy, asserting that if the sons have “flouted the faith you were brought up 
in—the one true faith of the Catholic church—and your denial has brought nothing but 
self-destruction!”
41
  Jamie and Edmund immediately ridicule their father’s appeal to 
Catholicism, and the fact that he has used the Church as a weapon to demean his sons 
likely makes his faith unappealing to the audience.  When Jamie and Edmund expose 
their father’s hypocrisy he almost immediately becomes a target of the viewer’s 
sympathy as James reveals that he prays daily for his wife.  James admits that he has lost 
hope that Mary will triumph over her addiction, and this admission likely heightens the 
viewer’s sympathy toward him. 
 This pattern is repeated with more intensity in James’ conversation with his 
intoxicated wife.   Mary inquires as to why Jamie seems to be in such a bad mood, and 
she concludes that it is James’ fault, ultimately because “If he’d been brought up in a real 
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home, I’m sure he would have been different.”
42
  She continues her assault on James by 
attacking his alcoholism, to which he replies bitterly, “If I did get drunk it is not you who 
should blame me.  No man has ever had better reason.”
43
  Mary complains that she is 
lonely, and James encourages her to take a trip into town in the car, pointing out that she 
never uses the car though he bought it for her. He accuses her for this, bitterly asserting 
that the purchase was “Waste! The same old waste that will land me in the poorhouse in 
my old age!  What good did it do you? I might as well have thrown the money out the 
window.”
44
  Mary evades this attack by criticizing James’ cheapness in the purchase of 
the car and the hiring of a second-rate driver.  During this dialogue, Mary’s tone is eerily 
calm as James’ becomes more and more strident, but their argument does not compel the 
viewer’s sympathy; instead, watching an old married couple attack each other as directly 
and brutally as they can imagine likely compels disgust for both of them.   
 Again the tension builds to a breaking point, and instead of further attacking his 
wife, James begs Mary to stop for his sake and the sake of their sons.  This request moves 
Mary, and though she denies that she knows what he is talking about, she begs him to 
remember “We’ve loved each other!  We always will!  Let’s remember only that, and try 
not to understand what we cannot understand, or help things that cannot be helped—the 
things that life has done to us we cannot excuse or explain.”  As she utters these words, 
she puts her arms around her husband, and these sentiments, coupled with the stage 
picture of deep love serve to momentarily break the disgusted anxiety created by James 
and Mary and once again initiate compassion for the patriarch and matriarch of the 
Tyrone family. 
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 As Edmund leaves to see Doctor Hardy, there is a unique moment between him 
and his father that possibly calls for a unique emotional response from the viewer.  
Edmund confesses to James that he is broke and needs cab fare, and instead of lecturing 
his son about the value of a dollar, the old miser generously gives his son ten dollars and 
praises him for the hard work he has been doing at the local paper.  Edmund is 
“embarrassed by his generosity,”
45
 and reacts by sarcastically asking if Doc Hardy had 
told James that he was going to die.  As Edmund genuinely thanks his father for the 
gesture, the viewer is compelled to experience hope.  It seems as if something has 
changed in Edmund and his father’s relationship, and James’ unexpected generosity 
might be evidence that the cycle of Tyrone family conflict may end. 
 The hope generated by this moment of tenderness is abruptly interrupted by 
another Mary’s outbursts. Latching onto Edmund’s joke about dying, she “suddenly turns 
to them in a confused panic of frightened anger,” stomps her foot, and cries, “I won’t 
have it!...Do you hear, Edmund! Such morbid nonsense!...You’re not really sick at all!”
46
  
The tender moment between James and Edmund is shattered, and though Mary quickly 
changes her mode of address, “instantly changing to a detached tone,” teasingly scolding 
her son for his morbid humor, the familiar anxiety is raised, potentially erasing the 
feeling of hope created a moment earlier.  Mary can only sustain the detached tone for a 
moment, and she puts her arm around her youngest son, “hiding her face in his shoulder, 
sobbing.  Edmund is moved in spite of himself.  He pats her shoulder with an awkward 
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  Mary once again appears a sympathetic and tragic victim, her image 
compelling compassion and anxiety. 
 Act II ends with an emotionally harrowing conversation between Edmund and 
Mary.  Upon James’ prompting, Edmund pleads with his mother to stop taking morphine.  
Predictably, Mary denies she knows what he is talking about.  When this strategy fails to 
satisfy Edmund’s efforts, Mary changes the subject to James’ cheapness, Doctor Hardy’s 
ineptitude, and the loss of her Catholic virtue and soul.  Her monologue is delivered in 
the same strange, intoxicated tone that has marked much of her speech throughout the act, 
and this tone, coupled with her unwillingness to engage Edmund’s pleading, contribute 
once again to the ever growing anxiety directed toward her.   
As Edmund leaves the stage, Mary is left alone to deliver a soliloquy in which she 
reveals, as her “face hardens with bitter contempt,” that she is glad to be rid of her family 
members for the afternoon, for “their contempt and disgust aren’t pleasant company.”  As 
the curtain closes, however, she asks of herself, “then Mother of God, why do I feel so 
lonely?”
48
 This admission may address the audience emotionally in two ways: 1)the 
eeriness of Mary’s tone, and her bitter attitude toward her family promote and heighten 
the anxiety that is already present as part of the scene, and 2)her final admission of 
loneliness again calls for compassion. 
 The emotional contours of Act II frenetically modulate, but the reader would be 
hard pressed to deny that the overwhelming emotional tone of the act is negative.  There 
are several moments of levity that produce a mild happiness, particularly Cathleen’s 
boorishness as well as the stage business with the whiskey bottle, but overall the scene is 
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marked by anxiety and disgust.  There is one unique moment of hope directed toward 
James and Edmund’s relational attitudes toward one another, but this moment is quickly 
subverted by Mary’s caustic attacks and otherworldly tone. On the whole, the audience 
member would likely characterize this act as arousing more negative emotional states 
than the first. 
 The third act occurs just before dinner.  Mary and Cathleen have returned from 
the pharmacy, where Cathleen has filled more of Mary’s prescriptions for morphine.  As 
a reward, Mary has treated Cathleen to some bourbon, and the servant girl is noticeably 
intoxicated as the scene opens.  The stage directions describe Mary’s appearance:  
Mary is paler than before and her eyes shine with unnatural brilliance.  
The strange detachment in her manner has intensified.  She has hidden 
deeper in within herself and found refuge and release in a dream…There 
is at times an uncanny gay, free youthfulness in her manner, as if in spirit 
she were released to become again, simply and without self-
consciousness, the naïve, happy, chattering schoolgirl of her convent 





Seen in the light of the current analysis, this section of the Act presents an interesting 
variation on the theme O’Neill has crafted in Acts 1 and 2.  As each of these acts began, 
O’Neill uses levity, the hijinks the whiskey bottle, and Cathleen’s boorish behavior serve 
to contrast the emotional load that is levied upon the audience as each respective act 
develops.  There is a comical element present as Act 3 begins as well, as Cathleen’s 
obvious drunkenness heightens her boorishness, and Mary and Cathleen attempt to fill 
the whiskey bottle with water to supplement what they have taken (as the Tyrone sons 
have done in the previous act). The emotional tone set in at the beginning of this act, 
however, is not happy, because of the eerie manner of speech and intoxicated behavior of 
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Mary (accompanied with the absence of sun and drone of the foghorn) that dominates this 
sequence. As Mary and Cathleen reminisce about Mary’s past, the anxiety familiar to the 
audience at this point in the play returns and intensifies until the re-entrance of the 
Tyrone men. 
 Throughout Mary and Cathleen’s conversation, O’Neill works to arouse sympathy 
for both of the women.  Cathleen complains of Smyth’s inappropriate sexual advances, 
including “pinching me on the leg and the you-know-where,”
50
 and Mary simply ignores 
her complaints, lost in her own dream-like self-centeredness.  Mary’s callous lack of 
regard for Cathleen’s sexual safety calls for compassion directed toward the simple 
servant girl.  Likewise, compassion is momentarily elicited for Mary when Cathleen 
attempts to leave to go to the kitchen, and “with a flash of approbation,” Mary says, “No, 
don’t go, Cathleen.  I don’t want to be alone, yet.”
51
  Though Cathleen stays, it is clear 
that she does not comprehend the depth of Mrs. Tyrone’s admission, as she continues to 
make small talk, oblivious to the severity of her mistress’s condition.  Cathleen’s lack of 
appreciation of the suffering of the tormented woman of the house likely directs 
additional compassion toward Mary.      
 Though several additional moments of Mary’s reflection of the past likely elicit 
mild compassion for her, these lines are supposed to be delivered in such a distracted and 
distant tone that it is unlikely the audience would receive much relief from anxiety they 
feel directed toward Mary’s impending demise.  However, there is one significant 
moment that likely arouses a great deal of compassion for Mary.  After Cathleen returns 
to the kitchen, Mary is alone in the parlor, where she delivers a powerful soliloquy after 
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suddenly relinquishing “all the girlish quality” and appears “an aging, cynically sad, 
embittered woman.”  She bemoans the loss of her faith and recites the Hail Mary “in a 
flat, empty tone,”
52
 and then reminds herself that the Virgin sees not only what she does, 
but who she is within her heart.  Mary decides that she has not had enough of the drug 
and resolves to go upstairs to administer more, when she recognizes that James and 
Edmund have returned home.  “Suddenly, her whole manner changes.  She becomes 
pathetically relieved and eager,”
53
 claiming that she is glad they have returned.  This war 
within herself likely elicits strong sympathetic compassion for the suffering woman. 
 It might be fair to claim that this compassion directed toward Mary lingers as 
James and Edmund return to the scene.  She is genuinely glad that they have returned, 
and attempts to pour them a drink and make them comfortable, but they respond to her 
with “condemning eyes,”
54
 that she is unaware of at first, but later recognizes.  This 
compassion falls away as she begins to criticize Jamie and compares Edmund’s colicky 
behavior as a child to her “angel” Eugene, who died in infancy.  This diversionary tactic 
arouses disgust directed toward her, as Edmund is clearly not to blame for his behavior as 
a baby, and the audience likely senses how cruel she I being to her consumptive son. 
 As earlier in the play, O’Neill interrupts this moment of disgust with a moment of 
genuine tenderness that recalls the earlier compassion the audience likely felt toward 
James and Mary. After delivering a long, critical speech of James, Jamie, and Edmund, 
Mary apologizes and in a changed tone, justifies her behavior by saying, “it’s very dreary 
and sad to be he alone in the fog with the night falling.”
55
  This statement moves James to 
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compassion, and he assures her that, “I’m glad I came, Mary, when you act like your real 
self.”
56
  For a moment, they reminisce about how they met, and James tone of voice 
becomes husky.  Edmund turns away as his parent share a brief moment of romance, and 
this moment allows the audience to once again feel compassion for the tortured lovers.  
However, as before, this compassion falls away as Mary’s reminiscences turn away from 
the happy times she and her husband have shared and toward James’ continual 
drunkenness.  She recalls a night on her honeymoon, when James had gotten so drunk in 
a bar that he had to be carried back to the hotel room where she had waited for him for 
hours.  Mary’s retelling of this story, as well as her return to her impersonal, distant tone 
of speaking called for in the stage directions, once again elicits anxiety and disgust 
directed toward both the elder Tyrones. 
 Throughout the final, lengthy conversations that Mary has with her husband and 
son, the overwhelming emotion that is addressed is anxiety, made more acute than in 
previous acts as the family reveals more details of the past they have only hinted at 
before.  One example of such a revelation is when Mary bluntly blames Edmund for her 
addiction. When Edmund rebukes her for taking Cathleen to fill her prescription, Mary 
attacks him in the worst way she can conceive.  She turns to Edmund, in a fit of “almost 
revengeful enmity,” and exclaims, “I never knew what rheumatism was before you were 
born!  Ask your father!”  Immediately, the stage directions call for Edmund to look away, 
“shrinking into himself.”  Edmund’s physical action reveals how hurt he has been by his 
mother’s blame, and the audience feels incredible sympathy for him as well as disgust for 
what Mary has become.  Overall, because of this blunt attack, the audience would likely 
characterize their response to this moment in terms of anxiety, and perhaps even anger. 





 The emotional climax of the third act occurs just before the act closes. Edmund 
has had enough of his mother’s inebriated attacks and he abruptly exits.  The stage 
directions indicate that “He hurries away through the front parlor.  She keeps staring out 
the window until she hears the front door close behind him.  Then she comes back and 
sits in the chair, the same blank look on her face.”
57
  James re-enters the parlor after 
visiting the cellar for another bottle of whiskey and discovers that Edmund has gone.  Of 
her youngest son’s decision to miss dinner, she says, “He doesn’t seem to have any 
appetite these days.”  Then, seeming to reassure herself, she says, “But it’s just a summer 
cold.”  James looks at her blankly as he has another drink, and “suddenly it is too much 
for her and she breaks down in sobs.”  Mary throws her arms around her husband and 
cries, “Oh, James! I’m so frightened!...I know he’s going to die!”  Tyrone attempts to 
reassure Mary, but she accuses him of acting.  The image of Mary falling sorrowfully 
into her husband’s arms calls for a sympathetic response from the audience, and though 
this moment is hastily interrupted by the arrival of the drunken Cathleen announcing 
dinner, it is likely this image looms largest in the audience’s mind as the act ends. 
 When one attempts to inventory on a large scale the sorts of feelings she 
experiences throughout the third act, the overwhelming emotional contour can only be 
characterized negatively.  Though there are a few comical elements present in the act, 
these elements are not powerful enough to mitigate the overwhelming anxiety, disgust, 
and compassion incited in the action and dialogue propelling the plot.  Any trace of hope 
that Edmund or Mary might recover is almost immediately squashed by the return of 
anxiety produced through continual conflict and accusation.   The third act continues the 
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long emotional slide toward negative emotional states as onstage the day dwindles into a 
fog-ridden and dark night. 
 The opening of Act Four is remarkable in that when one attempts to isolate and 
examine the emotional address of this act’s first ten pages, she finds herself at something 
of a loss   Edmund has returned from a walk in the fog down by the beach, and though he 
and his father have several superficial conflicts over whether or not to burn the lights, 
which poets are best, and other such superficial topics, the viewer is not directly 
presented with a clear emotional object whereby she may organize her perceptions of 
James and his youngest son.   Though the dialogue does not provide a clear emotional 
focus, it is fair to acknowledge that O’Neill is crafting a general mood of (at least mild) 
anxiety as he paints a picture of the stage in his directions.  He writes: 
It is around midnight.  The lamp in the front hall has been turned out, so 
that now no light shines through the front parlor.  In the living room only 
the reading lamp on the table is lighted.  Outside the windows the wall of 
fog appears denser than ever. As the curtain rises, the foghorn is heard, 




Because of the lack of stage lighting as well as the appearance of fog outside the 
windows, the room appears much smaller, and as the curtain rises, James sits alone in the 
room, drunkenly playing cards.  Mary is absent, and it is likely the viewer will recall that 
she has gone upstairs to take more morphine.   For these reasons, it is fair to claim that 
though Edmund and James’ conversation does not elicit a clearly discernible emotional 
response, most of their conversation is colored by anxiety, given the circumstances 
surrounding their conversation as well as the appearance of the room that they inhabit.  
 Edmund and his father play a game of Casino at the parlor table, and as they do, 
they provide a good deal of exposition that further acquaints the viewer with the 
                                                     
58
 Ibid., 125. 
91 
 
relationship between Mary and her husband.  The first poignant conflict arises when 
Edmund blames his father for Mary’s addiction.  When James reminds Edmund that 
Mary has returned to morphine because of her anxiety about his condition, Edmund 
angrily retorts,  
It should never have gotten hold of her!  I know damned well she’s not to 
blame!  And I know who is!  You are! Your damned stinginess!   If you’d 
spent money for a decent doctor when she was so sick after I was born, 
she’d never have known morphine existed! Instead, you put her in the 
hands of a hotel quack who wouldn’t admit his ignorance and took the 
easiest way out, not giving a damn what happened to her afterwards!  All 




Edmund’s attack on his father does not evoke compassion for his father, as similar 
remarks have through the course of the play, because instead of being stung by his son’s 
words, James defies his son’s estimation of events, first angrily retorting, “How dare you 
talk of something you know nothing about!” and secondly by entreating his son to 
appreciate his side of the story.
60
  James dismissal of his son’s accusation likely makes 
Edmund appear insolent in this instance, which calls for disgust on the part of the 
audience.  Edmund amplifies his accusation instead of relenting in the face of his father’s 
defense, ending a violent speech by angrily shouting, “Christ, is it any wonder she didn’t 
want to be cured.  Jesus, when I think of it I hate your guts!”
61
  This disrespect toward 
James likely increases the disgust the viewer feels, and James’ line “how dare you talk to 
your father like that, you insolent young cub!”
62
 clearly articulates the grounds for such 
feeling.  
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 It is unclear at first exactly why Edmund is so angry at his father.  After all, Mary 
has been suffering this addiction for many years.  Why is Edmund’s ire toward James’ 
miserliness os intense?  This confusion is quickly alleviated as the scene progresses, as 
the audience member comes to understand that because of James’ unwillingness to pay 
for a private institution, Edmund is to be sent to a “state farm” to recover from his 
tuberculosis.  As this point is raised, the audience’s attention is justifiably focused the 
damage that James’ cheapness has done and is currently doing to those who he claims to 
love. Under these circumstances, it is likely that the disgusted feeling the viewer might 
experience with respect to Edmund’s insolence is redirected toward the father.  Edmund 
points out that with James’ attitude toward tuberculosis as a death sentence, it would be 
unreasonable to expect him to spend his money on a private hospital for his son, and 
though Tyrone denies this accusation, it is clear based upon the “bitter confusion” called 
for in the stage directions that Edmund’s comment reflects reality, again legitimating the 
disgust one feels toward Tyrone. 
 Edmund delivers an impassioned speech about “making allowances” for everyone 
in the Tyrone family, but he states that he will no longer do so with respect to his father’s 
cheapness.  “Bursting with rage,” Edmund cries, “And don’t think I’ll let you get away 
with it! I won’t go to any state farm just to save you a few lousy dollars to buy more 
damned property with!”
63
 As he delivers these lines, his rage provokes a fit of severe, 
consumptive coughing.  This moment evokes compassion toward Edmund by both the 
viewer and James as well. Instead of defending his selection of the state sanitarium for 
Edmund, James relents.  He tells his son, “ As he delivers these lines, his rage provokes a 
fit of severe, consumptive coughing.  This moment evokes compassion toward Edmund 
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by both the viewer and James as well. Instead of defending his selection of the state 
sanitarium for Edmund, James relents.  He tells his son, “You’ve got yourself worked up 
over nothing.  Who said you had to go to this Hilltown place?  You can go anywhere you 
like.  I don’t give a damn what it costs.”
64
  This moment is designed to elicit the emotion 
of hope.  The viewer once again becomes hopeful that Edmund and James’ relationship 
can be restored as she hoped when James had given Edmund the extra money for the cab 
fare in act three.  This hope is soon squashed however, as Tyrone quickly recovers his 
persona and states, “you can choose any place you like! Never mind what it costs!  Any 
place I can afford!  Any place you like—within reason.”
65
  Here, the audience comes to 
realize that it is unlikely that anything will ever change in the relationship between 
Edmund and his father, and this realization compels profound sadness. 
 Quickly this hopelessness is replaced with compassion for James in spite of his 
consuming concern for preserving his material wealth, as James next delivers a lengthy 
speech about his acting career, where he reveals that he feels a great deal of remorse for 
not staying true to his promise as a great Shakespearean actor.  He blames his 
impoverished upbringing for this failure in his life, an upbringing which made him jump 
at the chance to play the same role through his entire career for a profit of “thirty-five or 
forty thousand a season.”
66
  Tyrone confesses that he had realized too late that he had 
become so closely associated with that role that he could never be cast in other plays and 
that he had wasted his acting talents “through years of easy repetition.”
67
  This frank 
confession arouses sympathy from Edmund, who is moved and “stares at his father with 
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  Edmund feels compassion and sympathy for his father’s condition, and 
the audience shares his feeling toward James. 
 Jamie’s return from town marks a shift in the emotional tone of the act, as he is 
“as drunk as a fiddler’s bitch,” and as a result initially brings some levity to the scene by 
tripping over the front stairs and turning on every light in the house in part to annoy his 
father, who has stepped out on the porch to avoid any potential conflict.  The amusement 
that Jamie provides relieves the feeling of compassion that was incited in the previous 
moment, but quickly Jamie becomes a mean drunk and begins to criticize James for his 
cheapness and pretension.  Edmund weakly berates his brother for such attacks, clearly 
still moved by what he has learned about James moments earlier, and this interaction 
calls for more anxiety as conflict is impending between the brothers. 
 It is likely that in addition to anxiety, the viewer would experience disgust 
directed toward Jamie for at least two reasons.  First of all, Jamie is nearly out of his 
mind with inebriation, and he staggers around the stage, slurring his speech and insulting 
both his brother and his father.  Secondly, Jamie tells the story of visiting the whorehouse 
and sleeping with Fat Violet, the overweight prostitute who plays the piano for Mamie 
Burns.  Jamie’s interaction with low-end prostitutes, who he later reveals are actually 
“poor, stupid, diseased slobs,”
69
 likely appears disgusting to the viewer. 
 The audience’s disgust toward Jamie is further reinforced and intensified (perhaps 
to its most powerful point in the play thus far) when Jamie, “in a cruel, sneering tone with 
hatred in it,” asks, “Where’s the hophead?  Gone to sleep?”
70
  Upon hearing such a 
statement of disrespect directed toward his mother, Edmund jumps up and punches his 
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brother.  This rapid movement and physical confrontation again validates the audiences’ 
sense of disgust toward the eldest Tyrone son.  Despite the fact that Jamie has incited 
rage and disgust from his brother and those who observe his interaction with his brother, 
Jamie’s response to Edmund’s attack immediately undermines that emotional response.  
According to the stage directions, “For a second Jamie reacts pugnaciously and half rises 
from his chair to do battle, but suddenly he seems to sober up to a shocked realization of 
what he has said and he sinks back limply.”  Jamie immediately apologizes, thanking his 
brother for hitting him, recognizing that he “had that coming.”
71
  Jamie explains why he 
is feeling so negatively toward his mother, explaining that he had hoped that if “she’d 
beaten the game, I could too.”
72
  Upon admitting this disappointment, Jamie breaks into 
tears, “and the horrible part of his weeping is that it appears sober, not the maudlin tears 
of drunkenness.”
73
  This revelation is provided to the audience so that they might cease 
feeling disgusted toward Jamie and begin to feel compassion for him again, as they 
undoubtedly realize the toll Mary’s addiction has taken on even him. 
 O’Neill does not seem content to allow the audience to dwell upon compassionate 
feelings they may have toward Jamie, however.  In a moment of frankness, Jamie reveals 
to Edmund that he has been a “rotten bad influence.”  Not only this, Jamie claims that he 
has done so on purpose in a harrowing and drunken speech: 
No, Kid!  You listen!   Did it on purpose to make a bum of you.  Or part 
of me did.  A big part.  That part that’s been dead so long.  That hates 
life.  My putting you wise so you’d learn from my mistakes.  Believed 
myself at times, but it’s a fake.  Made my mistakes look good.  Made 
getting drunk romantic.  Made whores fascinating vampires, instead of 
poor, stupid, diseased slobs they really are.  Made fun of work as a 
sucker’s game.  Never wanted you succeed and make me look even worse 
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by comparison.  Wanted you to fail.  Always jealous of you.  Mama’s 
baby, Papa’s pet!...And it was your being born that started Mama on 
dope. I know that’s not your fault, but all the same, God damn you, I 




For audience members sympathetic to the suffering Edmund, this speech likely incites 
anger, especially as Jamie is explicitly blaming his brother for the worst part of the 
Tyrone family’s lives.  However, this moment is complicated by the fact that Jamie is—at 
least in his opinion—honestly warning his brother about the harm he intends to cause 
him.  At first Edmund dismisses Jamie’s statements as drunken babbling, to which Jamie 
replies,  
Think it over and you’ll see I’m right.  Think it over when you’re away 
from me in the sanitorium.  Make up your mind you’ve got to tie a can to 
me—get me out of your life—think of me as dead—tell people, “I had a 
brother, but he’s dead.”  And when you come back, look out for me.  I’ll 
be waiting to welcome you with that “my old pal” stuff, and give you the 




Based upon this duplex display of brotherly affection and revelation of brotherly hatred, 
it is very unclear how the viewer is to feel toward Jamie, and perhaps this lack of clarity 
is designed to escalate the anxiety that will lead to the emotional climax of the act—and 
of the play—namely, Mary’s only appearance in the final act.  
 Jamie passes out on the couch from the effects of too much alcohol and James 
returns to the parlor, admonishing Edmund not to put too much stock in what Jamie says 
when he is drunk. James stares down at his son, pours himself a drink, and then says, “A 
waste! A wreck, a drunken hulk, done with and finished!”
76
  This statement is ironically 
accompanied by the image of James having another drink.  Here the audience sees the 
generational curse of alcoholism passed from Tyrone to his namesake.  Though the 
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emotional address of this moment might be difficult to pin down in conventional 
emotional terms, it is likely that this stage picture is intended to evoke sadness. 
 After Jamie wakes and chides his father about the “art of acting,” the three men sit 
dozing at the table, waiting for Mary to go to bed so that they might too go to bed without 
seeing her because by now she would undoubtedly be completely under the control of the 
morphine.   O’Neill then prescribes how Mary appears for the first time in the act.  In the 
stage directions, O’Neill indicates: 
Edmund sits tensely.  He hears something and jerks nervously forward in 
his chair, staring through the front parlor into the hall.  He jumps up with 
a hunted, distracted expression.  It seems for a second he is going to hide 
in the back parlor.  Then he sits down again and waits, his eyes averted, 
his hands gripping the arms of the chair.  Suddenly, all five bulbs of the 
chandelier in the front parlor are turned on from a wall switch, ad a 
moment later someone starts playing a piano in there—the opening of one 
of Chopin’s simpler waltzes, done with a forgetful, stiff-fingered groping, 
as if an awkward schoolgirl were practicing it for the first time.  Tyrone 
starts to wide-awakeness and sober dread, and Jamie’s head jerks back 
and his eyes open.  For a moment they listen frozenly.  The playing stops 
as abruptly as it began, and Mary appears in the doorway.  She wears a 
sky-blue dressing gown over her nightdress, dainty slippers with 
pompons on her bare feet.  Her face is paler than ever.  Her eyes look 
enormous.  They glisten like black polished jewels…Her white hair is 
braided in two pigtails which hang over her breast.  Over one arm, carried 
neglectfully, trailing on the floor, as if she had forgotten she held it, is an 
old-fashioned white satin wedding gown, trimmed with duchesse 
lace…They stare at her. She seems aware of them merely as she is aware 
of other objects in the room, the furniture, the windows, familiar things 
she accepts automatically as naturally belonging there but which she is 
too preoccupied to notice. 
77
      
 
The sudden illumination of the stage prescribed by the stage directions, coupled with 
Mary’s pale appearance and strange, girlish attire, is likely intended to evoke a great deal 
of anxiety from those watching the action on the stage.  As Mary plays this piano, the 
strange, halting lilt of a poorly performed Chopin piano piece heightens that anxiety. 
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 Mary’s arrival and behavior elicit a sharp response from the three Tyrone men, 
and Jamie arouses disgust by his disrespectful reference to Hamlet.  After Mary finishes 
playing, he “breaks the cracking silence—Bitterly, self-defensively sardonic,” and 
proclaims, “The Mad Scene.  Enter Ophelia!”
78
  This statement and the tone with which it 
is delivered, provokes a reaction of disgust from James and Edmund, and Edmund “slaps 
Jamie across the mouth with the back of his hand.”
79
  Jamie does not retaliate, admitting 
once again that he “had that coming,” and he buries his face in his hands and begins to 
weep.
80
  Here, the audience sees the toll Mary’s addiction has taken on Jamie, and in this 
moment, perhaps feels compassion directed toward him, if not outright sadness.  Jamie’s 
weeping dampens his father’s anger toward him, and he turns to his son “and shakes his 
shoulder, pleading,”
81
 that Jamie stop crying, strengthening the compassion one feels 
toward Jamie. 
 This moment is interrupted, for “then Mary speaks, and they freeze into silence 
again, staring at her.  She has paid no attention whatever to the incident.  It is simply a 
part of the familiar atmosphere of the room.”
82
  Again, the audience’s anxiety is raised, 
given the fact that she is behaving as if she were still a girl in the convent.  As she speaks, 
the audience learns that she is carrying her wedding gown, which likely intensifies the 
anxiety they direct toward her.   
 As the act and the play draw to a close, O’Neill crafts deliberate moments to 
arouse compassion directed toward each of the Tyrone men.  The first of these moments 
occurs when James realizes that Mary is carrying her wedding gown.  He begins to scold 
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her for what she is doing, but adopts a different tack, and offers to take it from her, saying 
“you’ll only step on it and tear it and get it dirty dragging it on the floor.  Then you’ll be 
sorry afterwards.”
83
  He then takes the dress and sits back at the table, “holding the 
wedding gown in his arms with an unconscious clumsy, protective gentleness.”
84
 The 
image of Tyrone holding the wedding dress coupled with his weak pleading with Mary to 
come to her senses, likely casts the glow of compassion on him for the audience.   It is 
likely that they see him as a devoted husband who has come to the end of his rope and is 
deserving of pity. 
 Jamie next compels the audience’s compassion, and his brother elicits similar 
feelings.  He tells James that it is no use to try to appeal to Mary, but it seems as though 
he cannot resist making an attempt of his own to draw her back from the dream-world she 
inhabits.  He “turns to look up into her face—and cannot help appealing pleadingly in his 
turn.”  He simply says, “Mama,” but she does not respond, and “he looks away 
hopelessly.”
85
  Jamie’s attempt to reach his mother has proven as futile as his father’s, 
and Mary’s rejection of the pleas of her firstborn directs the viewer’s compassion toward 
Jamie. As Mary babbles about the looking for something she lost, Edmund abruptly turns 
to Mary, takes her by the arm and tries to tell her that her suspicions have been 
confirmed—that he has consumption.  Momentarily, Mary is jarred from her dream, but 
she immediately retreats to the world of the convent, saying, “You must not try to touch 
me. You must not try to hold me.  It isn’t right, when I’m hoping to be a nun.”
86
  Edmund 
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immediately releases his mother in defeat.  Mary’s inability to comfort her son in his 
most vulnerable moment shifts the focus of the audience’s compassion to Edmund.  
 As Mary delivers her final monologue that will close the play, James and his sons 
pour themselves more whiskey, and while he holds his wife’s wedding dress, “Tyrone 
lifts his glass and his sons follow suit mechanically, but before they can drink Mary 
speaks and they slowly lower their drinks to the table, forgetting them.”
87
  This 
simultaneous movement demonstrates to the audience that the men are not able to ignore 
the words of the Tyrone patriarch, and this is likely intended to draw the audience’s 
attention to Mary, presumably heightening the impact of her final speech. 
 The emotional address of Mary’s final monologue is ambiguous.  She speaks as if 
she is a young girl, and the stage directions call for her to deliver her lines “with a girlish 
pique.”
88
  She reflects upon her experience in the convent, claiming that she had always 
wished to be a nun and recalling how the Reverend Mother had recommended she not 
pursue such a profession.  The Reverend Mother, according to Mary, had told her to 
return home and take a year or two to decide whether or not she was serious about her 
commitment to a life of chastity in service to the church.  After recounting this event, the 
stage directions indicate that Mary “pauses and a look of growing uneasiness comes over 
her face. She passes a hand over her forehead as if brushing cobwebs from her brain.”
89
  
Mary’s illusion of girlhood is gone as she delivers her final lines,  “That was in the winter 
of senior year. Then in the spring something happened to me. Yes, I remember.  I fell in 
love with James Tyrone and was so happy for a time.”
90
  After she finishes delivering the 
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final line of the play, the stage directions indicate that James shifts in his seat, and 
Edmund and Jamie sit motionless.  What is not present in Mary’s speech and the 
accompanying stage picture prescribed in the directions is any sense of conclusion.  The 
viewer can have no confidence that things will improve for the Tyrones, and it is likely 
that the feelings one is left with as the curtain closes can only be characterized as anxiety, 
sadness, or compassion.   
 Overall the final act is easily the darkest of the four acts of the play, and when one 
examines the emotions elicited by this act, she can only characterize those emotional 
states as negative, as there are minimal mitigating positive emotional states.  The 
appraisals the audience makes of the three Tyrone men oscillate from compassion to 
disgust, and Mary’s appearance is so otherworldly and strange she likely elicits anxiety 
more than any other emotional response.    In emotional terms, the play ends more 
gloomily than it began. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
In the above analysis, I have carefully evaluated the emotional address of each act, and I 
have provided good reason to reject the formulation of (2) proposed in the previous 
chapter.  In terms of the emotions elicited in response to the events and characters Long 
Day’s Journey into Night, it seems absurd to suggest that on the whole people experience 
more positive emotional states than negative ones.  Though there are moments of levity 
throughout the play, these moments do not mitigate the overwhelming feelings of 
compassion, anxiety, and sadness elicited by Journey. 
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 Should the reader conclude, then, that it is nonsense for an audience member to 
claim to “enjoy” a performance of Long Day’s Journey into Night?  Though the 
preceding analysis seems to render such a statement incoherent, in the following chapters 
I will present an approach to this problem that attempts to salvage the concept of tragic 
enjoyment while recognizing the powerful negative emotional address of the play.  I will 
argue that it is possible to enjoy Long Day’s Journey into Night for a unique opportunity 
it affords the viewer, although this enjoyment is not derived from the events depicted in 
the play.  In order to build this approach, one must turn to a significant voice in O’Neill’s 










In his 1936 Nobel Prize acceptance speech, Eugene O’Neill calls the Swedish playwright 
August Strindberg, “the master, more modern than any us, still our leader.”
1
 Egil 
Törnqvist  remarks that this statement should be not at all surprising, as O’Neill’s 
dramatic works owe a great deal to the creative genius of the playwright; additionally, in 
this speech he was addressing the Swedish Academy and the Swedish people.
2
  It is only 
natural that O’Neill would praise Strindberg in this way.  However, the praise O’Neill 
confers upon the Swede is not a solitary honor; in the same sentence, the American 
playwright bestows the same accolades upon German philosopher and modernist 
visionary Friedrich Nietzsche. 
The connection between Nietzschian philosophy and O’Neill’s plays has been 
well-documented, and no other literary/philosophical influence can be as transparently 
detected throughout the playwright’s work. In a letter to close friend Benjamin de 
Casseres, O’Neill explicitly confesses his indebtedness to Nietzsche’s work.  He writes: 
What you say of “Lazarus Laughed” deeply pleases me – particularly that 
you found something like “Zarathustra” in it.  “Zarathustra,” although my 
work may appear like a pitiable contradiction to this statement and my 
life add an exclamation point to this contradiction, has influenced me 
more than any other book I’ve ever read.  I ran into it, through the 
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 Qtd. in Arthur and Barbara Gelb, O’Neill (New York, 1962), 814. 
2
 Egil Törnqvist , “Nietzsche and O’Neill: A Study in Affinity,”  Orbis Literatum, 23: 2, (June 1968), 97. 
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bookshop of Benjamin Tucker, the old philosophical anarchist, when I 
was eighteen, and I’ve always possessed a copy and every year or so I 
reread it and am never disappointed, which is more than I can say of 
almost any other book. (That is, never disappointed in it as a work of art.  




This passage has proven to be a powerful starting point for those studying the 
philosophical and literary influences present in O’Neill’s plays, and many Nietzschian 
analyses of O’Neill’s plays have been performed, beginning in earnest with an extensive, 
unpublished 1956 dissertation by Esther J. Olsen and continuing to this day in the work 
of Egil Törnqvist , Albert A. Kalson, and Lisa M. Schwerdt, among many others. 
Bearing in mind the abundance of Nietzschian analysis available for all of 
O’Neill’s work, the reader might wonder what another such analysis might contribute to a 
discussion of tragic emotion and Long Day’s Journey into Night.  On this objection, I 
should like to point out that the majority of analyses performed on Journey based in 
Nietzschian philosophy fail to adequately account for O’Neill’s parenthetical statement to 
Casserres as presented above.  O’Neill claims, as early as June of 1922, that there were 
spots of Zarathustra’s teaching “that I no longer concede.”  The vast majority of 
Nietzschian approaches to Long Day’s Journey into Night consider almost exclusively 
how mid- and late-Nietzschian themes (such as those represented in Thus Spake 
Zarathustra , The Gay Science, and The Geneology of Morals) manifest themselves in the 
playwright’s work.  To my knowledge, no critic or commentator looking at Journey has 
noticed that the play seems to reflect a much earlier Nietzchian sensibility, a sensibility 
obscurely but powerfully communicated in the philologist’s first work, The Birth of 
Tragedy. 
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105 
 
In the following chapter, I intend to construct an interpretive framework utilizing 
Birth of Tragedy that reveals a key thematic message O’Neill intends his audience 
receive when viewing the play: a life well-lived (which is constituted of a positive 
attitude toward one’s suffering) cannot be achieved in isolation; this life can be obtained 
only in interdependent relationship with others.  In order to substantiate this claim, I will 
first describe O’Neill’s understanding of and relationship to Nietzsche, making reference 
to how this understanding informs some of O’Neill’s most important work.  Next, I will 
explicate some important themes of The Birth of Tragedy and construct a method 
whereby one might analyze Long Day’s Journey using those themes.  With this 
interpretive frame established, in the next chapter I will perform a close reading of 
Journey that will demonstrate the validity of my thematic reading. 
 
4.2 “More Modern than any of Us” 
In order to grasp what O’Neill meant in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, it may be 
necessary to roughly contextualize O’Neill’s experience of Modernity, particularly as this 
experience was manifested in his experience of the theatre.  Since O’Neill was raised in 
the home of James O’Neill, one of the most eminent American actors of his day, much of 
Eugene’s experience of the advent of the Modern age develops along Nietzschian lines.  
Growing up in the world of the theatre, O’Neill sensed the aesthetic crisis that Nietzsche 
describes in Birth of Tragedy firsthand, and Nietzsche’s hope for tragic redemption 
perhaps provided an impetus for O’Neill’s own work. 
O’Neill’s father made his name and fortune in what had become an almost 
entirely commercialistic theatrical industry in the United States. In the decades before the 
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Civil War, nearly every major American city had at least one resident stock company,
2
 
but by the end of the 1800s, that system had largely eroded, so that most playhouses in 
the United States hosted traveling shows.  These “combinations,” traveling companies 
organized around one or more “stars,” had access to towns and cities across the country 
because 130,000 new miles of track had been added by expanding railroad companies.
3
  
This system is what allowed James O’Neill, the star of the colossally successful theatrical 
adaptation of The Count of Monte Cristo, to make a small fortune by performing in only 
one production throughout most of his career. This system was funded by large 
monopolies of theatre owners and producers, and “plays that appealed to conventional 
tastes and were likely to be profitable took precedence over innovation, experimentation, 
and literary merit.”
4
  Eugene was born in a New York hotel in 1888, during one of James’ 
touring seasons, and before he was sent to boarding school, he traveled extensively with 
his mother and father as James performed the lead role in Count. 
By the time O’Neill began writing plays, the American theatrical scene was 
almost entirely relegated to New York.  Daniel Watermeier remarks, “Indeed, 
‘Broadway’ and ‘American theatre’ had become synonymous terms.”
5
 Because of rising 
production costs and other factors, the “star” model of touring shows diminished, and 
most theatre of significance appeared on Broadway.  Though the touring had largely 
ceased, the lion’s share  of the successful productions that appeared on Broadway during 
this time were still funded by large, monopolistic groups much more concerned about 
profit than artistic integrity.  As a result, plays such as Peg O’ My Heart, Abie’s Irish 
                                                     
2
 A company of local performers presenting standard repertory from the English/American canon. 
3
 Daniel Watermeier, “O’Neill and the Theatre of his Time,” in The Cambridge Companion to Eugene 
O’Neill, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 34. 
4
 Ibid., 35. 
5
 Ibid., 33. 
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Rose, and The Count of Monte Cristo dominated the Broadway theatrical scene, making 
investors a great deal of profit and providing audiences exciting but rarely challenging 
theatrical experiences.  The plays performed were familiar, thrilling, and entirely 
conventional, and audiences consumed such experiences in great numbers. 
There were serious actors, critics, and playwrights working against this cultural 
trend toward commercial, “popular” entertainment to the detriment of “legitimate” 
theatrical production, but their voices were largely stymied by the power of the 
monopolies.   William Winter, perhaps the most prominent American theatre critic, 
mourned that theatre had moved away “from the hands either of Actors who love and 
honor their art or of men endowed with the temperament of the Actor and acquainted 
with the art and its needs.”
6
  O’Neill would sympathize with such a critique, and 
throughout his career he would refer to Broadway as the “Great Trite Way.”
7
 
The crisis the theatre faced in the United States mirrored the crisis Freidrich 
Nietzsche describes in his first—perhaps greatest—book The Birth of Tragedy.  In a letter 
to Wagner that accompanied a manuscript of the book, Nietzsche points out what he 
believes to be the reason Germany finds itself ensconced in the Franco-Prussian war of 
1870: 
…if this act of self-collection were to prompt anyone to think of patriotic 
excitement and aesthetic self-indulgence, or courageous seriousness and 
serene play as opposites, they would be wrong; indeed, if such people 
really read the work they might realize, to their astonishment, that the 
matter with which we are concerned is a grave problem for Germany, a 
problem which we now place, as vortex and turning point, into the very 
midst of German hopes.  Perhaps, however, these people will take 
offence at such serious consideration being given to any aesthetic 
problem at all, particularly if they are incapable of thinking of art as 
anything more than an amusing sideshow, a readily dispensable jingling 
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 Qtd. in “American Stage in Danger, says William Winter,” in The Theatre Magazine 7:71, (1907), 268. 
7
 Qtd. in Egil Törnqvist , “Nietzsche and O’Neill: A Study in Affinity,” 102. 
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of fool’s bells in the face of the ‘gravity of existence’…Let these serious 
people take note: my conviction that art is the highest task and the true 
metaphysical activity of this life is based on an understanding which I 
share with the man and fighter whose sublime lead I follow and to whom 




According to Nietzsche, Germany’s conflict stems from a crisis of art.  Art in Nietzsche’s 
age has become largely “an amusing sideshow,” a mere distraction from the problems of 
life, instead of a “metaphysical activity” of life.  In plain terms, one of Nietzsche’s aims 
in The Birth of Tragedy is to call the reader to art that draws the reader deep into life—
including, and perhaps primarily, the horror of life—instead of distracting her from it.  In 
Nietzsche’s account, such art had last manifested itself in Greek (particularly Aeschylian 
and Sophoclean) tragedy.  Almost as quickly as it had emerged, this “tragic spirit,” was 
killed by the father of Western knowledge, Socrates, who introduced the methodology of 
abstraction and cause and effect to ancient Greek thought.  On Nietzsche’s understanding, 
Socrates’ deductive method of inquiry built a veneer over the horror of reality that 
produced an unfounded optimism, as Törnqvist  describes it, “that despicable heritage 
which enslaves modern man.”
9
  Socratic philosophy attempts to make the world 
intelligible, but according to Nietzsche, the world is too horrible for human rationality too 
behold.  On Nietzsche’s view, Socrates gives people hope that they may overcome the 
world, and this hope is delusional. This optimism assures those who use the Socratic 
method they will be able to accurately apprehend and ultimately overcome the ways of 
the world, when in reality, the world is cruel and incoherent for human comprehension 
and too powerful an adversary to be dominated.  Nietzsche will, upon later reflection, 
conclude that the problem he has uncovered is larger than the German inability to 
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 Friedrich Nietzsche. “Forward to Richard Wagner,” in The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, Edited 
by Raymond Guess and Ronald Spiers, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 13-14. 
9
 Egil Törnqvist , “Nietzsche and O’Neill: A Study in Affinity,” 101. 
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appreciate significant tragic art; instead, the problem is “the problem of science itself, 
science grasped for the first time as something problematic and questionable.”
10
  The 
translation of this line into English does not reveal entirely what Nietzsche is driving at 
here.  The German term he uses here is Wissenschaft, which refers to any endeavor of 
study.  The “science” of history, for example, might be referred to in German as 
Geschictswissenschaft. When Nietzsche refers then to a problem of “science,” he is 
referring to a problem in the fundamental mode of knowledge humans in the West have 
trusted for two millennia.  Nietzsche is not merely questioning the answers Westerners 
have developed to important life questions; he is questioning the method whereby the 
entire project of finding such answers has been undertaken. 
When O’Neill refers to Nietzsche as “more modern than any of us,” he is 
acknowledging Nietzsche’s unflinching awareness of the crisis of Modernity.  The very 
foundations of the world Westerners had trusted had rightly been called into question; as 
a result of this process much of the cultural heritage of the West had been wrecked.  
O’Neill saw himself as part of Nietzsche’s lineage, an artist who is tasked with rebuilding 
authentic culture on the rubble of collapsed Socratic civilization.  The rise and popularity 
of Apollonian, “plastic” theatre reflected a society that was fundamentally sick, and 
O’Neill believed, as did Nietzsche, that an authentic “tragic” theatre could provide the 
remedy for the cultural malaise infesting the United States. 
Though both O’Neill and Nietzsche held critical views of the culture they 
inhabited, they both shared the conviction that a pre-Socratic, authentic mode of 
encountering reality could be actualized in their respective historical moments.  This 
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 Friedrich Nietzsche, “An Attempt at Self-Criticism,” in The Birth of Tragedy, Edited by Raymond Guess 
and Ronald Spiers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4. 
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redemption would come through a return to tragic art.  Nietzsche believed this rebirth to 
be embodied in Wagnerian opera, and he cheerfully writes that, “…we appear to be 
moving back from the Alexandrian age and towards the period of tragedy. At the same 
time we feel that the birth of a tragic age means the return of the German spirit to itself, a 
blissful reunion with its own being after the German spirit, which had been living in 
hopeless formal barbarism, had been tyrannized for too long by forms introduced from 
outside by a vast, invading force (BT 19).”  O’Neill, similarly, believed that America was 
“in the throes of a spiritual awakening,”
11
 and that tragedy would deliver the American 
soul from its Socratic bonds toward authentic existence. 
Before one might ask how tragedy, on O’Neill’s view, delivers its viewers from 
Socratic optimism to a “pessimism of strength,” as Nietzsche calls it (in other words, an 
authentic attitude toward life) one must have an understanding of what Nietzsche refers 
to as the life well-lived, an authentic existence.   In order to explicate such a concept, it is 
helpful to turn to O’Neill’s favorite Nietzschian work, Thus Spake Zarathustra.  O’Neill 
was captivated by this work from the time he discovered it in 1908, and he even 
translated it from the original German, despite having only a rudimentary knowledge of 
the language, aided by “a German grammar and a dictionary.”
12
 
Thus Spake Zarathustra is a perplexing work of literature, and though Nietzsche 
claimed it was his most important work, many in the philosophical and literary 
community often disregard it.  However, during the Modern era, it appears that 
Zarathustra was Nietzsche’s most popular book.
13
  This seems a strange puzzle for a 
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 Arthur and Barbara Gelb, O’Neill, (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1962), 487. 
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 Barrett H. Clark, Eugene O’Neill: the Man and His Plays, (Dover: New York, 1947), 25. 
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 Robert Pippin, Introduction to Thus Spake Zarathustra, Edited by Adrian Del Cairo and Robert Pippin, 
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work so apparently haphazard, unusual, and possibly philosophically confused.  Even 
more puzzling is exactly what to make of the work.  How should one interpret 
Nietzsche’s central theme in Zarathustra?
14
 
Nietzsche claimed, upon reflection, that the fundamental “idea of the work,” is 
“the Eternal Recurrence, the highest formula of a life affirmation that can ever be attained 
(EH III:Z1).” The notion of eternal recurrence appears throughout Zarathustra, but the 
clearest and earliest explication of this doctrine appears in aphorism 341 of The Gay 
Science.     In this aphorism, entitled “The Heaviest Weight,” Nietzsche prompts the 
reader to consider what she might do if, 
in some day or night, a demon were to steal into your loneliest loneliness 
and say to you: “This life as you now live it and have lived it you will 
have to live once again and  innumerable times again; and there will be 
nothing new in it, but every pain and every thought and every joy and 
every though and sigh and everything unspeakably small or great in your 
life must return to you, all in the same succession and sequence – even 
this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment 
and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned over again and 
again, and you with it, speck of dust!” 
 
Nietzsche provides the reader with two options at such a moment: either she throws 
herself down and gnashes her teeth, cursing the demon, or she proclaims that the demon 
is a god, imparting divine beauty upon her life.  Nietzsche continues by asking the reader 
“how well disposed would you have to become to yourself to your life to long for nothing 
more fervently that to this ultimate confirmation and seal?”  In Zarathustra, Nietzsche 
reiterates the doctrine of the eternal return: 
“Now I die and disappear,” you would say, “and in an instant I will be 
nothing. Souls are as mortal as bodies. 
But the knot of causes in which I am entangled recurs – it will create me 
again!  I myself belong to the causes of eternal recurrence. 
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 To make matters worse, Nietzsche even subtitles the book “A Book for All and None,” perhaps 
acknowledging that even if the reader grasps the central theme of the work, she will likely reject it! 
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I will return, with this sun, with this earth, with this eagle, with this snake 
– not to a new life, or a better life, or a similar life: 
—I will return to this same and selfsame life, in what is greatest as well 
as in what is smallest, to once again teach the eternal recurrence of all 
things (Z III:13). 
 
Though Nietzsche claims this to be the central teaching of Zarathustra, and 
perhaps the most important philosophical concept he has developed, it is unclear exactly 
what the “doctrine” here is.  What central teaching is Nietzsche communicating here?  
That the universe is fixed as an eternal, repetitive cycle?  That one ought to be ready to 
give an account of her life?  That one ought to accept or reject her fate in a never-ending 
feedback loop? 
Before I endeavor to provide an answer to these questions from an O’Neillian 
point of view, I should point out the significance of Eternal Return in some of O’Neill’s 
most importatnt plays. Perhaps the earliest reference one might draw from O’Neill’s 
plays to this teaching appears in Anna Christie (1920), when after a mystical cleansing by 
the sea, the title character claims, “It all seems like I’d been here before, lots of times – 
on boats – in this same fog (AC II).”  In the Emperor Jones (1920), Brutus Jones 
expresses a similar sentiment, “Seems like I know dat tree – an’ dem stones – an’ de 
river.  I remember – seems like I been heah befo’ (EJ vii).” Upon initial reading, these 
statements seem to reference the Nietzschian Eternal Return, however Egil Törnqvist  
cautions those who adopt such an interpretation.  He acknowledgesa that O’Neill might 
be drawing from a different intellectual tradition, that of psychoanalyst Carl Jung.
15
  Here 
he refers the reader Doris Falk’s Eugene O’Neill and the Tragic Tension, as in the case of 
Anna Christie,  Falk provides a convincing argument that Anna’s déjà vu refers to 
“Jungian race memory or collective unconscious,” by pointing out that Jung refers to the 
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 Egil Törnqvist , “Nietzsche and O’Neill:  A Study in Affinity,” 106. 
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sea as a symbol of such mental phenomena.
16
  The entire play Emperor Jones, seems best 
understood through a Jungian hermeneutic, as through the plot of the play, Brutus Jones 
strips away layers of masks, “until at the end, he must confront his destiny – himself – in 
nakedness.”
17
   If Falk is correct, O’Neill is likely only superficially invoking the doctrine 
of Eternal Recurrence while more directly referring to Jungian categories of mental 
experience. 
It is easier to see references to the eternal return in O’Neill’s characters that are 
forward looking.  For example, Martha Jayson of The First Man (1921) proclaims: “Yes, 
it’s been a wonderful, glorious life. I’d live it over again if I could, every single second of 
it – even the terrible suffering (TFM II)!” Martha not only wishes to relive the good parts 
of her life, she expresses what Nietzsche refers to as amor fati, a love of fate.  Were the 
demon to appear to her at some time in the day or night and tell her that she would have 
to do it all over again, she would praise the demon as a god.  At the moment of death, 
Ponce de Leon in O’Neill’s The Fountain (1922) recognizes that his soul will be poured 
out into the “Fountain of Eternity,” and that it will eternally return as part of the fountain.  
Törnqvist  points out that these final lines of the play mirror Zarathustra’s speech in Part 
Four of Thus Spake Zarathustra.
18
 Zarathustra asks of eternity, “When will you drink my 
soul back into yourself (Z IV: 10)?” 
Many of O’Neill’s middle plays represent the eternal return through cyclical 
repetition.  Great God Brown and Ah, Wilderness! “both evoke seasonal recurrence at the 
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The most obviously Nietzschian play O’Neill wrote is Lazarus Laughed, 
which tells of the “ministry” of Lazarus after Jesus raised him from the dead.  The 
Lazarus of O’Neill’s play frequently resembles Zarathustra in his cheerful acceptance of 
life’s fullness, including his eventual execution at the hands of the Roman government.  
Throughout the play, there is a constant refrain of “Death is dead!” aesthetically 
underscoring the theme of eternal recurrence through cycles of repetition. 
20
 
With the strong connection between O’Neill’s plays and the doctrine of Eternal 
Recurrence established, I will now turn my attention to why this teaching mattered so 
much to O’Neill and how the reader ought to understand it. Though some evidence 
suggests that Nietzsche believed that Eternal Return was an actual description of the 
temporality of human existence
21
—that each of us would continually live and relive our 
lives throughout eternity—the reader need not commit to its reality to appreciate the 
significance of this teaching as a kind of moral or psychological litmus test. Whether or 
not Eternal Recurrence is true, the reader might ask, “if this were true, how would I 
react?”  Törnqvist  reads Nietzsche’s doctrine of the Eternal Return as endowing a great 
deal of meaning to every event of life.  He writes, “the moral consequence of this is 
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obvious.  It makes every moment of life important.”
22
 It should be noted that the moral 
consequence of this is not nearly as “obvious” as Törnqvist  asserts.  A number of 
Nietzsche’s critics have asserted the exact opposite. Martin Heidegger, for example, 
writes that “if everything recurs all decision and every effort and will to make things 
better is a matter of of indifference; that if everything turns in a circle, nothing is worth 
the trouble.”
23
  For many, Heidegger’s critique is sound and renders Nietzsche’s central 
doctrine unpalatable.  In fairness, such an objection is not easily answered; fortunately 
such an answer is beyond the scope of this work, for the evidence suggests that O’Neill 
interpreted the doctrine much more charitably. 
One might read the doctrine of eternal return as an exhortation to live one’s life in 
such a way that when the demon appears one is able to praise the demon because she will 
have the opportunity to live this fully through all eternity.  On this line of interpretation, 
Nietzsche is providing the reader a motivational account, a reason she should live in a 
certain way.  Unfortunately, this reading does not account for the fact that Nietzsche is 
very suspicious of the notion of “freedom of the will;” an important theme in Genealogy 
of Morals is that this concept is largely illusory and a product of the misguided approach 
of Western philosophy.
24
  What we think of as free moral choices, Nietzsche describes as 
the products of the evolution of civilization.  If freedom of the will is illusory, it is 
unlikely that Nietzsche is suggesting that a meeting with the demon might change the 
way that the reader would behave. O’Neill seems to share Nietzsche’s worry on this 
point, as in particularly The Iceman Cometh and Long Day’s Journey into Night he crafts 
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worlds in which the characters are ultimately powerless to stand against the whims of the 
universe. 
If Nietzsche is not providing a motivational account, as he likely believes that 
human action and will is largely determined, what good is the thought experiment he 
presents to the reader?  I believe the best way to read the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence 
is as a psychological test. The demon’s statement allows the reader to evaluate her 
attitude toward her life.  Is she able to affirm her life, even the darkest, most tedious, 
treacherous parts, or does the knowledge that life will repeat eternally banish her to a 
kind of mental Sisyphean hell?  Ultimately, this is a test that determines what kind of 
person the reader is by determining her psychological response to her life’s infinite 
return.  Can the reader affirm her suffering? Is she positively disposed to the darkest 
moments of her life?   Nietzsche might regard such a person as an Overman, a being able 
to overcome herself. 
O’Neill seemed to view his writing of Long Day’s Journey as evidence of such a 
self-overcoming.  In his famous dedication letter, published in the 1956 edition of the 
play, he writes to his third wife Carlotta that “I give you the original script of this play of 
old sorrow, written in tears and blood…But you will understand, I mean it as a tribute to 
your love and tenderness which gave me the faith in love that enabled me to face my 
dead at last and write this play—write it with deep pity and understanding and 
forgiveness for all the four haunted Tyrones.”
25
  Though here it seems O’Neill is adding 
his own caveat to the Nietzschian doctrine (a caveat I will discuss further in this chapter), 
the sentiment he expresses resonates with Zarathustrian life-affirmation.  The act of 
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writing an honest and painfully autobiographical play was, for O’Neill, a demonstration 
that he had the capacity to grasp, embrace, and affirm his own past personal grief. 
 
4.3 “Spots Of Its Teaching I No Longer Concede” 
In writing his most significant and final plays, The Iceman Cometh, Long Day’s Journey 
into Night, and A Moon for the Misbegotten, O’Neill abandoned most of the theatrical 
experimentation that had marked much of his career. Sophoclean choruses, masks, and 
cyclical repetition have been left behind in favor of serious, albeit more theatrically 
conventional, dialogue and action.  No longer is O’Neill attempting to pair Greek tragedy 
with American modernity as he did in plays such as Morning Becomes Electra. Travis 
Bogard describes Long Day’s Journey into Night as "a return he to four boards and a 
passion—to in other words, a confident reliance on his actors."
26
  The form of the play is, 
as Edmund Tyrone might describe it, “a faithful realism.”
27
  Given this turn in O’Neill’s 
writing, one might naturally assume he has set aside his hopes for remaking society 
through theatrical tragedy as Nietzsche describes in his early work, and such assumptions 
are well-founded. By the time O’Neill writes Long Day’s Journey, the experimental, 
Modernist mode of theatre he and the Provincetown Players endeavored to produce had 
largely fallen out of fashion in the United States, and perhaps it was clear to O’Neill that 
tragedy, on the whole, might not provoke the great “spiritual awakening” he had 
envisioned early in his career.  Most critics analyzing Long Day’s Journey from a 
Nietzschian point of view make this assumption regarding the play and focus their 
attention on certain themes within the play that seem sympathetic with Nietzsche’s later 
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work, themes such as the death of God, inauthentic vs. authentic living, and dreary 
nihilism in the face of the horror of existence.  What I propose however, is that Birth of 
Tragedy’s presence looms large in Journey, and a close reading of the play reveals how 
much Nietzsche’s first work informed O’Neill in the writing of his most important play. 
 In order to argue for the significance of Birth of Tragedy within Long Day’s 
Journey so that I may use it as an interpretive tool, I must first explicate some key themes 
of Birth of Tragedy.
28
 I will pay particular attention to the spirits of Apollo and 
Dionysus—the most significant figures throughout the book—using Nietzsche’s text to 
construct a methodology whereby each of these concepts may be appropriated in order to 
analyze Long Day’s Journey into Night. 
 While lecturing on pre-Socratic philosophy in 1870-71, Nietzsche became 
interested in what he began to refer to as the “Dionysian world-view.”  As a philologist 
by training, Nietzsche was disciplined in the art of “reading well.”  According to Pearson, 
philology is an art which “consists of reading slowly and deeply, and with which one 
looks and sees in a certain and specific manner.”
29
  This training allowed him to uncover 
what he believed to be the powerful driving force behind the pre-Socratic, Greek Spirit.  
He begins his analysis in Birth of Tragedy by examining Athenian tragedy before 
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Euripides.  In Athenian tragedy, Nietzsche detects and identifies two primordial, 
psychological urges that the Greeks named for two of their most significant deities, 
Apollo and Dionysus.  In art, Apollo is manifested in the “art of the image maker or 
sculptor,” while Dionysus produces “the imageless art of music (BT §1).”  Though these 
impulses make themselves most obvious in art, the Apollonian and Dionysiac spirits are 
fundamental features of the natural world.  These powers “erupt from nature itself, 
without the mediation of any human artist, and in which nature’s drives attain their first, 
immediate satisfaction (BT §2).” 
 These fundamental elements appeared to Attic Greeks in tragic art, and they are 
best understood, according the Nietzsche, in terms of analogy.  Apollo reveals itself to 
the mind most readily in the “art-world” of a dream.  In a dream, “every human being is 
fully an artist…and the lovely semblance of dream is the precondition of all the arts of 
image-making, including, as we shall see, an important half of poetry (BT §1).” 
Dionysus, however, is best understood in terms of intoxication.  When intoxicated, the 
Dionysiac spirit causes “complete subjectivity to vanish to the point of complete self-
forgetting.”  In this moment of drunkenness, those under the influence of this spirit 
“awaken either under the influence of narcotic drink, of which all human beings and 
peoples who are close the origin of things speak in their hymns, or in the approach of 
spring when the whole of nature is pervaded by a lust for life (BT §1).” 
 In order to appreciate the power of these images for Nietzsche, it may be helpful 
to consider the philosophical tradition which weighs heavily upon his interpretation of 





  According to Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, the world can be 
divided into two primary spheres: will and representation.  Pearson explains that 
Schopenhauer, 
borrows the expression principium individuationis (principle of 
individuation) from scholastic thinking and uses it to denote the 
phenomenal world of time and space as that which gives us a plurality of 
coexistent ad successive things…by contrast, the will is the thing-in-itself 




In Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche appropriates this metaphysical dualism and, although he 
will attempt to improve on Schopenhauer’s theory, roughly the forces manifested in 
Apollo and Dionysus reflect representation and the will, respectively. 
 The Apollonian spirit, conceived as a manifestation of principium individuationis, 
cultivated in representation, directly manifests itself in works people recognize as 
illusion.  In a dream, for example, one may be drawn powerfully toward some image or 
conclusion, yet she still “nevertheless retains the sense that it is semblance (BT §1).”  
Representational art relies on the spirit of Apollo; artists and poets attempt to mirror the 
“real” world.  People enjoy such representations, and part of this enjoyment is derived 
from the fact that they are somehow being willingly deceived about the nature of the 
object before them.  In pairing Apollo with Schopenhauer’s force of representation, 
Nietzsche is asserting that the Apollonian spirit reflects a fundamental fact of reality, that 
though people may conceive of themselves as individuals unique and apart from the 
world, in truth, they are willingly (and necessarily) deluding themselves, as the will 
underlies and unifies all things.  While Nietzsche will be critical at times of the 
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Apollonian impulse, he does acknowledge its necessity in the lives of those who choose 
to go on living despite the horror of existence (BT §1). 
 Nietzsche points out that Apollo was also the god of prophecy, and this feature of 
the Apollonian urge will be especially relevant to his later critique of the Socratic 
Method.  This Apollonian prophet might be best conceived of in terms of abstraction and 
pattern recognition, much like the philosophical and scientific tradition that followed 
Socrates.  A prophet recognizes what he believes to be consistent, repeated features of the 
world (on Nietzsche’s view, such features are Apollonian illusions), and he is able to 
abstract from these features to make predictions about future events as a result.  It is 
important to bear in mind, however, that the features of the world the Apollonian prophet 
relies on are ultimately illusory, and though the prophet’s predictions seem to reflect 
truth, these truths do not reflect the true nature of the world. 
 The phenomenal character of the Apollonian spirit might best be understood as 
one of repose.  Of the image of Apollo, Nietzsche writes that it “should include that 
measured limitation, that freedom from wider impulses, that wise calm of the image-
making god (BT §1).”  Apollo represents for humans the capacity to comprehend and 
control the world, and a human who possesses such an Apollonian spirit will meet the 
world with a kind of calm confidence, knowing that she will not be overcome by it.  He 
invokes an image from Schopenhauer’s World as Will and Representation to 
communicate this sense of calm: 
Just as the boatman sits in his small boat, trusting his frail craft in a 
stormy sea that is boundless in every direction, rising and falling with the 
howling, mountainous waves, so in the midst of the world full of 
suffering and misery the individual man calmly sits, supported by and 




The Apollonian spirit not only allows one to see herself as an individual, but it also 
endows her with the ability to traverse the horrors of the world without descending into 
terror.   
 The other deity manifesting itself in tragic art, the god of wine and fertility 
Dionysus, defies the principium individuationis.  It is best understood in terms of 
intoxicated ecstasy, because in moments of group hysteria brought on by strong drink, 
one loses a sense of herself as unique, and experiences the feeling which “arises from the 
innermost ground of man, indeed of nature itself.”  When one is under the influence of 
the Dionysiac spirit, “he feels himself to be not simply united, reconciled, or merged with 
his neighbor, but quite literally one with him, as if the veil of maya had been torn apart, 
so that mere shreds of it flutter before the mysterious, primordial unity (BT §1).” 
 The knowledge one gains when experiencing Dionysiac ecstasy roughly 
correlates to the knowledge of the Schopenhaurian will.  Those in such a state recognize 
they are one with all things, and for a moment, they are able to forget themselves and 
experience a basic unity with all existence, unmediated through language or other forms 
of mental abstraction.  In effect, the spirit of wine and fertility endows his followers with 
the opportunity to appreciate reality at its fundamental level. 
 Nietzsche writes that in tragedy, the feelings aroused by the Dionysiac spirit are 
experienced as “Titanic” and “barbaric.”  Attic Greeks, participating in the festival of 
Dionysus, felt themselves connected to the greatness of their forbearers.  The tragic hero 
that these Greeks venerated endures bleak and seemingly endless suffering. “Excess 
revealed itself as the truth; contradiction, bliss born of pain, spoke of itself from out of 
the heart of nature (BT §4).”  The Dionysiac spirit unifies all beneath a singular banner of 
123 
 
suffering.  The unity that one derives from Dionysus is in part a recognition of the horror 
of life; all that exists does so through pain. 
 As I have suggested earlier in this chapter, though Nietzsche is analyzing the 
forces present in Attic tragedy, for him, this is not merely a historical or hermeneutical 
exercise.  Instead, Nietzsche believes himself to be articulating a new, non-religious 
“justification for existence.” By “justification of existence,” Nietzsche seems to refer to 
two unique, but related concepts.  The first of these concepts seems to be roughly 
ontological.  He intends to offer the reader an occasion to view the world and her place in 
it through eyes untarnished by the Socratic—and what would later become the 
Christian—tradition.  If one strips away the optimism produced through the Socratic 
tradition, she is able to appreciate the world as Dionysus describes it to Silenus.  The king 
asks his companion “what is the best and most excellent thing for human beings?”  The 
god replies, 
“Wretched, ephemeral race, children of chance and tribulation, why do 
you force me to tell you the very thing which it would be most profitable 
for you not to hear?  The very best thing is utterly beyond your reach not 
to have been born, not to be, to be nothing. However, the second best 
thing for you is: to die soon (BT §3).” 
 
This passage is one Nietzsche’s earliest suggestions of what will become a significant 
theme throughout his philosophical work: the horror of existence.  At the heart of the 
existence is the truth that life is full of suffering, but this reality is not what is ultimately 
most horrifying.  Kahn points out that “human beings can live with suffering.  What they 
cannot live with is meaningless suffering—suffering for no reason at all.”
32
  Yet this is 
precisely the reality that human beings inhabit.  The world is not merely indifferent to 
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human beings, “it is not designed for human beings at all…the cosmos is horrible, 
terrifying, and we will never surmount this fact.  It is a place where human beings suffer 
for no reason at all.”
33
   
 Given that such a world exists, what is one to do?  Since Socrates, Westerners 
have ignored this reality and created a “scientific,” Apollonian illusion to obscure the 
horror of existence, but Nietzsche suggests that Greeks before Socrates adopted a 
different strategy to “justify existence.”   Here, the justification of existence refers to a 
method whereby one might live a flourishing life in the context of a horrific universe.  
Even as early as The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche believes such a justification is possible, 
as he is already dissatisfied with Schopenhauer’s nihilism.  He writes, 
For what must be clear to us above all, both to our humiliation and our 
elevation, is that the whole comedy of art is certainly not performed for 
us, neither for our edification or our education, just as we are far from 
truly being the creators of the world of art; conversely, however, we may 
very well assume we are already images and artistic projections for the 
true creator of art, and that our highest dignity lies in our significance as 
works of art – for only as an aesthetic phenomenon is existence and the 
world eternally justified  (BT 5). 
 
To navigate and embrace the horror of existence, one must adopt an attitude drawn from 
the experience of tragic art.  In tragedy, the horror of existence is displayed through the 
mimetic representation of Apollo, and instead of being defeated, it is celebrated in the 
revelry of Dionysus.  Though this concept is primitively communicated in Birth of 
Tragedy, Nietzsche is essentially making the same claim he will more fully develop in 
Zarathustra, a flourishing life can be achieved if one is able to unflinchingly gaze upon 
and celebrate her suffering. 
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 While what counts as an abundant life stays essentially the same throughout the 
development of Nietzsche’s thought, there does seem to be a shift in how a positive 
disposition toward the horror of existence might be achieved—if such a disposition is 
even possible for most people.  This shift seems to occur in reference to the role of the 
individual in a community.  The later Nietzsche as represented in Zarathustra suggests on 
many occasions that an overflowing life—a life positively disposed toward the horror of 
existence—cannot be achieved in community with others.  In “On the Love of the 
Neighbor,” Zarathustra claims that the affirmation of others prohibits most people from 
becoming the Overman.  He states, “you invite a witness when you want someone to 
speak well of you; and when you have seduced him into thinking well of you, you think 
well of yourselves (Z 1; 16).” The affirmation of others leads one away from her true 
nature, the “farthest,” as Zarathustra describes it in this passage.  He writes that one’s 
love of her neighbor is her “bad love” for herself.  He echoes such a sentiment in his 
discussion on marriage and procreation, pointing out that most people procreate as a 
distraction from themselves, thus failing to live up to their true natures (Z 1; 20). 
 At the end of the first part of Thus Spake Zarathustra, the prophet leaves his 
disciples, advising them to go into the world alone as well, because he recognizes that 
even his companionship inhibits them from actualizing themselves in the way that he has 
been describing.  In what amounts to a loose parody of Christ’s warning to Peter that he 
would deny Him three times, Zarathustra commands his followers, “Indeed, I counsel 
you to go away from me and guard yourselves against Zarathustra!  And even better: be 
ashamed of him.  Perhaps he deceived you (Z 1; 24,3).”  This dramatic moment 
underscores the individual’s need to stand alone and affirm her life by her own strength.   
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In point of fact, Zarathustra claims that even his influence may be inhibiting his followers 
from achieving such a goal.   
 Perhaps this feature of Nietzsche’s philosophy expressed in Zarathustra is what 
O’Neill refers to in his letter to de Cacerres as a point he can no longer concede.  This 
seems a fair assumption in light of O’Neill’s dedication letter to Carlotta published in 
Long Day’s Journey into Night.   O’Neill sees the writing of the play as a way of facing 
and affirming his suffering as embodied in the dead members of his family, but he found 
himself only emboldened to do so through her “love and tenderness.”  This act of self-
overcoming was assiduously difficult for O’Neill, as his wife Carlotta reports in her 
diary.  He was, according to her account, “being tortured every day by his own writing.  
He would come out of his study at the end of the day gaunt and sometimes weeping.  His 
eyes would be all red and he looked ten years older than when he went in in the 
morning.”
34
  Yet O’Neill saw himself as one who courageously faced his suffering and 
captured it aesthetically, a course of action Nietzsche would applaud.  However, he does 
not face this suffering alone. Self-overcoming, on Nietzsche’s developed view, can only 
be achieved in isolation, but O’Neill believes differently; he attributes his ability to 
overcome himself to courage derived from a faithful, loving relationship with another.  
 There was a Nietzschian option amenable to such a view, however, and this 
option is described in Birth of Tragedy.  Here, O’Neill might have considered more 
thoroughly the mode of life affirmation described by Nietzsche in Birth of Tragedy, and 
he may have discovered that Nietzsche had, in his first work, articulated a claim 
sympathetic to O’Neill’s beliefs about life-affirmation.  Greek tragedy was produced in 
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context of community.  The festivals of Dionysus were a collective event, and it is this 
context which produces the union of the Apollonian and Dionysiac powers. Hellenic 
tragedy, according to Nietzsche, provides an occasion during which the Greeks gazed 
upon and celebrated their common identity, an identity fundamentally unified by the fact 
that all living things suffer.  The individual has an opportunity to approve of her suffering 
because of her collaboration with the community of sufferers in which she finds herself.  
Unlike Zarathustra, who urges his disciples to go out into the world and actualize 
themselves alone, the early Nietzsche believes such an existence can be attained through 
interaction with an event that requires the willing—and authentic—contributions of 
others.
35
  This theme seems to resonate as a key element of Long Day’s Journey, and with 
Birth of Tragedy in mind, paired with the life-affirming elements of Nietzsche’s 
developed philosophy, supports such a reading of the play
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With the key principles of Birth of Tragedy explicated, I am now in a position to apply 
these principles to a reading of Long Day’s Journey into Night.   It is highly unlikely that 
in Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche is proposing anything resembling a hermeneutic method 
one might use to read a work of literature, however, the above explication has revealed 
rough categories to do such a reading. In what follows, I will describe these categories, 
drawing from the above explication and distilling the conceptual content I intend to use to 
interpret the play: 
1.The Horror of Existence—As described above, this concept is represented in 
Dionysus’ answer to Silennus’ question: “The very best thing is utterly beyond your 
reach not to have been born, not to be, to be nothing. However, the second best thing for 
you is: to die soon.”  This interpretive category will be used to describe moments of the 
play which depict the “horrific universe,” a universe not only indifferent to human 
existence, but in fact hostile to life.  Additionally, this category will describe depictions 
of what amounts to meaningless suffering within the play. 
2.Affirmation of Life—This concept refers to an individual’s capacity to embrace life 
“as it is,” which means not only accepting the hardships and suffering inherent in 
129 
 
existence, but embracing and even celebrating such hardships.  A person with such a 
disposition toward her own suffering can be described as having overcome herself.  This 
does not refer to a “grin-and-bear-it” sort of attitude, which relies on an understanding 
that at some point suffering will end.  Instead, this is a grim “pessimism of strength,” that 
affirms unending (and perhaps eternally recurring!) difficulty. 
3.The Dionysiac—Arises in moments of intoxicated ecstasy, when individuality is lost.  
The Dionysiac feeling is a primitive, titanic, experience, marked with excess and 
indulgence.  Individuals under the influence of Dionysus recognize themselves as one 
with all living things.  It is a “bliss borne of pain,” therefore one should not construe the 
intoxication of the Dionysiac spirit as an escape from life’s suffering, but as an spirit 
which empowers those under its influence to deeply appreciate such suffering.  Under 
possession of Dionysus, self-deception is stripped away, along with individuality, and 
this enables those in such a state to glimpse the world for what it is and who they are 
within it.  In this sense, the Dionysiac refers to unflinching awareness of the truth, 
especially those truths that are so horrible most people wish to remain unaware of them. 
4.The Apollonian—The Apollonian manifests itself, not merely in mimetic art, but in the 
human propensity to abstract illusion from reality.  Under the Apollonian influence, 
people cultivate a sense that the world can be overcome and predictable outcomes can 
emerge from past events.  The emotional state produced by Apollo might best be 
described as calm, however it is important to point out that this calm feeling is based 
upon the dubious belief in man’s ability to defeat the destructive forces of the world.  
Informed by Apollo’s spirit, people believe themselves to be unique individuals, able to 
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guide their own destinies.  While this may be a necessary self-deception for many, such a 
belief inhibits people from attaining their highest nature. 
 If one reads Long Day’s Journey into Night with these categories in mind, I 
believe she will come to two important conclusions: 1)In the writing of O’Neill’s greatest 
play, the playwright is heavily informed, not just be a general Nietzschian philosophy, 
but specifically by a Nietzschian philosophy drawn from Birth of Tragedy, and 2)With 
Journey, O’Neill intends his audience understand that a positive attitude toward life as 
Nietzsche describes cannot be achieved in isolation; instead, such a disposition can only 
be obtained in concert with others.  In what follows, I will conduct a close analysis of the 
play that should validate both (1) and (2). 
 
5.2 A Nietzschian Reading of Long Day’s Journey into Night 
As Long Day’s Journey into Night opens, O’Neill carefully and “novelistically” 
prescribes the setting and stage layout.  The play is set in August of 1912, and the events 
of the play unfold over a single day in the parlor of Tyrone home.  In O’Neill’s initial 
description of the layout of the stage, the careful reader already begins to sense the 
Apollonian/Dionysiac tension that will play itself out on this day in the Tyrone home.  On 
stage right, between two entrances O’Neill describes, 
a small bookcase, with a picture of Shakespeare above it, containing 
novels by Balzac, Zola, Stendhal, philosophical and sociological works 
by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Marx, Engels, Kropotkin, Max Sterner, 
plays by Ibsen, Shaw, Strindberg, poetry of Swinburne, Rosetti, Wilde, 
Ernest Dowson, Kipling etc… Farther back is a large, glassed-in 
bookcase with sets of Dumas, Victor Hugo, Charles Lever, three sets of 
Shakespeare, The World’s Best Literature in fifty large volumes, Hume’s 
History of England, Thiers’ History of the Consulate and Empire, 
Smollett’s history of England, Gibbon’s Roman Empire and 
miscellaneous volumes of old plays, poetry, and several histories of 
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Ireland.  The astonishing thing is that all the volumes have the look of 




As the audience member gazes for the first time at the set, she—provided she had the 
ability to read the titles of the books on each shelf 
2
—immediately is able to sense the 
tension between the Dionysiac and Apollonian.  Beneath a looming image of 
Shakespeare, the viewer discovers what is undoubtedly Edmund’s library.  These works 
certainly reflect O’Neill’s autobiographical impulse, representing the philosophy and 
literature he was reading in 1912 before entering a tuberculosis sanitarium, however from 
a Nietzschian vantage point, perhaps such works represent a mode of knowing the world 
that might be loosely characterized as Dionysian.  The thinkers listed represent radical 
lines of divergence—not simply in content, but in epistemological method—from those 
represented in the glassed-in bookshelf farther back, presumably the library of James 
Tyrone.  On the one hand, Edmund is absorbed in the work of egoists, nihilists, radicals, 
and anarchists, while James reads and rereads received historical accounts detailing the 
standard story of Western evolution.  Hume and Gibbon’s empirical approaches to past 
events stand in stark contrast to the assertions found in Nietzsche, Marx, and Engels that 
Western culture is fundamentally warped and has to be remade. 
The creative and dramatic literature represented on each of these bookcases 
represents a similar divergence.  The works of Dumas, Hugo, and Lever typically portray 
heroic figures that, despite intense struggle, rise above their world and conquer their 
opposition.   Such works clearly represent a “Socratic optimism” about man’s ability to 
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within the text to create an atmosphere where his thematic message might be made evident. 
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overcome the universe in the face of hardship.  The Apollonian character of such works 
informs James’ illusion of the world, and in the final act of the play, he will acknowledge 
how his adherence to creating such an illusion in the form of a single, Romantic theatrical 
role has robbed him of the ability to personify his true talent as an actor.  By contrast, the 
novels of the Balzac, Zola, and Stendhal appearing on Edmund’s shelves contain 
naturalistic and often bleak portrayals of the world.  These French writers embody an 
unflinching look at reality, regardless of the loss of the centeredness or optimism that 
might result from such an act. Paired with these naturalists, it seems hardly a stretch to 
suggest that the decadent, self-indulgent poetry of Swinburne and Wilde, full of reckless 
sexual experimentation, are included to refer to Dionysian revelry which is certainly 
Nietzschian in spirit.  These books, embedded, practically invisibly within the set, are a 
literary manifestation of the contest which will take place on this day—the contest 
between Apollonian illusion and Dionysiac intoxication. 
The play opens just after breakfast, and the morning sunshine illuminates the 
stage from the windows at the right of the stage. Mary and James Tyrone enter the room, 
playfully discussing Mary’s recent weight gain and healthy appetite.   Mary points out, by 
contrast, that Edmund had no appetite for breakfast whatsoever, foreshadowing the later 
revelation that he has contracted tuberculosis.  As she does, the viewer discovers that she 
has become agitated and nervous, her hands frantically fidgeting.   This moment is the 
first indication that Mary has resumed her use of morphine, an addiction she with which 
has been struggling since the birth of Edmund.  Since Edmund has returned home for the 
summer, and Mary has begun to suspect that he is consumptive, the stress has driven her 
back to her addiction, from which she had been previously in recovery for three months. 
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Early on in this act, a major motif is introduced as Mary and James discuss the 
fog of the previous night.  Mary complains that the sound of the foghorn kept her awake 
throughout the night, and James empathizes, though it is fairly clear that he slept soundly 
through the noise.  The fog is clearly symbolic throughout the play, although many critics 
differ on what exactly the fog represents.  On the surface, the fog, steadily increasing 
throughout the day, frames the descent into intoxication which will occur as the day 
progresses.  Beneath the surface, Falk claims that the fog “O’Neill’s first and last symbol 
of man’s inability to know himself.”
3
  Here she is undoubtedly referring in part to one of 
O’Neill’s earliest (and perhaps worst!) one-act plays The Fog.  From Falk’s Jungian point 
of view, this interpretation has considerable merit, however I intend to argue throughout 
this reading of the play, that the fog—akin to the intoxication it portends—is a Dionysiac 
symbol which points to man’s ability to see through the “veil of maya,” and recognize 
himself as one with all that exists.  In contrast to Falk, throughout my analysis, I will 
defend the claim that the fog symbolizes man’s ability to know himself, as Nietzsche 
would likely argue, beyond the illusion created by Apollonian individuation.   Instead of 
drawing one away from reality, throughout the play, the fog draws members of the 
Tyrone family deeply into reality at its most fundamental level.  
As the Tyrone sons Edmund and Jamie enter the room, the mood continues to be 
light and jovial, however it is clear that much of this joviality is feigned.  First of all, 
Jamie—perhaps the character in the play most sensitive to the signs of his mother’s 
addiction—notices that Mary is acting a bit too happy this morning.  His stare during her 
quips about James’ snoring, immediately provokes a guilty reaction from Mary, and she 
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begins nervously fussing with her hair.  When Jamie attempts to change the subject by 
sharing in Mary’s joke about the volume of James’ snoring, the elder Tyrone immediately 
attacks Jamie’s frivolous gambling and aimless lifestyle.  Upon Mary’s admonition, 
James changes the subject and resumes the ruse of family serenity by asking the sons 
what they had been joking about in the dining room. 
Edmund relates a story he had been told the night before in a bar by Shaughnessy, 
a poor Irish farmer who is renting land from Tyrone.  The land that Shaughnessy rents 
borders the land of Harker, an oil millionaire who is friends with Tyrone.  Edmund 
relates the story Shaughnessy had shared with him: 
Well, you remember, Papa, the ice pond on Harker’s estate is right next 
to the farm, and you remember Shaughnessy keeps pigs.  Well it seems 
there’s a break in the fence and the pigs have been bathing in the 
millionaire’s ice pond, and Harker’s foreman told him he was sure 
Shaughnessy had broken the fence on purpose to give his pigs a free 
wallow. 
 
So, Edmund continues, when Harker confronts Shaughnessy with his foreman’s 
accusation, the Irish farmer, 
accused Harker of making his foreman break down the fence to entice the 
pigs into the ice pond in order to destroy them.   The poor pigs, 
Shaughnessy yelled, had caught their death of cold.  Many of them were 
dying of pneumonia, and sever others had been taken down with cholera 
from drinking the poisoned water.  He told Harker he was hiring a lawyer 
to sue him for damages.  And he wound up by saying that he had to put 
up with the poison ivy, ticks, potato bugs, snakes, and skunks on his 
farm, but he was an honest man who drew the line somewhere, and he’d 
be damned if he’d stand for a Standard Oil thief trespassing.  So would 
Harker kindly remove his feet from the premises before he sicked the dog 




 Of this passage, Törnqvist remarks that “O’Neill has inserted what to a casual 
observer may seem a digression out of tune with the serious mood of the play and 
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completely unrelated to it.”
5
  However, he contends that this passage is significant not 
only because it serves as an episodic starting point for O’Neill’s later Moon for the 
Misbegotten, but that it “obviously helps to characterize the Tyrones in the sense that 
their reactions to it reveal something about their natures.”
6
  Törnqvist argues that this 
story is a microcosm of the family’s story, and that the fate of pigs eerily resembles the 
fate of each member of the Tyrone family.  He points out that James’ reaction to the 
retelling of the story is quite telling.  Initially, James responds with admiration for 
Shaughnessy’s boldness, laughing as he proclaims the Irishman, “the damned old 
scoundrel!  By God, you can’t beat him!”  However, as James reflects for a moment on 
the situation, he quickly changes his mind, telling Edmund, “That dirty blackguard!  He’ll 
get me in serious trouble yet.  I hope you told him I’d be mad as hell.”
 7
 Edmund points 
out that his father is secretly “tickled to death by the great Irish victory,”
8
 and his 
observation makes the conflict within James’ response to the incident clear.  On one 
hand, James feels a great sense of connectedness with his Irish tenant because he too had 
risen from abject Irish poverty, and this incident represents a victory for a “wily Shanty 
Mick.”
9
  On the other hand, however, as an immensely successful matinee actor and 
incredibly wealthy member of the upper class aristocracy, he believes himself responsible 
to his station in the world.   Tyrone’s feigned offense at the effrontery of Shaughnessy, 
which the whole family—as well as the audience—clearly sees through, might be read as 
an attempt by Tyrone to maintain an Apollonian lie with respect to his own life.  Tyrone 
claims to be worried about a potential lawsuit filed against him, but what he really 
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worries about is his standing with people like Harker, who live in a social class to which 
he does not rightfully belong.  Jamie seems to relish his father’s unveiling before Harker, 
as he maliciously quips, “I’ll be the next time you see Harker at the Club and give him 
the old respectful bow, he won’t see you,” to which Edmund adds, “Yes, Harker will 




As Tyrone’s tone escalates, Edmund decides to leave the go upstairs to read in 
order to avoid more conflict.  When he is gone, Jamie worries aloud that Edmund is 
suffering from something worse than a “summer cold,” and it is clear he believes 
Edmund to be consumptive.  Mary’s demeanor immediately changes upon the mention 
that Edmund might be really ill.  Once again, she begins to nervously adjust her hair in 
the mirror, and she remarks how it had once been a beautiful, “rare shade of reddish 
brown.”
11
  She complains that she cannot see clearly in the mirror because she does not 
have her glasses.  To perceptive readers this is yet another sign that she has resumed her 
use of morphine, as this act is an attempt to maintain the appearance of self-control, 
though her ability to do so is quickly slipping away. Throughout the first two acts of the 
play, each time Mary gazes at herself in the mirror, the reader might infer, through eyes 
informed by Nietzsche, that Mary is desperately attempting to reclaim an Apollonian 
illusion of herself.  Throughout her life, she has defined herself in terms of the praise of 
others, as is evidenced by her asking Tyrone, “but I truly did have beautiful hair once, 
didn’t I, James?”  Here one might recall the words of Zarathustra, “you invite a witness 
when you want someone to speak well of you; and when you have seduced him into 
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thinking well of you, you think well of yourselves (Z 1; 16).” As the features that she was 
once praised for have faded due to old age, she tries in vain to maintain the illusion by 
constantly adjusting and primping in the mirror, but the approval she had received was 
superficial and transitory, like the images of Apollo.  It is only later in the play, when 
Mary is in the euphoria of a morphine high, where the audience will actually be able to 
glimpse—and appreciate her—for who she really is behind the illusion. 
After Mary leaves the room to make dinner arrangements with the cook, Jamie 
reveals himself to be the most Dionysian character in the play.  In the ensuing quarrel 
with his father, this is suggested in two ways:  First of all, and most obviously, the 
audience learns that Jamie is a “no-good” carouser, a frequenter of whore houses, who 
squanders his genetic ability to be a fine actor.  Instead of living up to his reputation as a 
Tyrone, Jamie opts for more immediate and primal gratification.  Secondly, Jamie 
perpetually implores his family to see the world for what it is, making no accommodation 
for personal fear.  When Tyrone tells him that he should not worry his mother about 
Edmund’s condition, Jamie shrugs and says, “All right, have it your way.  I think it’s 
wrong to let Mama go on kidding herself.  It will only make the shock worse when she 
has to face it.”
12
  He criticizes Doc Hardy for “pulling punches” with Edmund’s 
diagnosis, and he directly points out that his father is a miser, even when it comes to 
paying for his son’s care.  From Edmund’s youth, Jamie had taught his younger brother 
how to navigate barrooms and whore houses; he had “put Edmund wise to a few things,” 
teaching him “that if you can’t be good, at least you can be careful.”
13
  Jamie is not afraid 
to face the horror of existence, and his drinking and “irresponsible” lifestyle are not 
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attempts to escape reality, but to live fully.  Tyrone points out that Jamie is able to live 
this way because he has his inherited his father’s strong constitution.   In contrast to 
Edmund, Jamie is a “healthy hulk,” and this characteristic rings as a characteristic of 
Nietzsche’s Overman.  Jamie’s reckless living, propensity for truth-telling, and physical 
and mental power to withstand the horror of existence can be best accounted for as 
Dionysian characteristics. 
 During Tyrone and Jamie’s emsuing argument, the audience also learns that 
Edmund has recently returned home from a voyage as a merchant sailor, and that since 
the suspicion of his consumption has been raised, both Jamie and Tyrone have begun to 
worry that Mary will succumb to worry and return to her addiction.  Jamie’s suspicions 
have been raised because he observed his mother in the spare bedroom instead of 
sleeping with her husband the night before. It is implied that she has used the spare 
bedroom as a location to administer morphine, and Jamie recognizes that Mary, because 
of her fear that Edmund has tuberculosis, is on the verge of relapse.  Upon Jamie’s 
mention that Mary had been in the spare room, Tyrone immediately rebukes his son, 
dismissing the truth that he undoubtedly knows.   Tyrone lamely claims that his wife was 
in the spare bedroom to avoid his snoring, and even Jamie seems to be satisfied with this 
claim, although it is clear that both men are deceiving themselves. Again, the conflict 
between Apollonian illusion and Dionysiac honesty is evident.  Tyrone would rather 
believe a useful fiction instead of faithfully engaging his wife’s condition. 
 Mary returns to the parlor and interrupts the argument between Jamie and his 
father, and the Jamie hastily reminds the elder Tyrone that they are wasting a fine 
morning and that they should be outside trimming the hedges.  To avoid explaining the 
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argument to Mary, Tyrone hastily agrees with his son.  At a functional level, O’Neill uses 
the hedge-trimming excuse as a means to get Jamie and Tyrone offstage in order to set up 
a dialogue between Mary and Edmund, however even the Tyrone’s hedge-trimming 
reveals certain Nietzschian qualities to the audience. After returning to the parlor, Mary 
looks out of the window and notices that as one of the wealthy neighbors drives by in 
their new Mercedes, Jamie hides beneath the hedges to avoid being seen, while James 
pauses in his work to bow to them “as if he were taking a curtain call.”
14
  Mary is 
embarrassed that her husband would make such a show of himself in a filthy suit of 
clothes that she has tried to throw away, and she is also embarrassed that instead of 
paying a gardener to trim the hedges, her husband, one of the most esteemed actors in 
America, chooses to do it himself.   In Mary’s critique of Tyrone, one is able to 
appreciate a tension in his mode of being in the world that might be described in terms of 
Apollo and Dionysus.  On the one hand, as an upstanding and important member of the 
small New London community, Tyrone is obligated to keep the grounds of his estate 
appropriately manicured, to perpetuate a carefully managed aesthetic in order to keep up 
appearances.  On the other hand, however, Tyrone who comes from a very humble 
working class background cannot bring himself to pay a hired hand to care for his 
property.  In this manual labor, Tyrone reveals his authentic nature as a working class 
Irish immigrant who has little concern for the trappings appropriate for an American of 
his means.  However, when confronted with other members of his community, he 
quickly, but awkwardly, adopts a demeanor that conforms to social expectations and 
bows ridiculously to his pretentious neighbors.  Mary’s remarks demonstrate the 
absurdity of Tyrone’s life: he is attempting to occupy two worlds, and even he, a great 
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performer, cannot authentically accomplish such a feat.  Jamie realizes the absurdity of 
such a position and hides from the passersby, further pointing up the silliness of his 
father’s position. 
 Though Mary sees clearly the artificiality of her husband’s position, at this point 
in the play, (in the sober light of day) she is unable to recognize her own struggle 
between the Dionysian and Apollonian impulses.  In her conversation with Edmund she 
reveals that she has never felt at home in the New London house, and one of her chief 
complaints is that she is always alone.  Immediately the conversation turns toward the 
direction of Mary’s struggle with morphine addiction, and she asks him not to remind her 
of the past.  Edmund responds, “Please, Mama!  I’m trying to help.  Because it’s bad for 
you to forget.  The right way is to remember, so you’ll always be on your guard.  You 
know what’s happened before.”
15
  Here, the reader sees what might be read as a rejection 
of Nietzsche’s Zarathustran doctrine of the affirmation of life in favor of a Dionysian 
doctrine of the affirmation of life.  Edmund’s admonition to his mother to remember 
might best be understood both as a way to manage her addiction and as an 
encouragement to her to affirm her suffering.  However, Mary is incapable of doing this 
alone;  her loneliness exacerbates her suffering, and instead of facing her past and present 
difficulties, she attempts to drown her sorrows in the haze of a morphine induced high.  
Ironically, in such states of intoxication, Mary does not escape the horrors of her 
existence; as the play progresses into the last act, the audience sees Mary from behind the 
veil.  Under the influence of the drug, Mary sees her world and herself for who she is and 
faces this reality with courage.  Here in act one, this theme is only suggested for a brief 
moment in Edmund’s dialogue with his mother, but nearly as quickly as this discussion 





begins, it ends with Mary admonishing her son to go outside and read so that she can nap 
upstairs.  It is clear to both Edmund and the audience that Mary’s worry about Edmund’s 
condition is getting the best of her, and that she intends to go upstairs to dose herself with 
morphine.  Instead of protesting, Edmund adopts a joking tone and agrees to go get some 
fresh air.  The act closes with Mary sitting in the parlor, struggling with a state of 
“nervous panic.”  As the curtain for Act 1 falls, Mary “begins a desperate battle with 
herself. Her long fingers, warped and knotted by rheumatism, drum on the arms of the 
chair, driven by an insistent life of their own, without her consent.”
16
 
 Act II begins shortly before lunch.  Edmund sits in the parlor reading, and the 
servant Cathleen brings a in a bottle of bonded bourbon from which he sneaks a quick 
drink, despite knowing that he should not, given his poor health.  Jamie enters a takes a 
drink of his own, pausing to fill the bottle of whiskey with enough water to compensate 
for what he had taken.  He scolds his brother for having a drink in his condition. Edmund 
responds by saying that after he has officially receive the bad news, he will give up 
alcohol in the interest of his recovery.  Again, Jamie, in his typical Dionysian mode, 
praises his brother for preparing for the worst. Jamie next asks Edmund about the 
whereabouts of his mother and is shocked to discover that Edmund had allowed Mary to 
go upstairs “to take a nap” in the spare room.  Edmund attempts to defend Mary, claiming 
that she was merely taking a nap and scolding Jamie for his distrust of his mother.  Jamie 
responds, 
Listen, Kid, I know you think I’m a cynical bastard, but remember I’ve 
seen a lot more of this game than you have.  You never knew what was 
really wrong until you were in prep school.  Papa and I kept it from you.  
But I was wise ten years or more before we had to tell you.  I know the 
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game backwards and I’ve been thinking all morning of the way she acted 




In this speech, the reader catches a glimpse of the unity produced in tragedy that 
Nietzsche describes in Birth of Tragedy.  Jamie, the Dionysian, is using his knowledge of 
past events to predict the outcome of Mary’s current behavior, an Apollonian move.  
Embodied in Jamie in this moment is the Apollonian ability to prophesy based upon past 
patterns, coupled with the Dionysiac spirit of authentically gazing upon the horrors of 
life. 
 Mary comes downstairs, and it is clear to the audience that she is under the 
influence of a narcotic.  She no longer appears nervous, her eyes are brighter, and her 
demeanor is one of “peculiar detachment.”
18
  In her ensuing dialogue with her sons, the 
reader is struck by her frankness.  When Jamie criticizes his father for delaying lunch so 
that he might put on airs with a passing neighbor, Mary bitterly scolds her son, 
“Everyone else admires him and you should be the last to sneer—you, who thanks to 
him, have never had to work hard in your life!”  When Edmund asks his mother why she 
feels the need to attack Jamie so suddenly, she replies: 
Because he’s always sneering at someone else, always looking for the 
worst weakness in everyone…But I suppose life has made him like that, 
and he can’t help it.  None of us can help the things life has done to us.  
They’re done before you realize it, and once their done they make you do 
other things until at last everything comes between you and what you’d 




Mary, under the influence of the drug, does not delude herself about the nature of her son.  
In her accusation of him, she faithfully articulates the horror of reality, and she 
recognizes in her own life the impossibility of living authentically.  As the play closes, 
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the audience will come to understand that morphine addiction is ultimately not what has 
prevented Mary’s authentic existence; in point of fact, as Mary slips more deeply into her 
intoxication through the progression of the play, she becomes more self-aware, self-
affirming, and honest.  Intoxication, like the fog, reveals the true nature of reality instead 
of obscuring it.  At this point in the play, this is only suggested, however this theme will 
become clear as the play develops. 
 Mary’s frankness in interrupted by Jamie’s accusation.   As Edmund steps out 
onto the porch to hurry his father along, Jamie tells his mother that she is not fooling him; 
he knows what she has done.  Mary attempts to veil her intoxication, but Jamie tells her 
to look at her eyes in the mirror.  Based upon the dilation of her pupils, Jamie easily 
discerns that she has been using drugs, but she flatly denies it and when Edmund returns, 
she scolds Jamie for his accusations.  This scolding raises Edmund’s ire, and the brothers 
quarrel, diverting their direct attention away from Mary, though they are arguing about 
her.  Mary leaves the parlor before Tyrone enters, and he and his sons have a drink, 
though he has reservations about giving the ailing Edmund whiskey. When Mary returns 
and sees Edmund’s empty whiskey glass, she turns her frank accusation toward Tyrone 
and says, “You’re to blame, James.  How could you let him?  Do you want to kill him?  
Don’t you remember my father?  He wouldn’t stop after he was stricken. He said doctors 
were fools!  He thought, like you, that whiskey is a good tonic!”
20
  At this point in the 
act, it seems as if the effects of Mary’s morphine dose are weakening, because she is 
nearly immediately able to mask her terror and check her tone by adding, “But, of course, 
there’s no comparison at all.  I don’t know why I—forgive me for scolding you, James.  
One small drink won’t hurt Edmund. It might be good for him, if it gives him an 
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  Because of the lessening influence of the narcotic, Mary is better able to 
assume an Apollonian, calm demeanor, though as the scene closes, the audience observes 
her oscillate rapidly between this demeanor and one associated more closely with the 
Dionysian. As James realizes that Mary is under the influence and expresses his anger, 
she fluctuates from begging for his understanding and forgiveness to denying that she has 
any idea why she is being accused. 
 The second scene of Act II begins as the family is returning to the parlor after 
lunch.  Mary speaks dully about the poor quality of help that she has with the 
housekeeping, and she claims to look forward to James’ return to his performing season 
so that she can no longer concern herself with the difficulty of running the house.  
Though she is becoming more capable to sustain small talk without delving into the 
nature of her suffering, this speech leads her back to her claim that the New London 
house has never been a home for the Tyrones.  James attempts to point out that this house 
could have been a home had Mary not been mired in addiction, to which she replies, 
No, no. Whatever you mean, it isn’t true, dear.  It was never a home.  
You’ve always preferred the Club or a barroom.  And for me it’s always 
been as lonely as a dirty room in a one-night stand hotel.  In a real home 
one can never be lonely.  You forget I know from experience what a 




Again, Mary underscores the theme of isolation, but as she brings up her father’s home, 
she is drawn back to present familial concerns, and she expresses her worry that Edmund 
is not eating as he ought.  Mary’s concerns are interrupted by the ringing of the phone, 
and Tyrone takes the call.  He has a conversation with Doctor Hardy, the Tyrone family 
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doctor, in which the Doctor asks to meet with Edmund at four o’clock that afternoon. At 
the mention of Hardy, Mary again attacks her husband, 
Oh, we all realize why you like him, James!  Because he’s cheap!  But 
please don’t try to tell me! I know all about Doctor Hardy.  Heavens I 
ought to know after all these years.  He’s an ignorant fool!  There should 
be a law to keep men like him from practicing.  He hasn’t the slightest 
idea—When you’re in agony and half insane, he sits and holds your hand 
and delivers sermons on will power! 
 
Her mood intensifies, 
 
He deliberately humiliates you! He makes you beg and plead!  He treats 
you like a criminal! He understands nothing! And yet it was exactly the 
same type of cheap quack who first gave you the medicine—and you 
never knew until it was too late! I hate doctors! They’ll do anything to 
keep you coming to them.  They’ll sell their souls! What’s worse, they’ll 




Mary’s bluntly accurate attack on James’ cheapness, clearly fueled by the intoxicating 
effects of the morphine, leads her into a monologue that resonates with Nietzsche’s 
understanding of the tragic.  Mary finds herself prisoner in an intractable situation; she is 
both a prisoner of fate as well as her own actions.  Again, her intoxication allows her to 
gaze at the horror of existence; it is important to note that she is recognizes this existence 
as terrifying; she is not somehow overcoming her terror by acknowledging it.  However, 
in her inebriation, she does not attempt to sugar-coat the truth of her life: she is 
humiliated, addicted, and wrecked by the world. 
Mary regains control of herself and apologizes for her outburst.  She then informs 
her family that she needs to go upstairs to fix her hair—that is, if she can find her glasses.  
As the play moves forward, at Mary’s most intensely emotional moments, she will retreat 
upstairs, presumably to administer more morphine.  She obviously believes, as is the 
common assumption, that taking the drug will dull her senses to the concerns of life; 
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however, as she becomes more inebriated, the audience observes that her demeanor 
becomes more and more direct with her family, and her intoxication reveals many of the 
conflicts within the family that were hidden as the play began.  A similar phenomenon 
occurs as each of the Tyrone men become more and more intoxicated through their 
consumption of alcohol as the day progresses.  As the effects of the morphine are 
subsiding, Mary even apologizes to her husband for her bitterness.  She claims that James 
is not at fault for her current predicament, a fact which, under the influence of the truth-
telling drug, she will undoubtedly deny. 
As Mary goes upstairs, Jamie bitterly and ironically points out, “Another shot in 
the arm!”
24
  This apparently disrespectful statement provokes both Edmund and Tyrone, 
with the latter threatening to throw his eldest out “into the gutter” for his lack of “pity or 
decency.”  Again, Jamie’s Dionysiac truth-telling puts him at odds with the rest of the 
family, as Edmund and Tyrone wish to hold out hope that Mary may one day be cured.  
Interestingly, at this moment, Jamie reveals that he is not without pity for his mother, and 
he expresses empathy for his mother, “I understand what a hard game she’s up against—
which is more than you ever have.”
25
  Jamie recognizes that Mary’s condition is his own, 
trapped in addiction, under pressures beyond ability to conquer.  Edmund rebukes his 
brother’s cynicism, to which Jamie replies that he thought his brother shared such feeling, 
given the kind of poetry Edmund is fond of.  He refers to the bookcase, and Edmund’s 
“pet with an unpronounceable name.”  Edmund defends Nietzsche, saying “You don’t 
know anything about him.  You haven’t read him.”
26
  At the mention of Nietzsche’s 
name, Tyrone’s ire is raised, and he scolds his sons for abandoning their Christian faith, 
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“You’ve both flouted the faith you were born and brought up in—the one true faith of the 
Catholic Church—and your denial has brought nothing but self-destruction!”
27
  Edmund 
and Jamie both scoff at such a suggestion, and they point out Tyrone’s hypocrisy in 
practice and belief.  In practice, Tyrone has not been to Mass in years, and in belief, he 
admits that he has abandoned hope that Mary might ever recover from her addiction.  
Edmund points to the lack of efficacy of Tyrone’s prayers for his mother as Nietzsche 
does in Thus Spake Zarathustra, “Then Nietzsche must be right, ‘God is dead: of his pity 
for man hath God died’.”
28
  
 In the “Critical Backward Glance” Nietzsche writes fourteen years after the 
publication of The Birth of Tragedy of the “consistently cautious and hostile silence about 
Christianity—Christianity as the most excessive, elaborately figured development of the 
moral theme that humanity has ever had to listen to.”
29
 He writes that behind the 
Christian moral code there lies, “a hostility to life, a furious, vengeful enemy towards life 
itself…From the very outset Chirstianity was essentially and pervasively the feeling of 
disgust and weariness which life felt for life, a feeling which merely disguised, hid, and 
decked itself out in its belief in ‘another’ or ‘better’ life.”
30
  James’ prayers for his wife 
are a powerful illustration of such a hatred of life.  Instead of accepting the reality of 
Mary’s addiction, James has prayed and hoped that somehow she will be granted Divine 
aid in her efforts to overcome the hold morphine has over her life.  At this moment in Act 
II, Tyrone acknowledges, in part, the illusion of Christian religious belief, although he 
does not affirm his suffering as Nietzsche asserts the Overman would.  James’ problem, 
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conceived in terms of Birth of Tragedy, is not primarily that James is that religious, but 
that he places his hope in illusion instead of confronting the immediate reality of 
existence before him in the form of his wife’s addiction. 
 Edmund goes upstairs to get dressed for his afternoon appointment with Doctor 
Hardy, making sure to make a great deal of noise so that his mother will not accuse him 
of sneaking upstairs to spy on her.  When he is out earshot, Jamie asks his father what 
Doctor Hardy told him on the phone regarding Edmund’s condition.  Tyrone confirms 
Jamie’s suspicions of Edmund’s tuberculosis.  Tyrone informs Jamie that Edmund must 
be committed to a sanatorium for six months to a year, and he has high hopes that if 
Edmund follows the treatments he will be prescribed, he will make a full recovery.  Jamie 
points out that Edmund should be sent to a quality institution, and he warns his father not 
to be a cheapskate when selecting the treatment facility for Edmund.  Jamie fears that his 
father, because of his Irish acquaintance with the horrors of tuberculosis, will send Jamie 
to a second-rate facility.  He says, “What I’m afraid of is, with your Irish bogtrotter idea 
that consumption is fatal, you’ll figure it would be a waste of money to spend any more 
than you can help.”
31
  Again, Jamie sees his father for who is, cheap and Irish, and 
although Tyrone attempts to deny his son’s charges, it is clear that he does not believe 
Doc Hardy’s prediction that Edmund will recover.  This is underscored by the fact that he 
uses the phrase, “I have every hope Edmund will be cured.”
32
  Tyrone’s use of the term 
hope here is significant, as just moments before, when describing Mary’s condition, he 
had bluntly stated that he has lost all hope that she will recover.  Now, after declaring the 
futility of hope, he expresses his “hope” that his son will not die.  As if attempting to 
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avoid Jamie’s scrutiny on this point, Tyrone quickly attacks Jamie for insulting his 
homeland, and in doing so, he successfully dodges the attention the Dionysian Jamie 
would give to such a remark. Jamie does not pursue the point and informs his father that 
he will go with Edmund to his appointment to see Doc Hardy. 
 Mary returns to the parlor, still searching for her glasses, but her manner is more 
detached, and it will grow increasingly detached as the scene continues.  She looks out 
the window and remarks that the fog is returning.  Again, O’Neill is connecting the 
returning fog to the intoxication into which the family will sink as the night approaches.  
In nearly every line that Mary delivers, the reader detects an oscillation from Dionysian 
authenticity and Apollonian illusion.   For example, when Mary discovers that James has 
an appointment at the club, she states that he’ll be drunk that evening.  Tyrone denies that 
he is ever drunk, and instead of pressing the point, Mary says, “Don’t think that I’m 
finding fault, dear.  You must do as you please, I won’t mind.”
33
  When Mary asks him 
not to leave, James replies that it is she who is leaving them,  Mary ignores his 
implication and instead momentarily perpetuates an illusion by replying, “I? That’s a silly 
thing to say, James.  How could I leave?” but the morphine’s truth-speaking powers 
immediately engulf her, and she again harshly chides James’ cheapness as illustrated in 
his purchase of a second-hand car and his lack of desire to pay a “real” chauffer.  Again, 
the Apollonian breaks through in Mary’s dialogue, and she seems to momentarily extend 
understanding to her husband, 
You mustn’t be offended, dear.  I wasn’t offended when you gave me the 
automobile.  I knew you didn’t mean to humiliate me.  I knew that was 
the way you had to do everything.  I was grateful and touched.  I knew 
buying the car was a hard thing for you to do, and it proved how much 
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you loved me, in your way, especially when you couldn’t really believe it 




Again, by the end of this speech, the spirit of Dionysus, manifested in offering an 
unvarnished glimpse at the truth, appears again, and one can assume that the drugs in 
Mary system empower to offer such a glimpse.  At this, James begs his wife to stop 
taking morphine, if not for her own sake, for the sake of her sons.  Sensing his distress, 
Mary immediately adopts the calm of Apollo, denying that she knows what he is talking 
about, but merely for a moment as she puts her arms around her husband and says, 
James!  We’ve loved each other! We always will!  Let’s remember only 
that, and try not to understand what we cannot understand, or help things 
that cannot be helped—the things that life has done to us we cannot 
excuse or explain.
35
   
 
This line, reflecting a Dionysian sentiment, expresses a Nietzschian rejection of the 
traditional, received method of knowing another person through abstraction and 
explanation.  Instead, Dionysus, through the words of Mary, implores Tyrone to simply 
accept and affirm the suffering of this life.   At this point in the play, this is not an 
acceptable option for Tyrone, and he again implores her to stop.   Mary complains again 
of feeling alone, and she reflects upon how she never felt alone when she was in Catholic 
boarding school.  She reminds Tyrone that she lost that community after she married an 
actor, as the profession of acting carried with it a negative stigma because of the 
reputation many actors have as men of loose morals. 
 Tyrone encourages his wife not to dwell on past losses, and Mary informs him 
that she intends to drive into town to go to the drug store.  Though she claims that she 
only intend to collect tooth powder, toilet soap, and cold crème, James recognizes that 
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she is likely going to fill a prescription for morphine.  He bitterly encourages her to 
collect a good supply of the drug so that “we’ll never have another night like the one 
where you screamed for it, and ran out of the house in your nightdress half crazy, to try 
and throw yourself off the dock!”
36
 At mention of this incident, Mary cries out to her 
husband not to remember, as such memories are too painful to bear, but the power of 
Dionysus to illuminate pain is too strong for Mary to resist.  She reflects aloud about the 
birth of Edmund and how the intense pain of childbirth and later complications had 
compelled the doctor to prescribe morphine to give her relief.  Again, Tyrone implores 
her to forget the past, to which she replies, “Why?  How can I?  The past is the present, 
isn’t it?  It’s the future, too.  We all try to lie out of life but life won’t let us.”
37
  Here, 
Mary points out that temporality is an illusion, and that putting the past behind oneself is 
merely a lie perpetuated so that one might ignore the magnitude of the horror of 
existence.   She goes on to recall another painful past event, one that occurred before the 
birth of Edmund: the death of her second son, Eugene. She reveals to the audience that 
Eugene had contracted measles spread to him by the seven-year-old Jamie who, perhaps 
purposefully, went into the baby’s room.  The baby contracted the illness, and died soon 
afterward.  Because Mary felt guilty for allowing this to happen, she claims that she 
always felt as if she had another child, something terrible would happen.  She believes 
that Edmund’s affliction with consumption may be due to the fact that she has visited 
some sort of Divine curse upon him.  She rightly points out that Edmund has always been 
sickly and nervous, and she believes this to be her fault.  As she acknowledges her fear 
and guilt over the birth of Edmund, she regains control of her overflowing emotions and 
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once again adopts the calm façade of Apollo, stating that “Oh. I know it’s foolish to 
imagine dreadful things when there’s no reason for it.  After all, everyone gets colds and 
gets over them.”
38
          
 At this moment, Edmund enters from the front hall, dressed to go into town for 
his doctor’s visit.  He asks his father for cab fare, and James begins to lecture him about 
the value of a dollar, but as Tyrone looks at his son’s sick face, and instead of giving 
Edmund exact change for the cab, he is filled with guilt and generously gives his son a 
ten dollar bill.  This moment of genuine compassion is cut short by Tyrone once again 
quickly adopting a tone of sarcasm, however Edmund does not allow his father off the 
emotional hook.  Edmund is touched and genuinely thanks his father with an 
affectionate—albeit one-armed—embrace.  This moment is one of the few in the play 
where the audience finds itself privy to true Tyrone compassion, and this sense is quickly 
shattered as James hurries off to his meeting at the Club and Mary asks Edmund to come 
sit in the parlor with her.   
 Mary encourages Edmund not to travel into town and meet with Doctor Hardy, 
claiming that such a trip would not be good for him and that she will care for him 
throughout the afternoon.  Here she adopts the façade of the dutiful mother, attempting to 
dissuade Edmund from learning of the results of the doctor’s tests. By encouraging 
Edmund to avoid his meeting, she is encouraging him to continue living under the 
illusion that he merely has a summer cold and will recover in a few days.  Though neither 
Mary and Edmund have received confirmation of Edmund’s condition, they both suspect 
that he has consumption, and Mary’s attempt to get Edmund to stay with her through the 
afternoon is best explained as an Apollonian attempt to thwart the facts of reality.  In the 
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face of such an attempt, Edmund pleads with his mother to try to resist the pull of her 
addiction, but her ability to deny reality is getting stronger, presumably as the effects of 
the drugs subside as they did in the previous scene.  However, Mary does still oscillate 
between the Dionysian and Apollonian modes of expression.  On the one hand, she 
implicitly tells Edmund that his illness has caused her the stress that has driven her back 
to the narcotic, while on the other hand she attempts to assure him that she does place any 
blame upon him for her condition.  In a powerful monologue, Mary explains this some 
day, when Edmund is happy and healthy again, she will find the strength to defeat her 
addiction, 
some day when the Blessed Virgin forgives me and gives me back the 
faith in her love and pity I used to have in my convent days, and I can 
pray to her again—when She sees no one in the world can believe in me 
even for a moment any more, then She will believe in me, and with Her 
help it will be so easy.  I will hear myself scream with agony, and at the 




Nietzsche’s criticisms of Christianity ring powerfully in opposition to Mary’s words.  In 
this Apollonian mode, Mary is looking for an easy fix to her problems in the form of help 
from the Blessed Virgin.  She claims that at some point in the future, she will find 
redemption, and then her recovery will be effortless.  However the play in its entirety 
makes clear that no such relief will ever be available to Mary.  Even she dismisses such 
an idea almost immediately, telling Edmund—and herself—“Of course, you can’t believe 
that either.”
40
  On a Nietzschian view, if Mary is ever to recover, she must affirm and 
thereby master her suffering without aid from outside herself, even from the Divine.   
 As Edmund, Jamie, and their father leave the house, Mary finds herself alone in 
the parlor, and she delivers the following lines, “It’s so lonely here…You’re lying to 
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yourself again.  You wanted to get rid of them  Their contempt and disgust aren’t 
pleasant company.  You’re glad they’re gone…Then Mother of God, why do I feel so 
lonely?”
41
  Mary is, in this speech articulating an important and complex theme within 
the play.  In order for her to affirm life, Mary must do so by accepting the truth of reality, 
in this case this means accepting that bears responsibility for her addiction, but she 
cannot do this alone.  She needs the company of others, even—and perhaps especially—
if that company sees her with contempt and disgust.  It is only through this shared 
honesty that Mary will be enabled to stand bravely in the face of her suffering. 
 Act III begins at six in the evening, and O’Neill points out that the fog coming in 
from over the Sound is prematurely ushering in the dusk.  This fact will be evidenced to 
the audience by the pervasive and regular sound of the foghorn, warning approaching sea 
vessels of the dangers of the coast.  The presence of the fog is intentional, signifying not 
only Mary’s descent into narcotic intoxication, but the descent of the rest of the Tyrones 
into intoxication as well.  Throughout the final two acts, Mary will complain about the 
foghorn, but she is not merely complaining about the noise.  The foghorn seems to 
represent an Apollonian deception, a contraption devised to pierce the void of existence 
and provide safe and Socratic direction to port.  The ship’s captain can use the foghorn 
for direction and guidance through the fog of existence, and this may more or less safely 
direct him to shore, however ultimately the foghorn will provide no relief from the horror 
of the reality of suffering.  The captain who follows such direction and believes himself 
safe from a horrific fate is deluding himself, and the foghorn is the instrument of such a 
delusion.  For Mary, the sound of the foghorn is an Apollonian attempt to draw her away 
from the fog of her intoxication and to center her attention on the charade of human life.  
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As Cathleen babbles on in the opening of the scene about the chauffer Smythe, Mary says 
of the fog, “I really love fog…It hides from the world and the world from you.  You feel 
that everything is changed, and nothing is what it seemed to be.  No one can find you or 
touch you any more…It’s the foghorn that I hate.  It won’t let you alone.   It keeps 
reminding you, and warning you, and calling you back.”
42
 
 The audience discovers Mary and the servant Cathleen as the scene opens.  
Cathleen is visibly intoxicated, holding an empty whisky glass in her hand.  Mary also 
displays the signs of intoxication, as  
her eyes shine with unnatural brilliance.  The strange detachment in her 
manner has intensified.  She has hidden deeper within herself and found 
refuge and release in a dream where present reality is but an appearance 





O’Neill here accurately characterizes the Dionysiac impression of the Apollonian world.  
Mary finds herself almost entirely under the power of morphine, and this will enable her 
to see through the constructed reality of her family and pierce the deep mysteries of 
Being, insofar as those mysteries are revealed in her relationship to her family.  On fewer 
and fewer occasions throughout the final acts will Mary second guess or apologize for the 
words of Dionysus, and her presence increasingly points those around her to the central 
theme of Long Day’s Journey. 
 Cathleen and Mary have taken a trip into town where Mary has filled another 
prescription for morphine, and as a reward for her assistance, Mary has treated Cathleen 
to several drinks of her husband’s whiskey.   In her desperation for companionship, Mary 
reveals many details of her past to a servant girl, from her formative years in the convent, 
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to her marriage to James. Cathleen asks Mary why she had never been involved in 
theatrical performing like her husband, to which Mary replies, 
I’ve never felt at home in the theatre.  Even though Mr. Tyrone has made 
me go with him on all his tours, I’ve had little to do with the people in his 
company, or with anyone on the stage.  Not that I have anything against 
them.  They have always been kind to me, and I to them.  But I’ve never 




In order to appreciate the force of Mary’s sentiment, it is important to bear in mind the 
kind of theatrical performers Mary refers to here.  Here, Mary is likely not referring to 
“Method Actors,” theatrical performers who harness sophisticated psychological method 
to attempt to create a kind of “emotional truth” onstage for the audience.  Though such 
performance styles were developing in the American theatre during the time James was 
performing, it is likely, considering the fact that James Tyrone is based upon Eugene’s 
own father, that the players in Tyrone’s High Romantic matinee drama did not employ 
such methods.  Instead, their work would likely consist of melodramatic, presentational 
acting that would, by contemporary standards, be considered “hammy.”
45
  Such acting 
relied heavily on the creation of an illusion, and this is why Mary could never feel 
comfortable with people within James’ circle, people whose profession rested upon their 
ability to simulate and distract audiences from life.  As a Dionysian, Mary cannot feel at 
home in a group of people who perpetuate a fiction. 
 Mary then reveals to Cathleen that as a girl she had aspirations toward two 
professions: that of a nun, or of a concert pianist.  Both options, she claims, were taken 
from her when she married James.  According to Mary, the church gave her a sense of 
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belonging, and the piano gave her access to beauty.  The reader might recall that the full 
title of Nietzsche’s first work is The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music, and 
Nietzsche often portrays the spirit of Dionysus, the unifying god of intoxication, as the 
founder of instrumental music.  In Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche follows Schopenhauer’s 
story of the nature of such music as the “essence of nature (BT §2).”  In music, 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche contend that people are presented with the ground of being, 
and the understanding they derive from such an experience is unmediated by language 
and an authentic presentation of the world.
46
  It is consistent with Mary’s character as a 
Dionysian that she would desire interconnectedness with community as well as 
immediate access to the ground of being by way of music.  However, her infatuation with 
and eventual marriage to a man of the Apollonian arts took away her opportunity to live 
authentically in either mode of being; perhaps this is one reason Mary always reports 
feeling “homeless” and “lonely.” 
 Mary delivers a long monologue to Bridgett describing how she met James, 
concluding with the following lines of deception: 
Thirty-six years ago, but I can see it as clearly as if it were tonight!  
We’ve loved each other ever since.  And in all those thirty-six years there 
has never been a breath of scandal about him.  I mean with any other 
woman.  Never since he met me.  That has made me very happy, 




This statement to Cathleen demonstrates that once again the power of the morphine upon 
Mary’s mind is receding again, as she has mentioned earlier in the play a scandal that 
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James was involved in with another woman.
48
  Cathleen does not realize this, of course, 
not being privy to the earlier conversation, and she drunkenly asks to be released to go 
about her duties.  When she is gone, Mary delivers a short soliloquy that confirms she is 
feeling the return of her Apollonian capacity to cover the truth.  She reveals herself to be 
a woman involved in a Nietzschian conflict with herself.  Reflecting upon the beautiful 
memory she had just related to Cathleen, she says, “You’re a sentimental old fool.  What 
is so wonderful about that first meeting between a silly romantic schoolgirl and a matinee 
idol?  You were much happier before you knew he existed, in the Convent, when you 
used to pray to Blessed Virgin…If I could only find the faith I lost, so I could pray 
again.”  The Socratic hope of a better life expressed in the optimism of prayer emerges in 
Mary’s mind, and she attempts to say a “Hail Mary,” but she stops herself and the Spirit 
of Dionysus corrects her illusory hope: “You expect the Blessed Virgin to be fooled by a 
lying dope fiend reciting words!  You can’t hide from her!”
49
  Mary recognizes that she is 
at war within herself, and she jumps up to go administer more of the drug to silence the 
conflict.  She is interrupted by the arrival of Edmund and James, but had she been 
allowed to give herself another injection, it is clear she would have descended further into 
the world of Dionysian reality.  As a result, Mary’s dialogue with her family continues in 
the pattern of difficult oscillation from one extreme to the other, from Apollonian to 
Dionysian, from denial to confession. and from forgiveness to accusation. 
 As Edmund and James enter, it is clear that they have been drinking and, though 
they bear their alcohol well, they are perceptibly drunk.  This scene begins the family’s 
“journey into night,” as O’Neill begins to draw a contrast between two modes of 
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Dionysiac intoxication, Mary’s narcotic intoxication, which allows her only to see life as 
it is but does not enable her to affirm it, and the alcoholic intoxication of the Tyrone men, 
which not only presents the horrors of existence to those under its power, but allows them 
to understand their interconnectedness with others in the midst of such horror.  At sight of 
them, for a moment Mary adopts the role of dutiful wife and mother, expresses her 
gladness that they have returned home in time for dinner.  She is able to adopt this façade 
to such an extreme that she even pours Edmund a drink as an appetizer, despite her 
earlier outburst about the dangers of consumptive drinking and how drinking while 
afflicted with tuberculosis is what killed her father. 
 The men recognize that Mary’s cheerfulness is an act, and neither touches the 
drink that she has poured for them.  They simply stare as Mary slips into Dionysian voice 
again.   She remarks the Jamie will not likely be home for dinner, “so long as he has the 
price of a drink left.”
50
  This, according to Mary, is evidence that Jamie is lost to them, 
and has been so for a long time.  She then tells her husband, “But we mustn’t allow him 
to drag Edmund down with him, as he’s like to do.  He’s jealous because Edmund has 
always been the baby—just so he used to be of Eugene.  He’ll never be content till he 
makes Edmund as hopeless a failure as he is.”
51
  Edmund attempts to ignore his mother’s 
warning, however James chimes in and somewhat confirms what she is saying, “All the 
same there’s truth to your mother’s warning.  Beware of that brother of yours, or he’ll 
poison life for you with his damned sneering serpent’s tongue!”
52
 
Tyrone’s agreement with his wife on this truth, a truth that Jamie will admit to in Act IV, 
is evidence of the power of the Dionysiac urge rising within him as he becomes further 
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intoxicated.  More and more, James and his sons will be able to face the world for what it 
is as the night progresses, the fog thickens, and they continue to drink.  Edmund, not yet 
drunk enough to realize the reality his parents point to, dismisses his father’s warning as 
easily as he had his mother’s. 
 Mary again speaks hard truths to her husband and son, reminiscing about how 
Jamie and their second son were such happy babies, noting that she had allowed Eugene 
to “die through my neglect.”
53
  She detachedly outlines Jamie’s decline from promising 
and likable young student to a drunken waste, and she places the blame for this decline 
upon the shoulders of James, because he brought Jamie up “to be a boozer” by giving 
him teaspoonfuls of whiskey to calm him after nightmares as a child.  Tyrone protests 
that he should not be held responsible for Jamie’s current state of being, and Mary once 
again retreats to a tone of Apollonian understanding, denying that Tyrone is to blame, as 
his Irish upbringing did not prepare him to behave any better.  At this, Edmund 
encourages his father not to listen anymore to Mary’s narcotic accusations, and for the 
moment, Tyrone concedes.  Edmund drinks the whiskey Mary has poured for him, 
although it is unlikely that it adds substantially to their inebriation, as he notices how 
watered down it is.  In the bottle, Mary has replaced the drinks she gave to Cathleen with 
water, as Jamie did earlier in the day. 
 Mary seems to soften somewhat in the following dialogue with her husband, and 
it would seem that the power of the narcotics in her system is waning enough that she is 
able to present herself to him in affectionate, albeit less-than-truthful, terms.  She 
expresses her gratitude that James has chosen to come home, because “It’s very dreary 
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and sad to be here alone in the fog with the night falling.”
54
  Mary’s reference to the fog 
is paired here with her feeling of disconnectedness with other people.  Though her 
narcotic intoxication gives her access to the world as it is, in doing so, it isolates her from 
those for whom she ought to care.  However, for a moment, she finds herself able to 
sustain the illusion of Romantic love directed toward her husband.  She tells her husband 
that she knows he still loves her in spite of all that has happened; he assures her that she 
is correct.  As if to test that love, Mary’s Dionysiac tone returns, and she recalls that on 
their honeymoon, James had left her alone in the hotel room while he went to a bar and 
after hours of drinking had become so drunk that he had to be carried back to his room.  
Tyrone denies this ever happened, but there is a ring of truth to this claim that causes 
Edmund to cry out “with a look of accusing hate toward his father,”
55
 that it is no wonder 
things have turned out as they have.  Instead of pursuing his criticism of Tyrone, 
however, Edmund checks himself and attempts to change the subject. 
 Mary continues to reminisce aloud about her mother’s objections to her marrying 
James instead of becoming a nun.  Her mother claimed that she had been too spoiled by 
her father to ever make a good wife, and Mary asks her husband if she has in fact been a 
good wife.  Tyrone attempts to placate his wife and lies, “I’m not complaining, Mary.”
56
  
Mary acknowledges a “vague guilt” as she replies, “At least, I’ve loved you dearly, and 
done the best I could—under the circumstances.”
57
  Her capacity to deny the truth again 
evinces the decline of morphine in her system.  She continues to reflect on the beauty of 
her wedding gown, saying that she wished she had a daughter who might be able to use 
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it.  She wonders what she has done with, saying that someday she’ll take a look in the 
trunks in the attic to see if she might be able to find it. 
 Finally, James drinks the watered-down whiskey Mary had poured for him, and 
for a moment he believes that Mary has taken to alcohol in addition to drugs.  She quells 
his worries by pointing out that she had given Cathleen and Bridgett drinks in exchange 
for their efforts around the house.  Additionally, she reveals that Cathleen had helped her 
go into town and procure her prescriptions from the drug store.  Edmund responds to this 
by scolding his mother because Cathleen will tell everyone of the transaction.  His initial 
reaction is to shield his mother’s reputation, to maintain the illusion of the Tyrone family; 
this is ironic because earlier in the day he had showed little concern for the opinions of 
the families of “this hick berg.”  Edmund is not yet detached enough from the Apollonian 
world by way intoxication to lose his care for the value of false reputation. 
 James goes to collect a fresh bottle of liquor from the cellar, leaving Edmund and 
his mother alone.  Mary is successfully maintaining an Apollonian voice now, and she 
speaks amusedly about her husband’s miserliness, citing the fact that Tyrone’s father 
abandoned him and his family when James was a ten year old boy as a reason for his 
tight-fisted handling of money.   Edmund dismisses this, instead attempting to cajole his 
mother into asking about his doctor’s appointment.  Edmund is trying to get his mother to 
face the reality of his condition, but she refuses to hear him, as this will break the illusion 
of reality she has chosen to construct—for the moment. Edmund tells her that a specialist 
has been called in to verify his consumption, and that he will have to go away to a 
sanatorium, but she dismisses this as the machinations of Doctor Hardy.  She recalls the 
evening when, in a fit of withdrawal-induced madness fueled by Doc Hardy’s 
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“treatment,” she had attempted to commit suicide by throwing herself from the dock.  
Edmund describes this evening as the time when Mary’s addiction was first revealed to 
him by his family, and as his eyes fill with tears, he says, “God, it made everything in life 
seem rotten!”
58
  In earlier acts, Edmund might not have recalled this event so frankly, but 
under the influence of alcohol, he is beginning to face the truth of his own pain, and in his 
authenticity, he continues to try to make his mother understand the truth of his situation.   
   When Edmund insists to his mother that his condition requires convalescence, 
she flies into an angry speech of denial, accusing Hardy of trying to take her baby away 
simply to hurt her.  Edmund responds to the outburst by again drawing Mary’s attention 
to the fact that she has never seemed to care when he has gone away before, to which she 
bitterly replies, “I’m afraid you’re not very sensitive, after all.”
59
 In order to avoid the 
truth, Mary has attacked Edmund and hurt him deeply.   After attempting to no avail to 
get Mary to recognize the peril of his illness, Edmund bluntly states, “It’s pretty hard to 
take at times, having a dope fiend as a mother.”
60
  Mary winces as her son utters these 
lines, and for a moment the veil is torn away and she recognizes the truth of what 
Edmund’s loose, intoxicated tongue has revealed.  He immediately apologizes, and Mary 
quickly assumes the distracted air of the Apollonian, commenting on how lonely and sad 
the foghorn sounds.  Edmund has heard enough.  He leaves the house, telling his mother 
he does not want any dinner. 
 Tyrone returns with a new bottle of whiskey, and he asks where Edmund has 
gone.  Mary tells her husband that Edmund does not have any appetite for dinner, 
assuring herself that his “summer cold” is the explanation for this.  Suddenly, she can 
                                                     
58
 Ibid., 118. 
59
 Ibid. 119. 
60
 Ibid., 120. 
164 
 
maintain the illusion of Edmund’s condition no longer and cries out as she clutches her 
husband, “Oh, James, I’m so frightened!...I know he’s going to die!”
61
  Tyrone attempts 
to console his wife, who is honestly facing the horror of existence.  In her terror, she 
utters lines eerily reminiscent of Dionysus’ words to Silenmus, “…And it will be my 
fault.  I should never have borne him.  It would have been better for his sake.  I could 
never hurt him them.  He wouldn’t have had to know his mother was a dope fiend—and 
hate her!”
62
  Though James has an opportunity here to experience deep sorrow with his 
wife, as she is facing the terror of Edmund’s illness, he instead tells her to regain 
composure of herself, as Cathleen might witness her fit.  On cue, Cathleen enters and 
announces that dinner is served, and Mary immediately regains the Apollonian mastery 
of herself.  She excuses herself from dinner, explaining that her rheumatism is bothering 
her and that she is going to bed.  Tyrone knows that she is going upstairs to administer 
another injection of morphine, and he says that she will be “like a mad ghost before the 
night is over.”
63
  Of course, she denies that she knows what he is talking about.  Mary 
goes out of the parlor, and the curtain falls on Tyrone as a “sad, bewildered, broken old 
man.”
64
  What Tyrone has failed to realize is that he had an opportunity to help Mary face 
her fear.  She has honestly expressed her terror at the thought of Edmund’s consumption, 
and instead of affirming her pain, Tyrone told her to muster her dignity.  This rejection of 
her true impulse of fear has driven Mary back to morphine, where she mistakenly 
believes she will find solace.  The irony is that the deeper she sinks into intoxication, the 
more authentic and fearful she becomes. 
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 The final act takes place at around midnight.  Tyrone sits alone in the parlor, 
playing solitaire.  He is very drunk, and a half-empty whisky bottle sits on the table next 
to him, accompanied by another fresh bottle next to it.  Edmund enters, and because the 
house is almost completely dark, he crashes into the hat stand.  He is also visibly drunk.  
Edmund and his father quarrel about putting on the electric light; because of his thift, 
Tyrone refuses to turn on only the lights that are absolutely necessary.  Tyrone lectures 
his son on the “value of a dollar,” and the conversation eventually turns to the 
whereabouts of Jamie.  Both men know where he is, with a share of Edmund’s ten dollar 
bill, Jamie has gone down to the whore-house.  Tyrone pours a drink and invites Edmund 
to do the same.  Edmund pours a very large drink despite his father’s protests, and they 
drink. 
 In the haze of their intoxication, Edmund claims that he needed his walk home 
through the fog this evening.  His father scolds him, suggesting that he should have more 
sense than to walk all that way in the damp air given his condition.  Edmund responds, 
“To hell with sense!  We’re all crazy.  What do we want with sense?”
65
  The audience 
member attuned to Nietzsche’s Dionysian/Apollonian distinction will appreciate the 
significance of Edmund’s statement.  Edmund is dismissing the conventional Socratic 
wisdom that provides illusory comfort to those who follow “doctor’s orders.”  To 
emphasize this, Edmund quotes two stanzas from Dowson’s “Vitae Summa Brevis:” 
 “They are not long, the weeping and laughter, 
 Love and desire and hate: 
 I think they have no portion in us after 
 We pass the gate. 
 
 They are not long, the days of wine and roses: 
 Out of a misty dream 
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 Our path emerges for a while, then closes  




The message Edmund is delivering is clear.  The concerns of life, concerns as 
fundamental as health, weeping and laughter are ultimately transient and illusory.  The 
recitation of this poem leads Edmund to describe his walk in the fog in significantly 
Nietzschian terms: 
The fog was where I wanted to be.  Halfway down the path you can’t see 
this house.  You’d never know it was here.  Or any of the other places 
down the avenue.  I couldn’t see but a few feet ahead.  I didn’t meet a 
soul.  Everything looked and sounded unreal.  Nothing was what it is.  
That’s what I wanted—to be alone with myself in another world where 
truth is untrue and life can hide from itself.  Out beyond the harbor, where 
the road runs along the beach, I even lost the feeling of being on land. The 
fog and the sea seemed part of each other.  It was like walking on the 
bottom of the sea.  It felt damned peaceful to be nothing more than a ghost 
within a ghost…Don’t look at me as if I’d gone nutty.  I’m talking sense.  
Who wants to see life as it is, if they can help it?  It’s the three Gorgons in 
one.  You look in their faces and turn to stone.  Or it’s Pan.  You see him 





In Edmund’s description, he has married his intoxication with the fog, and the result is a 
glimpse at Being itself.  Orr describes Edmund’s walk in the fog as his experience of 
alienation from the world, drawing from Edmund’s rhetorical question, “Who wants to 
see life as it is, if they can help it?”
68
  However, if one takes into account the extent to 
which O’Neill has developed themes drawn from Birth of Tragedy, she understands that 
Edmund is not describing alienation at all, but unity with all that exists. Given this line of 
interpretation, when Edmund suggests that one would not want to see life as it is, he is 
referring to the Apollonian illusion of life instead of life at its most basic.  This is 
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confirmed when he identifies such a life as the “three Gorgons” who “turn one to stone,” 
a reproduction of the image of oneself.  In the fog, one loses her individuality, and 
according to a Nietzschian reading, comes to terms with all existence.  Edmund loses his 
sense of location and instead experiences the unity of all that is. 
 Tyrone dismisses Edmund’s vision of reality as poetic, but “damned morbid.”  He 
encourages his son to remember his Shakespeare for a clearer articulation of Dowson’s 
point, “We are such stuff as dreams are made on, and our little life is rounded with a 
sleep.”  Edmund sharply contrasts Tyrone’s “sentimental”
69
 Shakespearean statement 
with a sharp Dionysian one, “We are such stuff as manure is made on, so let’s drink up 
and forget about it.”
70
  While James is still rapt in an Apollonian illusion of life as 
expressed in the eloquence of the Bard, Edmund recognizes the horror of existence and 
finds intoxication as the appropriate mode of being in light of this.  James rebukes his son 
for his morbidity, saying that he should never have given him a drink.  Edmund replies by 
asking, “What’s wrong with being drunk?  It’s what we’re after, isn’t it? Let’s not kid 
each other, Papa.  Not tonight.  We know what we’re trying to forget.”
71
  His line here 
makes a distinct connection between intoxication and honesty.  Interestingly, Edmund 
assumes, as does Mary, that intoxication will enable him and his father to hide from the 
horror of existence, however the rest of the scene reveals that their drunkenness will take 
the blinders away, and they will be confronted in direct terms with the reality of their 
suffering. 
 Edmund’s theme of self-forgetting is again emphasized as he quotes a lengthy 
passage from Baudelaire’s prose poem commonly referred to as “Be Drunk,” 
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“Be always drunken, Nothing else matters:  that is the only question.  If 
you would not feel the horrible burden of Time weighing on your 
shoulders and crushing you to the earth, be drunken continually. 
Drunken with what? With wine, with poetry, or with virtue, as 
you will. But be drunken. 
 And if sometimes, on the stairs of a palace, or on the green side of 
a ditch, or in the dreary solitude of your own room, you should awaken 
and the drunkenness be half or wholly slipped away from you, ask of the 
wind, or of the wave, or of the star, or of the bird, or of the clock, or 
whatever flies, or sighs, or rocks, or sings, or speaks, ask what hour it is; 
and the wind, wave, star, bird, clock,  will answer you: ‘It is the hour to 
be drunken!  Be drunken, if you would not be martyred slaves of Time; 





James initial reaction to the piece is an attempt at humor, “I wouldn’t worry about the 
virtue part of it, if I were you!”  He quickly changes his tone, and condemns this piece as 
“more morbid nonsense,” however it is clear to him that there is something authentic 
about the sentiment it expresses, or at least, the beauty of its deliver.  He compliments his 
son’s delivery of the piece and inquires about the author, perhaps demonstrating that his 
intoxication is opening his mind to the truth of reality that Baudelaire expresses. 
 Edmund points out that Baudelaire has written about the pleasures of whore 
houses, pleasures that Jamie no doubt is indulging in as they speak.  He quotes from 
Baudelaire’s “Epilogue,” emphasizing the final stanza which states that, “Harlots 
and/Hunted have pleasures of their own to give,/The vulgar herd can never understand.”  
This reference to the debauchery of his firstborn causes James to cry out in disgust, 
“Morbid filth!  Where the hell do you get your taste in literature? Filth and despair and 
pessimism! Another atheist, I suppose!  When you deny God, you deny hope!”
73
   His 
Apollonian response to the “authentic” poetry his son has recited is typical, as James will 
be the last character to deny the illusions of life (in this case, those perpetuated by the 
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church) and affirm the true nature of existence.  Edmund continues despite his father’s 
reply, poking fun at Jamie for sleeping with fat whores and reciting Dowson to them, 
“kidding himself that he is superior and enjoys pleasures ‘the vulgar herd can never 
understand’!”
74
  In his drunken honesty, Edmund admits that he has done the same thing, 
comparing himself to Dowson.  He concludes his reflection by saying, “Poor Dowson!  
Booze and consumption got him.”
75
  Though he quickly changes the subject, Edmund has 
articulated his own fate; again, the power of the Dionysian spirit to reveal reality through 
intoxication has been manifested, but Edmund does not yet have the courage to face and 
affirm the reality of his own demise. 
 After a fruitless appeal to his son to disregard the Modernist writers he is so fond 
of in favor of Shakespeare, Tyrone and Edmund have another drink.  Under the power of 
liquor, it is James’ turn to face and affirm, in small part, the truth of Edmund’s condition.  
In a brief monologue, James reflects on the “ordinary” home that Mary grew up in.  He 
points out the hypocrisy of Mary’s criticisms of his drinking, in light of her father’s own 
alcoholism, “She condemns my drinking but she forgets his.  It’s true that he never 
touched a drop till he was forty, but after that he made up for lost time...Well, it finished 
him quick—that and the consumption—.”  Tyrone stops, realizing that he has breached 
the line of propriety, however Edmund does not attempt to change the subject, as he had 
before; instead, he sardonically points out, “We don’t seem to be able to avoid unpleasant 
topics, do we?”
76
 Though his father will again divert the conversation by inviting 
Edmund to play a game of cards, the audience is witnessing both men’s steady 
progression toward a state of honest, interdependent affirmation of their suffering. 
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 As the men absently play Casino, Tyrone continues to criticize the myth Mary has 
constructed of her happy past.  He discounts her promise as pianist as well as her desire 
to become a nun.  On this point, he remarks, “She was a bit of a rogue and a coquette, 
behind all her shyness and blushes. She was never made to renounce the world.  She was 
bursting with health and high spirits and the love of living.”
77
  Of course, Tyrone is 
recognizing that Mary’s authentic mode of existence is not suited for a world of 
abstraction, but that she has always been rooted in pleasures that the actual world offers.  
Edmund encourages  his father to play his hand in an attempt to change the subject.  
Tyrone explains that Mary’s recent relapse is due to her worry about Edmund’s 
condition, and he reminds his son to “remember she’s not responsible.  Once that cursed 
poison gets a hold on anyone—.”
78
  These words set Edmund off and he and his father 
finally have the argument that they have been avoiding throughout the entire play.  
Edmund blames his father for Mary’s addiction, asserting that if James had not employed 
such a cheap doctor to help her after his birth, she would never have been exposed to 
morphine.  Tyrone responds in his defense, claiming that he had been ignorant of the 
effects of morphine and that he had attempted to find the best doctor he could to help 
Mary recover.  Edmund refuses to believe his defense, and he further blames his father 
for her condition by asserting that Tyrone had left her to raise her children alone.  At this 
point, Tyrone loses complete control of his temper and blurts out, “Or for that matter, if 
you insist on judging things she says by what she says when she’s not in her right mind, 
if you hadn’t been born she’d never—.”
79
  He stops before finishing his sentence, but 
Edmund knows that what James has said rings true.  He concedes his father’s point, 
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admitting that he—through no fault of his own—bears some of the responsibility for his 
mother’s condition.  Though Tyrone attempts to take back his harsh words, both he and 
Edmund have faced an awful truth together, and Edmund seems to feel closer to his 
father somehow.  He says. “I’m like Mama. I can’t help liking you, in spite of 
everything.”
80
  Despite the fact that Edmund and his father have realized a horrible reality 
of his existence, they find themselves connected in kinship, as they are both culpable for 
Mary’s condition. 
 Now that the blinders are off, and the two drunk Tyrones are looking boldly at the 
horrors of existence, they examine another reality, one equally as horrific.  Tyrone 
attempts to comfort his son about his condition, assuring him that if he will follow the 
doctor’s orders, he will fully recover.  Instead of responding to his father’s Socratic 
optimism, Edmund looks into his father’s heart, “Don’t kid me. You don’t believe 
that…you think I’m going to die.”
81
  As evidence for this claim, Edmund points to the 
fact that his father is sending him away to the Hilltown Sanatorium, a publicly funded 
tuberculosis ward instead of a private institution. Edmund asserts that his father does not 
wish to waste the money for the private sanatorium because he has the Irish belief that 
consumption is fatal; he would rather send his son to a tax-funded hospital and cut his 
losses. Tyrone, of course, denies this assertion, but Edmund persists, working himself up 
into such a rage that he breaks into a fit of coughing.    The intensity of Edmund’s speech, 
coupled with the sound of his coughing, causes James to relent.   He tells Edmund that all 
he desires is for his son to be well, and that he will send Edmund anywhere he wishes to 
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go in order to recover.  James tells his son to have another drink, as a “bracer,” Edmund 
obeys, and they each have a large glass full of whiskey. 
 Tyrone is now drunkenly “loose-mouthed,” and he begins to tell his son about 
growing up in poverty, how his father had taken the family to America and then 
abandoned them to go back to Ireland and commit suicide.  As a ten year old boy, Tyrone 
took a job in a machine shop , working twelve hours a day for fifty cents a week.  It was 
in those days, he claims, that he had learned the value of a dollar.   After painting the 
bleak picture of his upbringing for his son, he reveals something to Edmund that he had 
never told anyone before because “tonight I’m so heartsick I feel at the end of everything, 
and what’s the use of fake pride and pretense.” 
82
  He confesses, 
That God-damned play I bought for a song and made such a great success 
in—a great money success—it ruined me with its promise of an easy 
fortune.  I didn’t want to do anything else, and by the time I woke up to 
the fact I’d become a slave to the damned thing and did try other plays 
too, it was too late.  They had identified me with that one part, and didn’t 
want me in anything else.  And they were right, too. I’d lost the great 
talent I once had through years of easy repetition, never learning a new 
part, never really working hard.  Thirty-five to forty thousand dollars net 




At one point in his early career, Tyrone claims that he had possessed such drive and 
talent that Edmund Booth, esteemed as one of the greatest American actors, had said of 
James’ Othello that “That young man is playing Othello better than I ever did!”
84
 
However, at the age of 27, he purchased the production rights to the play that would 
make him a matinee icon, and he has spent the rest of his career doing nothing but 
performing the same role.   In the lateness of the hour, exposed by an evening of 
drinking, James expresses his regret for chasing only money in his artistic career, “I don’t 
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know what the hell it was I wanted to buy.” He recognizes how inauthentic his career has 
been—how he had never actualized his true talent as an actor—and he tells Edmund, “I’d 
be willing to have no home in the poorhouse in my old age if I could look back now on 
having been the fine artist I might have been.”
 85
  James recognizes that his pursuit of an 
easy fortune has transformed him into an Apollonian, rote performer who might have 
been artistically significant had he not discovered his signature role.   
 In his honest revelation of himself, brought on by the power of strong drink, 
Tyrone has revealed something significant of himself to his son, and this boldness has 
once again bred produced kinship between the two.  Edmund says, “I’m glad you’ve told 
me this, Papa.  I know you a lot better now.”
86
  Father and youngest son are increasingly 
facing their demons, and instead of rapidly changing the subject to more pleasant topics 
in the interest of Apollonian distraction, they continue to face life as it is, though this act 
is only produced through violent and harsh Dionysian conflict. 
 The men hear Mary moving around upstairs, and Edmund pours himself another 
drink.  After Edmund consumes the whiskey, “his expression changes.  When he speaks 
it is as if he were deliberately giving away to drunkenness and seeking to hide behind a 
maudlin manner.”
87
  In an effort to give his father a window to his soul as Tyrone has 
given to him, Edmund then delivers his most famous speech of the play, 
You’ve just told me some high spots in your memories.  What to hear 
mine?  They’re all connected with the sea.  Here’s one.  When I was on 
the Squarehead trigger rigger, bound for Buenos Aires.  Full moon in the 
Trades.  The old hooker driving fourteen knots. I lay on the bowsprit, 
facing astern, with the water foaming into spume under me, the masts 
with every sail white in the moonlight, towering high above me.  I 
became drunk with the beauty and singing rhythm of it, and for a moment 
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I lost myself—actually lost my life.  I was so free!  I dissolved in the sea, 
became white sails and flying spray, became beauty and rhythm, became 
moonlight and the ship and the high dim-starred sky!  I belonged, without 
past or future, within your life, or the life of Man, to Life itself! To God, 
if you want to put it that way.  Then another time, on the American Line, 
when I was lookout in the crow’s nest in the dawn watch.  A calm sea, 
that time.  Only a lazy ground swell and slow drowsy roll of the ship.  
The passengers asleep and none of the crew in sight.  No sound of man.  
Black smoke pouring from the funnels behind and beneat me. Dreaming, 
not keeping lookout, feeling alone, and above, and apart, watching the 
dawn creep like a painted dream over the sky and sea which slept 
together.  Then the moment of ecstatic freedom came. The peace, the end 
of the quest, the last harbor, the joy of belonging to a fulfillment beyond 
men’s lousy, pitiful, greedy fears and hopes and dreams!  And several 
other times in my life, when I was swimming far out, or lying alone on a 
beach, I have had the same experience.  Behind the sun, the hot sand, 
green seaweed anchored to a rock, swaying the tide.  Like a saint’s vision 
of beatitude.  Like the veil of things as they seem drawn back by an 
unseen hand.  For a second you see—and seeing the secret, are the secret.  
For a second there is meaning! Then the hand lets the veil fall and you are 





Esther Olsen points out that this speech is very reminiscent of two passages in Thus 
Spake Zarathustra (Z III §15, IV §19), in which “he affirmed the joy of life in the 
moment and enunciated the doctrine of eternal recurrence.”
89
  Edmund claims to have 
briefly found meaning in those moments when he has lost himself in the rhythm of the 
sea.  He describes this state as one of drunkenness, beyond “men’s lousy, pitiful, greedy 
fears and hopes and dreams.”  Each of these pejoratives readily describes man’s 
Apollonian impulses, and in moments when Edmund loses himself in the sea, he sees his 
connection with all that exists; he realizes the illusion of individuation, and this 
realization provides momentary peace.  At the end of the speech, he remarks that he 
cannot sustain such peace, because of the power of the Apollonian world in his life, “As 
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it is, I will always be a stranger who never feels at home, who does not really want and is 
not really wanted, who can never belong, who must always be a little in love with 
death.”
90
  Edmund her describes the isolation that has resulted from Socratic optimism 
and false Apollonian calm.  In moments of Dionysian ecstasy, Edmund feels authentic 
inter-connectedness with the world; however, in his daily life, that kinship is taken from 
him through the false Apollonian coping mechanisms culture has developed to avoid the 
horror of reality. 
 After this revelation, Tyrone sees something authentic in his son, and he responds, 
“Yes, there’s the makings of a poet in you all right.”  At this point, however, Edmund 
finds himself bound by the forces of Apollo, at the limits of language, and he replies, 
The makings of a poet. No, I’m afraid I’m like the guy who is always 
panhandling for a smoke.  He hasn’t even got the makings.  He’s got only 
the habit.  I couldn’t touch what I tried to tell you just now.  I just 
stammered. That’s the best I’ll ever do.  I mean, If I live.  Well, it will be 





Edmund knows the immediate experience of Dionysian being, and though he has tried to 
put this experience into words, he cannot adequately describe it.  There is something 
familiar in this experience to Tyrone, and this is why he praises his son’s poetic prowess.  
Though James and Edmund have both revealed themselves to be sufferers and inflictors 
of suffering, they have come to terms with themselves—at least for the evening—and 
they have only been able to do so in concert with one another.  Though Jamie’s arrival 
breaks this moment of authentic, affirming kinship, the audience has been privy to an 
important moment in the lives of Edmund and his father. 
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 When Tyrone hears his firstborn arrive on the front steps, he goes out onto the 
porch t avoid confrontation with his drunken son.  Jamie enters the room, “as drunk as a 
fiddler’s bitch.”
92
  He quotes Kipling as he activates every electric light bulb in the house.  
In the brightness of electric illumination, he discovers the full bottle of whiskey on the 
table and pours himself a big drink, despite Edmund’s warning that in his current state of 
intoxication, it will “knock him stiff.”
93
   Edmund reaches to pour himself a glass, but 
Jamie momentarily stops him, saying, “Not while I’m around. Remember doctor’s orders.  
Maybe you don’t give a damn if you die, but I do.  My kid brother.  I love your guts, Kid. 
Everything else is gone. You’re all I’ve got left.”
94
  Jamie is assuming the role of the 
protective older brother; however this is merely a fictional ruse that will be shattered by 
the end of their conversation. 
 Jamie drunkenly sets off on a familiar theme, his father’s cheapness, saying 
“What a bastard to have for a father! Christ, if you put him in a book, nobody would 
believe it!” Edmund, still aware of his kinship with his father displayed in their previous 
conversation, defends Tyrone, “Oh, Papa’s all right, if you try to understand him—and 
keep your sense of humor.”
 95
  Jamie dismisses Edmund’s claim, saying that he will never 
again make the mistake of believing his father’s “old sob act.”  Jamie has another drink, 
hoping that this one will deliver him into unconsciousness.  Instead, he becomes even 
more loose-lipped, describing an encounter he has just had with Fat Violet, a prostitute at 
the brothel in town.  Violet was on the verge of being unemployed, because she was not 
popular with the customers, so out of pity, Jamie takes her upstairs for the price of two 
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dollars.  He qualifies his intentions toward Vi, “I like them fat, but not that fat.  All I 
wanted was a little heart-to-heart talk concerning the infinite sorrows of life.”
96
 However, 
Violet was offended by Jamie’s preference for talk over action, and she accused him of 
simply taking her upstairs as some kind of joke.  She broke into tears, and out of pity, 
Jamie slept with her.  He reflects on this act: 
This night has opened my eyes to a great career in store for me, my boy!  
I shall give the art of acting back to the performing seals, which are its 
most perfect expression.  By applying my natural God-given talents in 
their proper sphere, I shall attain the pinnacle of success!  I’ll be the lover 
of the fat women in Barnum and Bailey’s circus!...Pah!  Imagine me sunk 
to the fat girl in a hick town hooker shop! Me! Who made some of the 
best lookers on Broadway sit up and beg!...But you’re right. To hell with 
repining!  Fat Violet’s a good kid. Glad I stayed with her. Christian act.  




The general critical consensus on this passage is that Jamie sleeps with Fat Violet as an 
act of defilement toward his mother.  Törnqvist, for example, points out that Mary has 
complained throughout the opening act of the play that she has gotten too fat and that Fat 
Violet is too fat even for Jamie’s tastes.  Additionally, both Mary and Violet play the 
piano, but lately Violet has been too drunk to even do this.  Jamie connects morphine use 
and prostitution, saying that he could not imagine women other than prostitutes took 
dope.
98
  These facts, and several others, lead O’Neill commentators to conclude that 
Jamie’s relationship with Violet is an Oedipal attack on his mother.  Such readings 
certainly have significant merit, however on a Nietzschian interpretation such as the one 
suggested in this essay, there is a much more straightforward understanding of this act.  
Jamie’s drunkenness has diminished his preoccupation with appearance; he rightly sees 
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himself, in this state, as inter-connected with all beings, and in this state, he is able to 
give Fat Violet a brief opportunity to affirm her own existence.  Though Jamie knows he 
should be ashamed because he could certainly aim for a higher caliber lover, he easily 
dismisses these concerns because he realizes that such concerns are illusions pushed upon 
him by inauthentic, Apollonian tensions.  His momentary expression of disgust with his 
act with Fat Violet gives way to an affirmation of his own suffering.   
 Jamie’s willingness to directly face the horror of existence is displayed in his 
ensuing conflict with his brother.  Looking around for his mother, he asks, sneeringly, 
“Where’s the hophead?  Gone to sleep?”
99
  Edmund cannot bear this insult to his 
mother’s dignity, and he springs from his chair and strikes his brother on the cheek.  
Jamie rises from his chair to do battle, but he stops himself, realizing the severity of what 
he has just said, and admits, “Thanks kid, I certainly had that coming.  Don’t know what 
made me—booze talking.  You know me Kid.”  Again, Jamie has referred to his mother 
as she is, refusing to pull punches or assume some stance of illusion in order to skirt the 
horror of reality.  He is even willing to face the consequences of such speech without 
resistence.  He explains his bitterness toward Mary, “I suppose it’s because I feel so 
damned sunk.  Because this time Mama had me fooled.  I really believed she had it 
licked.  She thinks I always believe the worst, but this time I believed the best…I suppose 
I can’t forgive her—yet. It means so much.  I’d begun to hope, if she’d beaten the game, I 
could too.”  Here, Jamie expresses kinship with his mother.  Her suffering is his own, and 
though he sobs at this thought, he is facing the facts of reality, and he refuses to obscure 
his suffering. 
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 Jamie has another drink but does not allow Edmund to do the same.  Fully 
expressing himself in the voice of Dionysus, in the ensuing conversation Jamie confirms 
Mary and Tyrone’s earlier warning about his intentions toward Edmund.  Mary had 
previously described Jamie as never being content “until he makes Edmund as hopeless a 
failure as he is,” and now, since veil has been torn back through Jamie’s extreme 
intoxication, Jamie verifies his mother’s concern: 
You listen!  Did it on purpose to make a bum of you.  Or part of me did.  
A big part. That part that’s been dead so long. That hates life.  My putting 
you wise so you’d learn from my mistakes.  Believed that myself at 
times, but it’s a fake.  Made my mistakes look good.  Made getting drunk 
romantic. Made whores fascinating vampires instead of poor, stupid, 
diseased slobs they really are.  Made fun of work as a sucker’s game. 
Never wanted you to succeed and make me look even worse by 





Though Edmund dismisses this claim, it is clear that there is truth to what Jamie is 
saying.  In order to ensure the sabotage of Edmund’s life, Jamie sees himself as crafting a 
myth of a life of excess. Though he certainly may have inhibited his brother’s success in 
an Apollonian sense, he has enabled Edmund to see through the ruse of culture and 
provided him with the tools to authentically face the horror of existence.  Edmund will 
not be happy in such a life, but he is able to face it honestly under Jamie’s intoxicating 
influence.  Jamie gives Edmund frank, honest advice about the danger of facing such a 
world, “When you come back, look out for me.  I’ll be waiting to welcome you back with 
that ‘old pal’ stuff, and give you the glad hand, and at the first good chance I get stab you 
in the back.”
101
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 Jamie collapses onto the couch in a drunken stupor, and Tyrone returns to the 
room, counseling Edmund not to take heed of Jamie’s exaggerations.  Jamie wakes, and 
after scornfully making fun of father’s profession of acting, the men sit together at the 
table, waiting for Mary to go to bed so that they can do the same.  Mary then makes her 
first appearance in this act.  She enters the parlor dragging her wedding dress that she 
must have retrieved from a trunk in the attic.  She goes to the piano in the back parlor and 
begins to play one of Chopin’s waltzes in “a forgetful, stiff-fingered groping, as if an 
awkward schoolgirl were practicing for the first time.”
102
  By the power of the morphine 
in her system, Mary is completely removed from the reality of the parlor, and she speaks 
as a schoolgirl still in the convent.  She does not seem to recognize or acknowledge her 
family.  In a bitter, harsh tone, Jamie observes, “A Mad Scene. Enter Ophelia!”
103
  
Enraged by Jamie’s frank disrespect, Edmund strikes his brother again, and again, Jamie 
apologizes, “All right, Kid. Had it coming. But I told you how much I’d hoped.”
104
  He 
breaks into tears, and his father who had momentarily cheered Edmund’s response to his 
disrespect, finds himself feeling compassion for his son, begging him to stop. 
 Mary finishes playing and wonders aloud why her hands are so knotted.  She then 
comes into the parlor dragging her wedding gown.  James takes it from her to protect it, 
and Mary responds, “It’s a wedding gown…I found it in the attic hidden in the trunk.  
But I don’t know what I wanted it for. I’m going to be a nun—that is, if I can only 
find…what is it I am looking for?  I know it’s something I lost.”
105
  Realizing that Mary 
is rapt in her own past and wholly removed from reality, the Tyrones each pour 
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themselves a drink and sit at the table, listening to Mary’s final speech.  She complains 
about something that she had lost and needs terribly.  Edmund attempts to interrupt her to 
tell her that she has consumption, but she simply asks him not to touch her, telling him 
that she plans to become a nun.  Then, as the men listen and lift their glasses without 
drinking, Mary recalls, 
I had a talk with Mother Elizabeth.  She is so sweet and good. A saint on 
earth.  I love her dearly.  It may be sinful of me but I love her better than 
my own mother.  Because she always understands, even before you say a 
word.  Her kind blue eyes look right into your heart.  You can’t keep any 
secrets from her.  You couldn’t deceive her, even if you were mean 
enough to want to. ..All this time. I don’t think she was so understanding 
this time. I told her I wanted to be a nun. I explained how sure I was of 
my vocation, that I had prayed to the Blessed Virgin to make me sure, 
and to find me worthy.  I told Mother I had had a true vision when I was 
praying to the shrine of our Lady of Lourdes, on the little island in the 
lake. I said I knew, as surely as I knew I was kneeling there, that the 
Blessed Virgin had smiled and blessed me with her consent.  But Mother 
Elizabeth told me I must be more sure than that, even, that I must prove it 
wasn’t simply my imagination.  She said, if I was so sure, then I wouldn’t 
mind putting myself to a test by going home after I graduated, and living 
as other girls lived, going out to parties and dances and enjoying myself; 
and then if after a year or two I still felt sure, I could come back and see 
her and we would talk again….I never dreamed Holy Mother would give 
me such advice!  I was really shocked. I said, of course, I would do 
anything she suggested, but I knew it was simply a waste of time.  After I 
left her, I felt all mixed up, so I went to the shrine of the Blessed Virgin 
and found peace again because I knew she heard my prayer and would 
always love me and see no harm ever came to me so long as I never lose 
my faith in her…that was the winter of senior year.  Then in the spring 
something happened to me. Yes, I remember, I fell in love with James 




Mary has fully revealed herself.  The source of her suffering is her loss of faith.  Her 
relationship with James and subsequent addiction to narcotics had opened her eyes to the 
illusory nature of Christian belief, but as she lay it aside, she also lost the sense of peace, 
community, and happiness she felt while at the convent.  Though Dionysus has given 
                                                     
106
 Ibid., 175-176. 
182 
 
hear a clear, unmediated view of the horror of existence, she has lost the benefits of 
Apollonian illusion, chief among those benefits, the ability to experience joy.  Though 
Mary faces the world in her intoxicate haze, the intoxication she experiences is ultimately 
not of a sort that Nietzsche would describe as fully Dionysiac, because instead of drawing 
her into kinship with those around her, her morphine will isolate her from everyone who 
cares for her.  By contrast, the Tyrone men have come to terms with one another, 
stripping away their self-delusion before each other, and though they remain unhappy, 
they no longer attempt to hide behind Apollonian, plastic perceptions of themselves.  
They gaze collectively into the horror of existence, and in this act they find themselves 
depending upon one another.   
 
  5.3 Conclusion 
 Through a careful examination of the text of Long Day’s Journey into Night, I 
have demonstrated that the entire body of the play may best be understood in terms 
expressed in Nietzsche’s work, particularly Birth of Tragedy.  Through the exposition of 
the first act, the reader comes to understand that the reality displayed in the bright 
morning light of the Tyrone’s home veils a more horrible truth beneath the surface.  This 
truth is first suggested as Mary begins taking morphine through the second act, and it is 
expanded and further explored as the Tyrone men drink until drunk in the final two acts. 
 In their intoxication, the Tyrone’s blame and the men accept blame for the 
suffering they are inflicting as well as experiencing.  The men are able to come to terms 
with and affirm one another’s suffering, but they are only able to do so in kinship with 
the other men in the family.  Mary’s intoxicated, Dionysian gaze at reality does not yield 
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affirmation of self, however, because the morphine causes her to withdraw from her 
family.   She’s is experiencing the reality of existence, but she is not the sort of suffer 
who would welcome Nietzsche’s demon described in The Greatest Weight. 
 The reading developed in this chapter is intended as the first horn of my larger 
argument, one that endeavors to describe the pleasure audiences take from Long Day’s 
Journey into Night.   In this chapter I have developed what I believe to be the thematic 
message O’Neill intends to deliver to his audience, that one can only affirm one’s life in 
concert with others.  In the next chapter, I will utilize this data to build a resolution to the 
problem of negative emotion and Journey. In the earlier chapters of this essay, I have 
analyzed the text for clues with respect to the kinds of emotions he intends to elicit in the 
viewer’s response to the play  The problem presented in this project is primarily a 
problem of the language of emotions, but in order to provide a probabilistic resolution to 
the paradox, it was important to examine the message O’Neill wishes to deliver to his 




SYNTHESIS AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In the first three chapters of this study, I have offered good reasons to reject the claim that 
Long Day’s Journey into Night does not arouse significant negative emotional states in 
those who watch it in performance.  I have demonstrated that attempts to resolve the 
paradox of emotion posed by Journey by denying the negative affective power the play 
possesses ignore key features of the viewer’s experience of Journey in performance.  One 
might rightly point out that I have not yet offered a solution to the problem of negative 
emotion and Long Day’s Journey, and it is to this task I will now turn.  In the following 
chapter, I will attempt to synthesize the analysis done in chapters 1-3 with the 
interpretation of Journey I have presented in chapters 4 and 5.  To review, the Paradox of 
Journey has been formulated as follows, and a good solution should modify (2):  
1.People generally avoid situations that arose negative emotions, and pursue 
situations that arouse positive emotions. 
2.People have negative emotional responses to performances of Long Day’s 
Journey into Night. 
 3.People pursue performances of Long Day’s Journey into Night. 
  
This following synthesis will offer good reason to accept the formulation I will present of 
the second statement of the paradox of Long Day’s Journey into Night. 
 The critique I have offered in the first three chapters of this work has served a 
dual purpose: first, it ruled out a series of popular resolutions to the Paradox of tragedy as 
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they apply to Long Day’s Journey into Night, and secondly, these critiques established a 
set of criteria an appropriate solution to the problem ought to include.  Most generally, I 
have shown that a solution to the Paradox of Long Day’s Journey must account for the 
fact that audiences viewing the play experience significant and prolonged negative 
emotional states (sadness, anger, pity, etc.) when viewing the play.  Through my 
emotional analysis in chapter 3 of Long Day’s Journey, I have established that O’Neill 
intends viewers of the play commonly experience such emotions in response to the play, 
and if Journey is produced in a manner faithful to the text, it is likely that these negative 
emotional states are actualized in audience response.  Therefore, any formulation of the 
second step of the paradox must affirm that audiences watching performances of Journey 
standardly experience powerful negative emotional states. 
 More specifically, a reformulation of (2) ought to be compatible with the idea that 
audiences watching Long Day’s Journey into Night actually care about and feel empathy 
for the characters portrayed onstage. A key reason to reject the “better you than me” 
approach to resolving the paradox present in responses to Journey is that this approach 
denies that viewers care about the characters’ suffering as it is displayed for them.  It 
seems intuitively appropriate to assert that interested audiences care for and feel empathy 
toward the suffering Tyrone family, and I have suggested, based upon empirical data, that 
this empathy is actually heightened given the fictionality of the portrayal of this suffering.  
For these reasons, any potential reformulation of (2) must be compatible with the idea 




In addition to the empathy requirement, a solution to the problem at hand ought to 
take seriously people’s capacity to experience mixed emotional states of opposing 
valence.  One shortcoming of Hume’s theory of tragic enjoyment is that it consolidates 
affective positive and negative states into one enhanced experience of “pleasurepain.”  
Based upon current cognitive psychological understanding of how people experience 
emotional states, I have shown that this is an unnecessary move, and a precise 
reformulation of (2) ought to acknowledge that in response to Long Day’s Journey into 
Night, it is possible that people experience both intentional and distinguishable positive 
and negative emotional states as they respond to the play, perhaps even simultaneously. 
 The most significant worry I expressed about the “control” theory of tragic 
pleasure is that it does not address the heart of the paradox I have articulated.  I have 
framed the paradox of Long Day’s Journey into Night in terms of motivation. In other 
words, here I am most interested in what motivates audiences to willingly subject 
themselves to the negative emotional address of Journey when they would attempt to 
avoid such stimuli in their real lives.  Control theories, even if they successfully 
characterize one’s experience of tragedy, do not provide an adequate motivational answer 
to this question.  Therefore, in addition to considerations of mixed emotions, legitimate 
care, and powerful negative emotional states, an appropriate resolution to the emotional 
problem posed by the play must provide some reason people pursue performances of the 
play.  That reason has to account for how tragedy generally (and Journey specifically) 
offers a unique emotional experience that audience members cannot typically obtain in 
real-world negative affective experiences. 
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 My thematic analysis of Long Day’s Journey into Night has offered the final 
consideration by which to test a solution to the emotional problem presented by the play.  
An accurate resolution to the paradox should take seriously the cognitive address and 
message O’Neill delivers in Journey in conjunction with the emotional effect the play 
elicits.  It seems reasonable that one draft her formulation of (2) with reference to the 
overall theme of the play, and I intend to show how a Nietzschian reading of the play 
inspires a resolution to the problem of Journey. 
 With these conditions established, I will now turn my attention to two other 
candidate formulations of (2).  These approaches differ from those presented in chapters 
1-3 in that they accept that tragedy evokes powerful negative emotional responses, but 
they attempt to resolve the problem by clarifying what one means when she claims to 
“enjoy” tragedy.  Both the “rich-experience” theory and the “meta-response” theory I will 
discuss seem to meet the minimal acceptable criteria I have established above (provided 
they are slightly modified to take into consideration the specific thematic data offered in 
relation to Journey), but I will ultimately show that an improved “meta-response” theory 
provides the most coherent account of what goes on when people willingly subject 
themselves to performances of Long Day’s Journey into Night and report enjoyment of 
that experience. 
 
6.2 Rich Experience 
After careful consideration, one might examine her responses to tragedy and recognize 
that perhaps she is mistaken when she characterizes her experience of a play like Long 
Day’s Journey into Night as “enjoyable.”  At the heart of the Paradox of tragedy is the 
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strangeness of such a characterization.  Alex Neill, taking seriously this recognition, 
approaches the paradox of tragedy by denying that consumers of painful art experience 
pleasurable responses at all. Instead, Neill proposes what some have referred to as a “rich 
experience” theory. Neill believes that the force of the paradox of tragedy lies in a 
misconception about what we derive from tragedy. He writes: “denying that the 
responses in question are characteristically pleasurable seems to me to be a very plausible 
way of addressing the paradox of tragedy; the idea that we commonly enjoy or take 
pleasure in seeing Oedipus or Gloucester stumbling around with their eyes out is after all 
somewhat peculiar.”
1
 According to Neill, people do not derive positive emotional affect 
from the consumption of tragedy, but they do value such experiences as important. When 
someone claims to “enjoy” Long Day’s Journey into Night, she is expressing the fact that 
she thinks the experience valuable, not that she experiences a pleasant emotional state 
when watching it.  If one were to try to appropriate such an approach in this context as a 
formulation of (2), such a formulation would appear as follows: 
Revised Statement of PoT: Though people experience significant negative 
emotions in response to performances of Long Day’s Journey into Night, they 
experience such emotions as part of a “rich experience,” an experience they 
value as significant and meaningful. 
 
In the context of the problem at hand, this statement of (2) offers a potentially powerful 
and plausible reconciliation. After all, it does seem somewhat strange for me to say that I 
actually enjoy watching Mary’s intoxicated trance or the fact that the Tyrones constantly 
harangue one another in the cruelest manner possible. Perhaps I am mistaken then, when 
I characterize my experience of watching the play in terms of positive feelings.  The fact 
that I value the experience of watching Long Day’s Journey into Night need not be 
                                                     
1
 Alex Neill, “On a Paradox of the Heart,” Philosophical Studies 65 (1992), 61. 
189 
 
characterized in simple, Humean, hedonic terms. When I say, “I enjoyed that 
performance of Journey,” on Neill’s view, I am saying that I found the performance 
meaningful, not that I actually experience anything resembling joy or hope (on the whole) 
as a result of my consumption of the play. 
 The rich experience theory generally seems to comport with the criteria I have 
established throughout this essay as requirements for (2), as I will defend below, though I 
find the rich experience theory somewhat implausible (for reasons I shall describe later) 
and costly.  Nevertheless, a defender of Neill’s rich experience solution to the problem of 
emotion posed by Long Day’s Journey into Night can sustain her theory in the face of the 
challenges I have posed for any such solution.  The rich experience theory provides a 
depiction of the negative address of the play, allowing for significant viewer empathy 
while potentially remaining uncommitted to the reality/non-reality of mixed emotional 
states.  Perhaps most powerfully, Neill’s theory provides a good motivational account 
that squares with the viewer’s understanding of the Nietzschian tone and theme of the 
play, provided one adopts a “cognitivist” view of the value of literature, as I will describe 
below. 
 Negative Address: Neill’s theory is built upon the reality of powerful negative 
emotional responses to tragedy, and if one uses his theory to describe audience response 
to Long Day’s Journey into Night, she is able to easily account for such responses.  
Unlike “control” or “conversion” theories, the rich-experience theory affirms our 
immediate intuitions about our reception to the play: Long Day’s Journey into Night 
makes us feel badly—perhaps very badly—and the rich experience theory does not 
compel us to deny those feelings.   Additionally, Neill accepts, perhaps prima facie, that 
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viewers can care deeply about the characters within a tragedy, and this is precisely why 
negative emotional states are aroused when we observe the struggles the Tyrones face.
2
   
Nothing in Neill’s iteration of (2) complicates the reality of our negative emotional 
responses to the play, as he affirms their existence and accepts their significant power 
over the viewer’s experience of tragedy.  Appropriated for our purposes, this component 
of Neill’s theory makes his approach the most likely candidate we have thus far 
encountered as a solution to the problem posed by Journey. 
 Mixed Emotions:  Neill’s own view of whether or not viewers experience 
simultaneous emotions of opposing valences in their response to tragedy is unclear at 
best, but it is likely that he does not believe these mixed emotional states are possible.
3
  
For example, Neill asserts that “it would be odd coming out a particularly harrowing 
performance of Death of a Salesman or King Lear to hear one’s companion exclaim ‘I really 
enjoyed that!’ or ‘that was fun!’,” apparently denying that anything resembling positive 
emotional states occur in the viewer’s response to Miller’s tragedy to King Lear.
4
 To 
complicate this position, though, in his discussion of the Paradox of Horror (a slightly 
different, but related problem) Neill does seem to admit that he feels mixed emotions 
when viewing tragedy.  He writes, “I wouldn’t take much pleasure in a performance of 
Lear (or of Schubert) that didn’t evoke these so-called ‘negative’ responses in me; at least 
part, and a central part, of the pleasure they give seems to be intrinsically related to the 
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fact that they do evoke such responses,”
5
 Contextually, however, he writes this to present 
the paradox as forcefully as possible, merely reflecting our intuitions on the subject, but 
not his final position. By the end of “On a Paradox of the Heart,” Neill has rejected the 
notion that tragedy is pleasurable at all, thus resolving the paradox.  It seems fair to 
characterize Neill’s theory of tragic emotions as constrained by the belief that viewers of 
tragedy only experience one emotional state at a time, and that on the whole, these 
emotional states are negative. 
 This denial would seem to count against the rich experience theory as a candidate 
reformulation of (2), as I have established in my criticism of Humean conversion theory 
that mixed emotional states are possible and likely responses to the events and characters 
of Long Day’s Journey. This is not a damning feature of the theory, however, for one 
who holds to the rich experience theory could easily nuance the view espoused by Neill, 
accepting the possibility of mixed emotional affective states, but merely denying that 
these states occur when audiences view Long Day’s Journey into Night. The rich 
experience theorist might rightly point out that none of the cognitive science that suggests 
that people can experience mixed emotions in reference to aesthetic stimuli have not 
demonstrated that this occurs when one watches theatrical tragedy.  The rich experience 
theory does not explicitly deny that mixed emotions are possible, just that this is not what 
is going on when one views tragedy.  Again, the rich experience theorist is only claiming 
that people are using inaccurate language when they claim to “enjoy” Long Day’s 
Journey; people are merely inaccurately expressing that they value the experience of 
watching the play, not that they derive positive affect from it.      
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 Motivation: On its face, the rich experience theory provides an easy answer to 
why audiences might pursue the negative emotional states that are aroused by Long 
Day’s Journey into Night: people watch the play because it gives them an experience they 
value as significant and meaningful.  Again, to be precise, this theory asserts that when 
we claim to “enjoy” Journey, we are informally expressing that we find the experience 
desirable, not that it produces positive qualia in our field of experience.  It is a mistake to 
claim that we derive positive affect from the play.   
One might complain, however, that the “rich experience” I have been describing 
is an ill-defined term, because it is unclear what makes such an experience rewarding if it 
is not hedonically satisfying.  It is to this concern I now turn.  The rich experience theory, 
at least in Neill’s iteration of it, seems to assert that something unique is gained from the 
consumption of tragedy, something that one cannot gain from other experiences in life.  
What exactly is the “rich experience” Neill refers to? Unfortunately, Neill has not 
elaborated on this claim, though Aaron Smuts and Paul Bloom have offered a 
contribution to this discussion that is worth considering. 
Smuts describes his conception of “rich experience” as follows: 
I argue that the motive for seeking out painful art is complex, but what 
we desire from such art is to have experiences on the cheap—not life 
experience on the cheap, as one theory puts it, but experiences of strong 
emotional reactions.  Art safely provides us the opportunity to have rich 
emotional experiences that are either impossible, or far too risky to have 
in our daily lives.  We can feel fear without risking our lives, pity without 
seeing our loved ones suffer, thrills without risk of going to jail, and a 
variety of other experiences that come with unwelcome pitfalls.  Outside 
of art, it is almost impossible to have many of these kinds of experiences 
without completely wrecking our lives—murdering our loved ones, 




                                                     
6
 Aaron Smuts, “The Paradox of Painful Art,” Journal of Aesthetics Education 41:3 (Fall 2007), 74. 
193 
 
This seems compelling on its face, but the reader might wonder how putatively negative 
art is able to accomplish in a way that other “thrill seeking” activities do not.  What is the 
difference between one’s experience of negative emotional states while watching evening 
news reports that elicit strong negative affective states and those one experiences when 
she watches Long Day’s Journey? Cognitive psychologist Paul Bloom offers a potentially 
helpful distinction between “real world” thrills and those one obtains when she views 
tragedy.  He suggests that there are three features of narrative art that compel attention 
more forcefully than narratives of actual events.  He asserts that fictional characters are 
generally more interesting than those in the real world, and “their adventures are usually 
much more interesting.”  Secondly, in the words of Clive James, “fiction is life with the 
dull bits left out.”  In other words, the events depicted in fiction are intensified because in 
the real world, “there are long spans where nothing much happens.  However, in fictional 
worlds, these boring bits are consolidated, so that each event is full of energy.”  Bloom’s 
last assertion is that in narrative, the technology utilized by the artist allows the audience 
to connect with the characters portrayed in ways more intimate than those available in 
real life.  In the case of a play like Long Day’s Journey into Night, the reader is able to 
glimpse into the minds of those characters portrayed (for example, through Mary’s 
soliloquy at the end of Act III) and understand the characters’ motivation and desires 
clearly; in the real world one rarely obtains such a glimpse of others mental lives.
7
      
 Bloom’s criteria suggest why people find narrative art compelling, and he uses 
this backdrop to defend a motivational account for the consumption of tragedy similar to 
Smuts.  When considering the paradox of tragedy, Bloom asks the reader to consider why 
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people “play fight.”  He asks, “Why do children get pleasure
8
 from grappling and 
punching and knocking each other down?  It’s not just the desire to exercise one’s 
muscles; if it were, they would do push-ups or sit-ups instead. It’s not sadism or 
masochism.  The pleasure is in the fighting, not the hurting and being hurt.”
9
  Bloom 
continues by answering that play is “safe practice.”  In the real world, when one involves 
herself in combat, she is bound to be injured, perhaps seriously.  When one engages in 
such play, she is able to practice her combat skills without the negative consequences—
namely injury or death.  Bloom argues that people pursue negative emotional states 
elicited by works of art because it allows them to cultivate coping skills for the negative 
emotional states they will likely experience in the real world.  On Bloom’s view, people 
are interested by tragedy because it enables them to fully explore and experience 
emotional states that can be otherwise messy in the real world.  Because of the clarity 
offered in tragedy through the careful construction of plot, character, setting, etc., the 
viewer can cultivate psychic fortitude, and he asserts that tragedy is an evolutionary 
product similar to the wrestling performed by young homo sapiens and lion cubs alike.  
Though Bloom’s account might be somewhat problematic for the “rich experience” 
theorist because Bloom seems to assert that tragedy gives pleasure (and thereby offering 
no help with the paradox of tragedy), a rich experience advocate could likely adopt an 
account like Bloom’s to explain what motivates people to view a play like Journey 
though they may not “enjoy” the experience. 
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 The Nietzschian Theme of Journey:  Those readers uncomfortable with the 
reductive nature of the evolutionary account of motivation presented above have another 
option available to them that allows them to retain a rich-experience style solution to the 
paradox of emotion and Long Day’s Journey into Night.
10
  Instead of a kind of an 
emotional “safe practice” that creates a rich experience for the viewer, perhaps the appeal 
of the play has little to do with the negative emotions one experiences while viewing it.  
Instead, perhaps the play is valuable to viewer because of the sophisticated and important 
Nietzschian theme I have argued is present in the play.  It is conceivable and consistent 
with the evidence to assert that when people find performances of Journey desirable, they 
do so because of the lesson they learn while viewing the play—namely, that an 
affirmative attitude toward life’s suffering can only be achieved in community with 
others.   
 One might refer to this sort of rich experience as a cognitive experience.  By using 
the term cognitive, I refer to something akin to the view of literature that asserts that 
literature “at its best is a form of understanding and, as such, though it differs greatly in 
other respects, is to be accorded the same evaluative status as a science, a status which its 
undoubted capacity to entertain and give us pleasure could not justify.”
11
  Such a view of 
literature generally is a controversial one, but essentially those who hold this view claim 
that literature is valuable because it teaches the reader something about the world that she 
could not learn through other means.  In the scenario at hand, one might argue that people 
value Long Day’s Journey into Night because they see a Nietzschian message of life-
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affirmation in community embodied uniquely in the interactions of the Tyrone family.  
One might claim that the experience of the play is a rich one because the audience 
member can see that a Nietzschian flourishing life is a livable reality in the face of (or 
because of!) immense hardship and suffering. 
 Even though the play elicits negative emotional states, one might argue that this 
cognitive understanding makes the experience of the play valuable to the audience wholly 
without eliciting positive emotions.  People are attracted to the play because of the 
embodied lesson it teaches.  Even if a cognitive view of literature as a whole is ultimately 
unsuccessful, it does seem conceivable to assert that in the case of Journey, there is a 
lesson that it is teaching, and one could not be significantly faulted for valuing her 
experience of the play based upon the lesson that she has learned.  This lesson does not 
necessarily produce positive emotional states, but it is valuable to the viewer nonetheless.   
 Based upon its satisfactory answers to the challenges of negative address, mixed 
emotions, motivations, and the thematic problem, one might readily and coherently 
embrace the solution offered by Neill and those of his persuasion.  Though I believe there 
is a better candidate solution the problem, it would be wholly appropriate for one to 
accept a rich experience solution here, provided she is willing to accept the cost of 
abandoning the idea of tragic pleasure.  
I find that rich experience-styled solution comes at too high a price, however. 
People often characterize their experience of negative literature in terms of enjoyment, 
and Neill would require them to deny this characterization. He repeatedly asserts that it 
would be strange to hear someone exit the theatre claiming to “enjoy” Death of a 
Salesman or King Lear, but would that really be such a strange experience? I contend that 
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it would not be strange at all, and that people often characterize their experience of 
tragedy in exactly those terms. 
Even if one were to grant that people do not generally leave the theatre 
immediately after Death of Salesman or Long Day’s Journey reporting that they had 
enjoyed the experience, does it seem unlikely they would never characterize their feelings 
in that way.  One might easily imagine a couple of theatregoers sitting in a café the 
morning after attending such a play, reflecting on the experience, and it is certainly 
conceivable that each might remark, “that was fun!”  Rich experience theorists would 
correct their assertions, insisting that the theatregoers did not have fun; instead the couple 
had witnessed something important, akin to a presidential inauguration and that their 
lives had been changed as a result.  Might not the incredulous couple reply, “Perhaps, but 
we had a really good time”? 
Further complicating such a solution is a well-established tenet of behavioral 
psychology. In the essay, “Choice and the Relative Pleasure of Consequences,” Barbara 
Mellers concludes her survey of the scientific literature on hedonism’s role in motivation 
by stating that “Anticipated pleasure is the critical determinant of choice” as it has 
“stronger predictive power than standard utility constructs."
12
 According to behavioral 
psychologists, potential pleasure and pain, though not the only motivators, are the best 
indicators of what choice we will make in our daily lives. I would argue that this is 
further heightened in the context of the consumption of tragedy, particularly 
performances of Journey, as we are under no obligation to consume such performances at 
all. If a choice does not provide people with potential positive emotional reward, they are 
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very unlikely to pursue it. For a rich experience approach to be palatable, one would have 
to offer an account of why people’s motivation toward “rich experience” of Journey is 
different than other choices they make in our lives, and how this motivation would 
supersedes their general desire to pursue pleasure and avoid pain.  Bloom and Neill’s 
description of “rich experience” is a good start, but these frameworks present the 
consumption of a play like Journey as some sort of obligation, akin to brushing one’s 
teeth or safely preparing oneself for the psychic consequences of loss, and they do not 
seem to provide a justifying reason one might violate the pleasure/pain principle Mellers 
(and virtually all cognitive psychologists working in the area) defend.  Even in his 
discussion of the paradox of tragedy, Neill seems to do little more than appeal to intuition 
on this point, and he does not address the almost overwhelming evidence from the 
science of human behavior that calls his approach into question. We choose whether or 
not to view art, and the positive emotion that we will receive from that viewing is an 
important component of our choice.  Which is more likely, that people view Long Day’s 
Journey because it is good for them, or that they like it?   
6.3 Meta-Response 
The last significant theory I will discuss in my .essay can be found in Susan Feagin’s 
essay “The Pleasures of Tragedy.” Feagin’s approach affirms the reality of negative 
affective emotional responses to tragedy, but unlike rich experience theory, Feagin’s 
“meta-response” theory also affirms the reality of positive affective states in response to 
tragedy. Feagin argues that when we experience negative emotions as a result of art, we 
are compensated with a “meta-response” that we might label as positive.  Initially, as we 
observe the suffering of the tragic hero, we experience negative emotional states—fear, 
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pity, and the like—but we also experience a meta-response, an emotional response to our 
direct response.  To put Feagin’s theory into the vernacular of philosophy of emotion, 
when exposed to negative art, one experiences negative emotional states directed 
intentionally at the horror depicted, but the viewer experiences a second-order response 
directed toward the first order response.  This “meta-response” has positive qualia.    She 
claims that viewers enjoy tragedy because they recognize that they are the kinds of 
people who are shocked by such suffering, and this realization is pleasing. Thus, 
audiences are motivated to pursue that pleasure. 
As evidence that such mixed emotional experiences are possible, she points to 
accessibly similar experiences in everyday life:   
For example, the remains of a spectacular car crash may titillate our 
curiosity, and we may feel disgusted with ourselves for being so morbid.  
On the other hand, we may enjoy the enticements of hawkers outside of 
seamy strip joints, and be pleased with ourselves for having overcome 
our puritanical upbringing…It should be noted that in ordinary as well as 
aesthetic contexts the two kinds of responses cannot be distinguished 
merely by what words we use to describe them.  ‘Pleasure,’ ‘shock,’ 
‘melancholy,’ and ‘delight’ may all describe direct or meta-responses, 
and the two are not always clearly distinguishable from each other.  A 
blush of embarrassment may be intensified by embarrassment over the 
blush.  The two things being distinguished cannot be infallibly 
distinguished, and that there are unclear cases of how and even whether 





Though these emotional states may seem difficult to parse with the aid of experience and 
introspection alone, Feagin (writing during the height of the popularity of cognitivism of 
emotion) believes that these emotional states can be rationally plumbed and described 
utilizing the methods of analytic philosophy of emotion. 
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Feagin argues that though second order meta-responses occur all the time in daily 
life, she insists that there is a unique emotional response available in the experience of 
negative art.  She writes, “The pleasure from giving vent to one’s pent-up feelings of 
anger, frustration, or sadness is different from the pleasure of being aware of the fact that 
you are the kind of person who feels those emotions in response to particular situations as 
represented in tragic works of art.”
14
  Because the negative emotional states aroused in 
tragedy do not have real-world consequence, the viewer is in a unique position to 
appreciate her capacity for being horrified or saddened, and this vantage point is what 
provides the occasion for the second-order, pleasant emotional response. 
  To sum up, according to Feagin, the initial response to the suffering depicted in 
art is shock and horror, but the viewer experiences a pleasure in the fact that she feels 
compassion and sympathy for the sufferer.  The worse things get for the sufferer, the 
more the viewer is horrified initially and gratified by her negative response to the 
horror.  Feagin argues that people who enjoy tragedy in art find pleasant the fact that they 
are horrified by things that should, morally, horrify them.  When we observes painful 
aesthetic representation, our shock reminds us that we “care for the welfare of human 
beings and that we deplore the immoral forces that defeat them.”
15
 The meta-response is 
a kind of self-congratulation of a viewer’s own moral sensibilities, and this self-
congratulatory “pleasure” is what she pursues when she views putatively painful 
art.  This framework navigates the paradox by appealing to a moral sense that the horrors 
of tragedy arouse, and it seems to provide a plausible solution to this problem.  In the 
current context Feagin’s framework offers a revision of (2) as follows: 
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Revised Statement of PoT: Though people experience negative 
emotions in response to Long Day’s Journey into Night, they receive a 
compensatory “meta-response” of self-congratulation that is 
pleasurable.   
 
The meta-response theory best satisfies the criteria I have laid out earlier in this chapter, 
provided one noticeably alter the second half of (2).  Below I will describe how each of 
these criteria is met by the meta-response approach, and I will offer a slightly altered 
version of (2) as follows: 
Revised Statement of PoT: Though people experience negative emotions in 
response to performances of Long Day’s Journey into Night, they receive a 
compensatory, Dionysian “meta-response” directed toward the community 
created during the performance. 
 
This iteration of the meta-response theory satisfies the criteria of legitimate pain, mixed 
emotion, motivation, and thematic content that I have established throughout this essay, 
as I will describe below.  
 Negative Address:  The meta-response theory that Feagin has proposed as well as 
my modification of it does not even get off the ground if one denies that Long Day’s 
Journey into Night produces significant negative affective states.  This is because one 
cannot obtain a positive meta-response without first experiencing a negative direct 
emotional response.  On Feagin’s solution, the meta-response of self-congratulation can 
only conceivably occur if the subject first experiences the appropriate negative emotional 
states in response to the play for which she can congratulate herself.  Similarly, on my 
revision of (2), the communal satisfaction one receives when watching a performance of 
Journey can only be achieved if negative emotional responses are significant for the 
viewer (I will elaborate on my revision later).  Because negative emotional reaction to 
tragedy figures so prominently in the meta-response theory, this theory should be a 
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serious candidate as I have established fairly conclusively that negative emotional 
responses to Journey are intended and likely elicited by the play during performance.       
 Mixed Emotions:  The meta-response theory again seems to be the best theory 
because it not only allows for the possibility of mixed emotional states, it is built upon 
the reality of such affective responses.  Feagin does not attempt to deny that one can 
experience both “pleasure” and “pain” simultaneously, and she even identifies the objects 
of such states.   Negative direct responses have the negative representation of action as 
their objects, while the positive meta-responses are intentionally directed at these 
negative responses within the context of the play. 
 Feagin admits that these emotional states may be difficult to separate, but this 
does not count against their divisibility, as has been demonstrated in chapter one of the 
essay in the discussion of Hume’s conversion theory.   A powerful method for rendering 
the paradox of Journey intelligible to is to accept the intuition that one experiences both 
positive and negative emotional states in response to Journey, and as in its description of 
the negative address of the play, the meta-response theory does not hedge its bets on the 
reality of such experiences. Instead, meta-response is predicated on such a reality.  
 Motivation:   The rich experience theory suggested that there was something 
unique to be gained by pursuing Journey (and tragedy generally), and the meta-response 
theory agrees with such a claim.  Feagin’s discussion of the uniqueness of tragic 
experience provides an important insight into why people pursue such experiences in art, 
but avoid those experiences in the real world.  In actual, real-world scenarios involving 
the witness of events that arouse negative emotion, the subject does not have the 
opportunity to evaluate her response and congratulate herself for possessing the moral 
203 
 
sensibilities appropriate to the harrowing circumstances she witnesses.  It would seem 
strange for one to witness a fatal car accident and afterward praise herself for the negative 
emotional response she displayed as a result of the event.  Tragedy, on the other hand, 
puts one in the position to evaluate the propriety of such responses, and Feagin would 
argue that this affirmative evaluation provides a unique positive emotional response that 
audiences are justified to pursue.     
The Nietzschian Theme: Feagin’s meta-response theory is difficult to square 
with what seems to be the central theme of Long Day’s Journey into Night. A key 
component of the pleasure derived from tragedy is the moral evaluation of the horror of 
suffering.  It would be difficult to congratulate oneself for being appropriately sad or 
angered at the fate of the protagonist if one had no sense that there was something 
objectively bad about suffering.  Yet I have argued that one of Nietzsche’s chief 
contentions throughout his writing on tragedy (and life itself) is that suffering is a reality 
that is beyond good and evil.  O’Neill seems to accept this depiction of life’s suffering, as 
he offers no escape for the Tyrones and no relief from the suffering for the audience.  
There is a strong sense in which it seems difficult to sustain the idea the play is enjoyable 
at all, and it seems incoherent to claim that Journey places the viewer in an evaluative 
moral position where she can recognize that suffering is terrible and congratulate herself 
for being empathetic. As I have shown in chapter 3, O’Neill constructs the play in many 
instances to disable the viewer’s capacity for empathy toward the characters in the play.  
In one instant, O’Neill will compel compassion for one of the Tyrones, and then 
immediately that character will go on the offensive, arousing disgust and likely erasing 
that compassionate feeling. On a Nietzschian view, sustained throughout Long Day’s 
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Journey into Night, suffering simply exists, and the best thing to do is bear up under it, 
or, as Silenmus’ wisdom imparts, “to die soon.”  Feagin’s theory assumes a moral 
position that is not sustained by the text of Journey or O’Neill’s Nietzschian heritage.  It 
is unlikely that the meta-response theory as Feagin has presented it can provide an 
adequate account of the enjoyment of Journey.    
What I would like to suggest, however, is that the meta-response theory not be 
jettisoned so hastily.  Perhaps such an approach, as it has a good deal of explanatory 
power, might be adjusted somewhat to provide a more satisfying account.  Interestingly 
enough, Nietzsche himself seems to defend a sort of meta-response theory, and though 
his account is not fully fleshed out, Nietzsche’s story of tragic pleasure may offer a 
compelling modification that will salvage a meta-response styled formulation of (2).  In 
The Birth of Tragedy, Friedrich Nietzsche offers a solution to the paradox of tragedy 
which serves as a starting point for my own thesis.  Nietzsche writes that during the tragic 
event, “We are really for brief moments Primordial Being itself, and feel its indomitable 
desire for being and joy in existence...In spite of fear and pity, we are happy living 
beings, not as individuals, but as the one living being, with whose procreative joy we are 
blended (BT 17).”  Here Nietzsche describes both the problem and a solution to the 
paradox.  During the play, viewers experience fear and pity, but they are compensated 
with a hedonic emotional state whose intentional object is the “oneness” of all living 
things.  In a moment (that only tragedy can adequately provide), individuality is stripped 
away, those participating find themselves in connection with others around them, and this 
experience is pleasurable.  If one were to attempt to describe this phenomenon in terms 
similar to Feagin’s, she might argue that the direct response of pity and fear brings about 
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pleasure in the fact that the viewer experiences solidarity with other viewers who have 
the same experience.   
One might rightly complain that the idea of “Primordial Being” or “the oneness of 
all living things” is far too esoteric a concept to fit within any sort of rigorous analysis of 
the emotional address of a play like Long Day’s Journey into Night, but perhaps there is a 
simpler and more precise way to understand the object of positive emotional states one 
might obtain in response to performances of the play.  Though it is likely that many 
readers will reject Nietzschian metaphysics, perhaps looking at Nietzsche’s claim here 
more modestly might be helpful.  I contend that Nietzsche here is loosely describing a 
phenomenon with which the reader has immediate experience.   
To elaborate on the idea of “oneness” Nietzsche describes, perhaps it would be 
valuable to examine the phenomenon of theatrical performance generally.   After all, 
when one leaves a performance of Long Day’s Journey into Night claiming to have 
enjoyed it, she does not seem to be claiming to have enjoyed all the negative depictions 
that likely aroused negative emotional states.  Instead, she claims to have enjoyed the 
event of the performance.  The object of her positive affective state is the performance.  
This assertion does not seem to resolve the problem, but only perhaps moves back one 
level.  How can one enjoy performances of negative acts?  One might characterize a 
public hanging as a sort of performance, but such an event ought not be “enjoyable.”  
How then can a theatrical performance that elicits similar emotional responses be 
sensibly regarded as such? 
The key, of course, is the distinction one ought to draw between the concepts 
“theatrical performance” and other sorts of “performance.”  David Osipovich has teased 
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out this difference very effectively for our purposes, though much of his discussion of 
what counts as theatrical performance is intended to undermine definitions of theatrical 
performance that argue it is merely an interpretation of a play.  Osipovich defends the 
following definition of theatrical performance:  
A theatrical performance is a particular kind of interaction between 
performers and observers (actors and audience members) in a shared 
physical space.  A necessary component of this interaction is that the 
performers pretend that the interaction is something other than what it 




What makes Osipovich’s definition unique among others (for example, the definition 
Woodruff defends in The Necessity of Theatre)
17
 is the priority Osipovich places upon the 
imaginative component of the performance.  It is vital on Osipovich’s definition that the 
audience recognizes the element of make-believe within the performance.  This make-
believe can be seen as a collaborative effort with the actors to suspend disbelief and allow 
oneself to be affected by the actions portrayed onstage.  Additionally, in theatrical 
performance “audiences and performers have to contend with each other in a way not 
available to audiences and performers in either film or live television.  Each affects the 
other and is affected by the other.”
18
 This unique collaborative element of theatrical 
performance helps bolster the account of tragic enjoyment that I present here. 
 Perhaps the “oneness” Nietzsche speaks of as a positive feeling in his discussion 
of the paradox of tragedy might be understood in terms of imaginative collaboration. 
When an audience member is negatively moved by Long Day’s Journey into Night, she is 
responding imaginatively to the actors portraying the negative events, collaboratively 
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allowing herself to be affected, and I contend that this response to the negative events 
portrayed in the context of communal effort between performers and the audience 
produces positive emotional states.  The pleasure of Journey is not, as Feagin argued, 
derived from a sense of one’s capacity for correct moral evaluation; instead, perhaps she 
better characterizes this experience when she writes that tragedy “reduces one’s sense of 
aloneness in the world, and sooths, psychologically, the pain of solipsism.”
19
  Such 
language seems to directly refer to the Nietzschian sense of “oneness,” but again, this 
need not be viewed as some sort of metaphysical contention.  Instead, it is a fair 
characterization, provided Osipovich’s definition of theatrical performance reflects the 
reality of the concept, to assert that people take pleasure in operating collaboratively with 
others. 
 My modification of the “meta-response” theory in light of the Nietzschian theme 
of the play provides what I view as a palatable solution to the Paradox of Long Day’s 
Journey into Night.  An added feature of this solution is that is closely resembles what I 
have argued to be the central theme of the play—namely that a positive disposal toward 
life only occurs in collaboration with others.  In performances of Journey, if the audience 
experiences enjoyment, it is because they agree to work in a kind of temporary 
community, contending with one another and allowing what is presented to them to 
negatively affect them.  This emotional vulnerability enables the viewer to experience 
community, and she is able to fairly characterize her experience in positive emotional 
terms because of that momentary sense of collaborative effort. 
6.4 Conclusion 
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As my earlier assessment has led me to conclude that theories of tragic pleasure which 
deny negative emotional responses, I turned in this chapter to an examination of two 
theories which affirm the reality of such responses.  I then subjected each theory to the 
conditions I have established as components for any acceptable resolution to the paradox.  
I examined “rich experience” theories that deny the reality of positive emotional 
responses to tragedy.  I put such theories to the test and determined that generally, they 
do provide a coherent account of an audience’s experience of Long Day’s Journey into 
Night,   I argued that such approaches are costly, and there is some evidence from 
cognitive psychology that compels the reader to look for a better alternative. 
 I next turned to the “meta-response” theory of tragic emotion proposed by Susan 
Feagin.  I argued that the meta-response theory is a powerful resolution to the problem of 
Journey, and in most respects, Feagin’s solution meets most of the conditions needed to 
satisfy the demands posed by the paradox.  I then augmented Feagin’s resolution by 
making reference to a theory of tragic emotion posed by Friedrich Nietzsche , and I 
demonstrated that such a meta-response theory is the most sturdy resolution to the 
problem of Long Day’s Journey in performance.  I argued that people pursue 
performances of Journey because, though they experience significant negative emotional 
states in response to the play, they are compensated by a positive meta-response directed 




Utilizing a generally Socratic method, I have examined the philosophical problem 
presented by the positive reception of Long Day’s Journey into Night.  In chapter one, I 
examined a group of theories that attempt to resolve the paradox by denying that plays 
such as Journey elicit significant negative emotional responses, and I found each of these 
approaches lacking in certain key respects.  The “Better You than Me” Theory, finding its 
inspiration in pre-Socratic pessimism about human nature, asserts that people are merely 
secret sadists who enjoy watching others in pain, and this is why people pursue plays 
such as Journey.  I pointed out that there is good reason to reject such a claim, drawing 
from intuitive and psychological evidence that makes clear empathic responses are 
central to the viewer’s experience of tragedy, and that we do feel delight that Edmund 
“got what was coming to him.”  Instead, our feelings about Edmund are much more 
complicated, a mix of empathic pity and fear. 
 Farther along in chapter one, I examined Hume’s own “conversion” theory, 
namely that when suffering is artfully presented in tragedy, the aesthetic beauty of the 
representation transforms the negative emotion one experiences into an amplified 
pleasure.  I criticized Hume’s reductive model of human motivation, the idea that the 
only motivators for human effort are pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain. I pointed 
out that most philosophers find Hume’s account incomplete because he does not establish 
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some sort of mechanism for the conversion of pain to pleasure.  Perhaps the most 
damning critique of Hume’s account is the evidence drawn from philosophy as well as 
cognitive psychology that it is possible that people can experience emotions of opposing 
valences simultaneously, rendering Hume’s account wholly superfluous.  For these 
reasons, the reader is wise to reject a Humean solution to the paradox of Long Day’s 
Journey. 
 To conclude chapter one, I then turned to another intuitively promising theory, the 
“control” theory of tragic enjoyment.  Control theories suggest that one can enjoy tragedy 
because the negative emotions aroused are not significantly powerful in the context of 
aesthetic experience.  Because one has significant control over how tragedy is consumed, 
she is able to enjoy the experience.  I demonstrated that Morreall’s criteria for control 
were fundamentally misguided and perhaps internally incoherent.  Even more troubling 
for control-based theories is the fact that they have no answer for the motivational 
component of the paradox. Such theories provide no reason why an audience member 
would willingly subject herself to tragedy, even if one grants that they correctly 
characterize one’s experience of tragedy. 
 In chapters two and three, I turned my attention to a refutation of the claim that 
while people may experience negative emotional states while watching Journey, on the 
whole they experience positive emotional states because of some sense of resolution that 
they derive from the play.  I defended a method of emotional analysis proposed by Nöel 
Carroll that I then utilized in the next chapter to carefully evaluate the emotional address 
of Long Day’s Journey into Night.  This evaluation disconfirmed the claim that O’Neill 
intends the audience derive some sense of emotional resolution from the play, and if the 
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play is produced faithfully, it is unlikely that a sense of emotional resolution would be 
obtained by the audience. 
 After determining that this family of theories does not coherently characterize 
one’s appraisal of Journey, I turned my attention to a thematic analysis of the play, as I 
believe that any localized solution to the paradox of tragedy must take into account the 
nature and message of the artifact that it seeks to describe. In chapter four, I established 
the link between O’Neill’s work and that of Friedrich Nietzsche, and I claimed that 
though the late O’Neill may have abandoned Neitzsche’s Zarathustrian teachings about 
individuality, there is good reason to believe that O’Neill agreed with the early 
Nietzsche’s theory of communal life-affirmation in tragedy.  In chapter five, I 
demonstrated that this is a central thematic element present in Long Day’s Journey 
through careful close reading.  The message O’Neill intends to deliver is that suffering is 
inevitable, and the proper attitude to is to affirm such suffering.  This affirmation cannot 
be achieved in isolation, however, but only through connection with other sufferers. 
 After establishing the theme of the play, in chapter six, I turned my attention back 
to the paradox of negative emotion presented by Long Day’s Journey.  Using the 
conditions established in my critique of the earlier theories of tragic pleasure, I presented 
two possible candidate theories, the “rich experience” and “meta-response” theories.  
Both of these approaches affirm that audiences experience powerful negative emotions in 
response to works of art such as Journey, but they differ in that rich experience theory 
denies that viewers experience pleasure as well, while meta-response theories accept the 
reality of such positive emotional responses.  I demonstrated how both theories might be 
modified slightly to provide coherent accounts describing an audience’s response to 
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Journey, but I presented several objections to rich experience theory that seem to make it 
less plausible than meta-response theory.  Finally, I defended a modified version of Susan 
Feagin’s meta-response theory, integrating the Nietzschian theme of Journey as a 
contributing component of the resolution.  I argued that the theory that best accounts for 
the positive reception one has to the play is one that accepts that though audiences 
experience significant negative emotional states as a result of Long Day’s Journey into 
Night, they are compensated with a positive “meta-response” directed toward the 
community created during the performance. 
 The reader might complain that there is insufficient evidence drawn from 
cognitive psychology to support my final formulation of the second step of the paradox.  
This is a worry that I am sensitive to, and as I continue in this area of research, I plan to 
empirically test this claim.  Such a research program can only begin, however, by 
eliminating other possible resolutions to the problem presented here, and this essay has 
demonstrated that if the paradox of Long Day’s Journey into Night is considered in light 
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